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European Culture, European Identity

Frank R. Pfetsch argues that Europe's cultural diversity would be best served by a federal political system

Culture is the missing subject in the European discourse; and Europe's lack of identity is a widely felt deficit in the European Union. One of the promoters and founders of the European integration process, Jean Monnet, allegedly confessed at the end of his life that 'if I had known, I would have begun with culture' (*si j'avais su, j'aurais commencé par la culture*). One should perhaps not take this at face value. Nevertheless, the process of building a European identity has a great deal to do with culture. The cultural dimension of the European project has become an important issue in the debate. The missing European *demos* and the lack of a European identity have to be linked to something other than the market economy and the political institutions of the European Union (EU); they must be bound to the domain of European culture, values and consciousness. Culture is the heart and content of politics: it determines the value system of a polity; and culture is an important element of identity.

In contrast to national identity, European identity has some particular characteristics:

* European identity is a dynamic process, not a given state of affairs; European identity does not exist at present – it is a vision, or a goal to be reached.

* European identity is intentional in the

sense that it is a vision of something that should or could exist in the future; the nation-state is the past, Europe is the future.


* Traces of European identity can be found in the past, but it is primarily with the institutional novelty of *supra-nationalism* that the vision of a European identity has become a realistic option.

* European identity is nourished by different internal and external sources. Internally, Europe has a long history both of common enterprise and of rivalry. Externally, Europe has found its identity only in opposition to the outside world. It follows that European identity can only be a shared or even a residual category. Each individual has multiple affiliations and they differ in intensity, space, and time.

Four factors can foster a

European identity: a) common values and common heritage; b) complementary cultures; c) common institutions; and d) a common foreign policy.

Common values and heritage. Europe's cultural, political, and intellectual elites have always been linked with each other. Europe was the cradle of individual liberty, of the norms of international law, of the idea of democracy, of human rights, of enlightenment. Europe also stands for the ideas of progress, tolerance, development, of the entrepreneur, and of



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invention. These are the positive aspects of Europe's heritage. There are the negative aspects, too; and in the past European philosophers were to a large extent Eurocentric. This heritage informs today's attitudes to the extent that it is brought to the attention of contemporary Europeans.

Complementary cultures can be regarded as enriching the *condition humaine*. It was in this sense that the term 'culture' was understood in the Age of

Enlightenment. This can only happen if the differences between cultures are seen as complementary, not exclusive. If differences are overemphasized diversities in cultures, ethnicities, religion, and so on can be instrumentalized politically to promote discrimination. Only if diversity is accommodated within a decentralized political framework can it be a uniting force.

The *common institutions* (the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, among others) have acquired a weight of their own and can, thus, promote the common European spirit. EU functionaries' dedication to the European cause facilitates decision-making, gives the European project a dynamic momentum, and ensures that there is continuity in policy over time.

The *common foreign and security* policy can only indirectly reinforce identity; it is more an expression of elite consensus than a source of identity. In addition, the capitalist market economy is, by its nature, a transnational force: it does not stop at the borders of nation states or of the EU and so does not contribute to identity formation. However, with the creation of the Euro as the EU's monetary unit, and as the EU competes with other regional bodies (the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, for example), so the economy can also help create a sense of 'Europeanness'.

What political forms would reflect the cultural diversity of European peoples? A

	Economic model <i>Adam Smith</i>	Cultural model <i>J. J. Rousseau</i> <i>J. G. Herder</i>	Federal Model <i>Federalists, Montesquieu</i>
Entities	global, regional free space	cultural boundaries, bounded space	different levels: - national; subnational; local
Borders/ boundaries	no economic borders inside and outside the national state	borders marked by cultural indicators: language, religion, ethnicity	local and subnational borders marked by cultural, ethnic, etc criteria
Mobility	high across borders	low with other entities	high on local, medium on subnational level
Actors	private, economic actors	cultural elite	state and private actors
Social characteristics	individualistic, atomistic, market society, 'Gesellschaft', <i>demos</i> without <i>ethnos</i>	communitarian, 'Gemeinschaft', civic spirit strong. <i>ethnos</i> = <i>demos</i>	Communitarian <i>and</i> individualistic, 'Gesellschaft' <i>and</i> 'Gemeinschaft', civic society, <i>demos</i> and <i>ethnos</i>
Political characteristics	weak political institutions, institutions state as a frame for economic activities, low loyalty to the state	framework for identity, educational functions, frame for cultural activities, high loyalty to small and/ or homogeneous entities	differentiated institutions on various levels, loyalty distri- buted amongst the levels
Culture	heterogeneous	homogeneous	heterogeneous and homogeneous

political framework for Europe should be informed by the following recommendations and considerations.

* There should be a set of common institutions headed by a figure in whose person the unity of these institutions is expressed, above all towards the outside world: a 'Mr Europe' or 'Mrs Europe'. The President of the Commission and the newly installed Permanent Representative of the Foreign and Security Policy are in this mould.

* The member states must agree on a principle of redistribution: subsidiarity, as it is called in the Maastricht Treaty. This basic pillar of federalism was coined in Catholic social doctrine (*Quadragesimo anno*, 1931) and played an important role in the European federalist movement in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Subsidiarity means that, if a lower political entity cannot fulfill a specific task, the next higher entity should assume responsibility for it. Competences should be distributed according to the capacities of each level (local, regional, national, international).

* European unity, it should be noted, is also a feature of non-governmental organizations, as well as of the co-operation amongst subgroups of national entities such as pressure groups, cities (twinning arrangements), trade unions, multinationals, and so forth. The more than 500 'Euro-associations' or 'Euro-groups' in the EU have to some extent anticipated official, government-level, European politics.

These ideas suggest a federal Europe

with a strong civil society. The federal traditions of Germany or Switzerland can serve as models of a federalism that best realizes unity with diversity or diversity with unity. The European member states have to play a bigger role than they would in an American-style federal system (where 'federal' means central government). The diagram above indicates what the key characteristics of such a model are. It compares this model with two other, quite different, models – economic and cultural, respectively – for organizing societies or communities. Each model contains different kinds of political institutions and suggests quite different ways of legitimizing the European polity.

Common values and norms (democracy, market economy, human rights, common history and heritage), common institutions and procedures, complementary identities: all these can be the foundation of the political unity that constitutes the European Union. Europe should have a federal and decentralized system of multilevel governance; it should be multicultural; its citizens should have differentiated loyalties/identities; and it must have a strong civil society.

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Restructuring Shanxi

David S G Goodman *explores how the identity of a Chinese province was reshaped in the service of economic reform*

In 1958, the then Governor of Shandong Province in the People's Republic of China (PRC), Zhao Jianmin, was purged after having reportedly argued, 'I am a native of Shandong. I am for the people of Shandong and the cadres of Shandong.' In 1993, the then Governor of Shanxi Province, Hu Fuguo, became something of a local hero when, in his first speech to the Provincial People's Congress, he said, 'I was born in Shanxi, grew up in Shanxi, lived and worked in Shanxi for 44 years. . . I have never been able to forget the affection of the people at home. My own fate and that of my home are firmly bound together.'

One of the more interesting aspects of politics in the PRC in the 1990s was the attempt by many provincial leaders to create a specifically provincial discourse of development. Reform has highlighted the role of provincial authorities as, through decentralization and devolution, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has withdrawn from government, and government has withdrawn from economic management.

Shanxi province has always been central to the PRC, both economically and politically. After 1949, a major national centre of heavy industry, dominated by large-scale state owned enterprises, was developed on foundations originally laid by Yan Xishan, the province's modernizing warlord, in the 1920s and 1930s. In the reform era Shanxi's economic growth has been moderate. Its level of foreign invest-

ment has been negligible; and state-sector heavy industry – particularly coal, steel and energy – still dominates the provincial economy. Nonetheless, during the 1990s, Shanxi's economic growth, though lower than in other, pace-setting, provinces, was steady, and in each of the four years 1995-1998 GDP grew at a rate above the national average.

LEADERSHIP CHANGE

The improvement in Shanxi's economic performance came in and after 1992 with a dramatically new strategy based on an explicitly provincial discourse of development. The catalyst for policy change was the emergence of a nativist and technocratic provincial leadership. The appointment of Hu Fuguo, a native of Southeast

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Shanxi, first as acting governor and then as secretary of the Shanxi Committee of the CCP from 1993 to 1999, led to a new style of politics – both popular and populist – which sought explicitly to appeal to provincial feelings of community.

Faced by the need to deliver a more self-reliant Shanxi, Hu Fuguo laid the foundations for an appeal to localism. His appealed not simply as a native son, but as one who argued that the province had

contributed greatly to the national cause without gaining adequate recompense. His style of politics was deliberately open and inclusive. In June 1996, for example, he even played the traditional peasant drums of his native region as part of the ceremony that opened the province's first major superhighway – the Tai-Jiu Expressway – connecting Taiyuan, the province's capital, through the Taihang Mountains to Shijiazhuang in Hebei.

Hu Fuguo's response to the need for reform was to establish working parties to examine strategies for Shanxi's development. He staffed these working parties mainly with professional intellectuals (university and research institute staff) and technocrats with industrial and business experience, all of whom were natives of Shanxi, and almost all of whom had previously been prevented from participating in public life because of their families' class backgrounds.

The difficulties the Shanxi economy faced by the late 1980s and early 1990s were not simply the result of the province's having a dominant state sector or of its specializing in heavy industry, but also of its dependence on central government investment and its lack of infrastructural development. The working parties emphasized the need for light industrial development and recommended a series of infrastructure projects. The most spectacular of these included a massive road-building programme to meet Shanxi's communications problems, and an attempt to ameliorate the severe water shortages by damming the Yellow River at Wanjiashai (in northwest Shanxi) and diverting water through pipelines to Datong and Taiyuan. The problem with these and other projects was financial: central government had made it plain that in future it would invest much less in the province; and foreign direct investment in Shanxi was extremely low.

In these circumstances, the only realistic option for the provincial leadership was to mobilize local resources. One tactic was to encourage people to think and invest locally. Another was to promote a new provincial identity, partly in order to strengthen feelings of community and solidarity as a motivator to public action, and partly to persuade people to donate their savings to the public good: some of the programme of infrastructure development was funded



by essentially mandatory public subscription. Only 40 per cent of the Tai-Jiu Expressway project, for example, was funded by government, either national or provincial: the rest was funded by public contributions and collection.

RECONSTRUCTING SHANXI

The construction of a specifically provincial identity was, then, essentially the cultural infrastructure project of Shanxi's new reform strategy. Yet despite the provincial leadership's desire to build on a sense of provincial community for both economic and political ends, an idea of Shanxi, and an identification with this idea, had first to be created. Unlike native place, county, and even to some extent the province's various sub-regions, Shanxi was not a strong or primary focus of identification.

The provincial discourse of development was promoted in and after 1992 under the slogan of 'A Prosperous Shanxi and a Wealthy People'. A sense of Shanxi identity was cultivated through the media. The provincial government produced publications dedicated to the promotion of local culture. These included magazines such as the bi-monthly *Shanxi wenshi ziliao* [Materials on Shanxi's Literature and

History]; culturally broad magazines such as *Cang Sang* [Vicissitudes]; and more literary journals such as *Huanghe* [Yellow River] and *Dushi wenxue* [Metropolis]; as well as a series of compendia, such as the 52-volume *Shanxi tongzhi* [The Shanxi Encyclopedia], which is still in production. The regular media – radio, television and newspapers – promoted the reconstructed Shanxi identity even more determinedly. Where the more establishment newspapers and programmes published stories of strategic interest in the field of economic development, the more popular media concentrated on items of more cultural or general interest. To support this construction of local and provincial identity, the provincial leadership also promoted the development of a network of institutes, study groups, and associations dedicated to popularizing the idea of Shanxi: these included a Shanxi Culture Research Association, a

Shanxi Overseas Exchange Committee, and a Shanxi Research Institute under the Provincial CCP Committee, with an initial staff of just under a hundred people. Perhaps even more remarkably, the provincial leadership also appointed 165 local historians in different locations

'The distinctiveness of Shanxi people was described in terms of social characteristics and cultural practices. Considerable attention was paid to food, especially noodles and vinegar.'

around the province, a major aspect of whose work was to supply news stories to the official media.

The scale and nature of the changes wrought during the 1990s need to be kept in perspective. Not every aspect of the new idea of Shanxi represented a radical break with the recent past, and in any case the result was definitely not a doctrine of

necessary conflict with the national and nationalist ideology. The CCP's pre-reform interpretation of the province had stressed Shanxi's role both as a supplier of national resources, and as a source of Communist traditions. The new provincial identity under reform built on those two elements and added two more.

One new element was a discussion of and emphasis on the distinctive social characteristics of Shanxi people; this was clearly designed to establish a provincial sense of solidarity with which to overlay the more local cultures. The other identified Shanxi as a source – sometimes the authentic source – of Chinese traditions.

SHANXI DISTINCTIVENESS

The distinctiveness of Shanxi people was described in terms of social characteristics and cultural practices, with little attempt to identify core values as the basis of solidarity. Considerable attention was paid to food, especially noodles and vinegar.

The centrality of food to an identification of Shanxi is not hard to understand since eating habits over most of the province, though varied, are really not the same as much of the rest of China. Even Shanxi's nativist literary culture is identified by reference to food, and is known as the 'Potato School.'

Beyond noodles and vinegar, the idea of Shanxi was also extended to theatre, music, folk traditions and literature, though more through the celebration of the local within the province. The plethora of new literary and cultural magazines in the province stressed their provincial focus, and provided a site where a specifically Shanxi culture and local identity could be explored. For theatre and music this was not difficult. Shanxi's tradition of local opera and theatre forms is one of the richest in China. However, these are all highly localized and not general across the province. In the 1990s search for a Shanxi identity, all were encouraged and resurrected (after having been suppressed during the Cultural Revolution), with some such as Puju (an opera form from Shanxi's southwest corner) and Shangdang Theatre (the local theatre tradition of Changzhi and the province's southeast) being recognized and often described as 'Shanxi Opera' and 'Shanxi Theatre', respectively.

The search for a distinctive Shanxi folk tradition that could be promoted as part of the new provincial identity led to a process not unknown in other localities

seeking to identify and market their own unique cultural representation. A highly localized folk tradition was made more formal and structured, in this case with the emergence of Drum and Gong Troupes. Folk music in southwest and southeast Shanxi had long centred on the playing of drums, though each locality has its own traditions of drums, drumming and accompanying percussion.

The promotion of Shanxi distinctiveness encouraged the pluralism of more local identities. However, neither provincial nor more local identities were promoted in opposition to each other or to any wider Chinese nationalism. All the elements in the definition of Shanxi identity as it emerged through the 1990s stressed the province's central role in the development of Chinese culture and the Chinese state: the emphasis on the exploitation of Shanxi's natural resources was on the province's contribution to the national economy; and Shanxi's role as a major contributor to the formation of CCP traditions continued to be publicized.

CHINESE TRADITION

The party leadership – in a manner typical of constructions of collective identity – also promoted the creation of an uninterrupted history from an earliest, often mythic, age to the present day. The essence of the message was Shanxi's long-term centrality to the project of China. In this case, the origin of Chinese civilization was found in the large number of pre-his-

'Neither provincial nor more local identities were promoted in opposition to each other or to any wider Chinese nationalism.'

toric settlements – a quarter of all those known in the PRC – in southwest Shanxi, in particular around Linfen. From these origins, Shanxi's place at the heart of the later development of Chineseness was repeatedly emphasized. For example, a 'Three Kingdoms City' was built in



Qingxu (south of Taiyuan) as a theme park to commemorate the Chinese classic *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, written by Qingxu native Luo Guanzhong about the period in Chinese history from 220 to 265; and Shanxi's role as a 'living museum' of Chinese culture was repeatedly stressed, partly in line with the provincial leadership's goal of developing tourism in the province, and partly to emphasize Shanxi's role in the development of Chinese culture.

To a considerable extent this emphasis on Shanxi's historical centrality to the development of Chineseness was the necessary counterweight, from the provincial leadership's perspective, to its emphasis on a provincial identity and its appeal to the local. In addition, the emphasis on the past allowed for the selection and development of aspects of Shanxi's history more concerned with the modernist causes of the reform era. For example, Shanxi under Yan Xishan was credited with having developed the first, albeit limited, native Chinese automobile industry. More significantly, the provincial leadership was also able to resurrect the native Shanxi banking tradition – the exchange shops (*piaohao*) – originally based in Pingyao, Taigu and Qixian from the late eighteenth through to the early twentieth centuries, which dominated the provincial economy at that time and supported the Qing government financially. The exchange shops provided credit and financial services throughout China, as well as to customers in Japan, Russia, Mongolia and Afghanistan. This was a ready-made tradition of commercialism that the provin-

cial leadership attempted to mobilize in support of reform. It suggested very firmly not only that there were no apparent cultural impediments to commercial activity in Shanxi, but also that, despite a period of isolation, emphasized during the warlordship of Yan Xishan, the province also had a history of significant national and international interactions, especially in economic development.

PROVINCE AND COUNTY

To some extent the emphasis on a provincial discourse of development in Shanxi paralleled experiences elsewhere in China with the introduction of reform.

However, the leadership of the party-state in Shanxi seems to have promoted its identity on a scale not followed in other provinces, and to greater effect, even though the economic gains were clearly modest.

In part, explanation of Shanxi's more favourable experience may lie with the relative homogeneity of the provincial population, as well as with Yan Xishan's having created a distinctive polity and Shanxi identity during the two decades before the War of Resistance against Japan. Yet the 1990s provincial discourse of development did not simply replicate Yan Xishan's promotion of Shanxi's identity, which had been separatist by design. Shanxi's leaders in the 1990s may have had a distinctive provincial agenda, and may have promoted provincial interests in the national arena, but they remained well within and committed to the boundaries of the national party-state. Their construction of a new Shanxi identity was intended to mobilize support for the national reform agenda by creating a feeling of solidarity that transcended the more immediately local. Its focus was the identification of a social particularism, rather than a political provincialism, within a structuring of identity that privileged China.

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Taiwan: Nation, Text, Blood

Mark Harrison on how a student protest in Taiwan in 1971 expressed the relationship between Chinese ideas of nationhood, textuality and the body



On Saturday, 17 April 1971, about 4000 students staged a rally in the sports field of Taiwan Normal University in Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC). At the end of the rally – the culmination of a week of protests at university campuses in the capital – the chairman of the organizing committee, Tan Jiahua, urged the students to go to the campus health centre to participate in the signing of a petition in blood, or a ‘blood letter’. Throughout the day, students lined up to have their blood drawn by nurses and then write their names with a calligraphy brush. Some students wrote with their fingertips pricked with a disinfected needle. The blood-letter day began at 8am and continued until after 6pm, at which point there were four, ten-metre-long petitions with a total of over two thousand names.

DIAOYUTAI ISLANDS

The students were protesting about the status of the small, uninhabited Diaoyutai Islands, 150 miles northeast of Taiwan and about 450 miles southwest of the Japanese island of Okinawa. After the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the islands had been incorporated into Okinawa Prefecture, but the terms of the peace treaties of 1951 and 1952 between Japan, the USA and the ROC – which revoked Japan’s claim to Taiwan and annulled the Treaty of Shimonoseki – were assumed to have restored the islands to Nationalist Chinese control.

In 1969 it emerged that there might be oil reserves around the islands. This happened as Japan and the USA were beginning sensitive negotiations over the reversion of Okinawa to Japan (the island had been under US control since the end of the Second World War), which were themselves part of the Nixon administration’s broader rethinking of east Asian security and, in particular, US–PRC relations in the context of the Vietnam war and changing US–Soviet relations.

In July 1970, Japan notified the ROC of its claim for the islands under the proposed terms of the reversion agreement with the USA. In September, the ROC foreign minister Wei Daoming made a counter-claim for ROC sovereignty. Wei demanded that Japan acknowledge the ROC claim, that the USA take into account the ROC position, and that the ROC be allowed the free movement of

boats and people to the island. The Taiwanese press gave the issue significant coverage, and the government newspaper *Zhongyang Ribao* ran editorials and commentaries about the status of the islands.

Though the issue had largely died down in Taiwan by the end of September 1970, in Hong Kong and the United States, it grew into a public nationalist movement among Chinese university students. In January 1971 several thousand students staged simultaneous demonstrations across the USA. The issue reignited in Taiwan the following year after the 9 April decision by the United States to formally support Japanese acquisition of the islands together with Okinawa (in 1972). (The targets of the blood petitions were the Japanese and US embassies in Taipei.)

The decision triggered reporting in the press – particularly in publications other than *Zhongyang Ribao* – far more vitriolic than that of the previous September. A 15 April editorial in *Zili Wanbao*, entitled ‘Our Blood Our Oil!’, argued in inflammatory and tendentious terms that China’s claim to the Diaoyutai oil reserves was morally righteous, whereas Japan’s was purely opportunistic.

The government’s official response was to express outrage without offending Japan or the USA. Foreign minister Wei Daoming publicly stated his intention to oppose the US position and insisted that the possibility of there being oil reserves in the surrounding waters had not influenced the government’s reaction.

STUDENT PROTESTS

Within a week of the US decision, however, on 16 April, as the visit to Taiwan by President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire began, the issue was off the official agenda. Yet, just as the government-controlled press was curtailing its coverage of the issue, the Protect Diaoyutai Islands Movement, operating at the margins of sanctioned expressions of opposition to the Japanese claim and the US support for it, continued to protest.

Most of the protests occurred on Taipei university campuses, where students organized committees, participated in rallies and protest marches, and wrote petitions. The leaders of the activities were mainly students from Hong Kong and Macao; and, once the Taiwanese press had passed over it, newspapers from the two territories provided the most detailed information about the

issue. The Okinawan reversion agreement was signed on a Friday and, from the following Monday to Saturday, students erected banners and posters on campuses in Taipei attacking the USA and Japan, and various demonstrations were held both at the universities and outside the US and Japanese embassies. On Wednesday 14 April, a rally at Zhengzhi University ended with a march on the Japanese and American embassies. A delegation of students also met presented a petition to the American ambassador. The following day students at National Taiwan University (NTU) assembled in an 'orderly way' in their class groups and marched to the Japanese embassy behind a banner reading 'Support the government'. At the gates of the embassy they broke into the song, 'Long Live The Leader', and chanted, 'The Diaoyutai Islands are our territory!'.

Student protests flared again after 17 June when the USA and Japan signed the final Okinawa reversion agreement.

LIVING IN TRUTH

Studies of Taiwanese politics have labelled the Diaoyutai Island movement a 'proto-opposition movement'. This interpretation is inadequate, however: the movement expressed pro-government sentiment, as we have seen. Similarly, the official response was ambivalent: although the protests were played down by the press, Zhongyang Ribao described the students on the NTU march as 'expressing their patriotic spirit'.

The student protests were independent of the government in the sense that they were not organized by it; but they were not anti-government, indeed, they supported the government. Yet if the movement was only implicitly oppositional, it did reflect the government's marginalization by and through the dispute. Although the student protests and the coverage in the leading liberal journal *Ta Hsueh* [The Intellectual] and the rest of the press were circumspect in their provocation of the government, and clearly avoided direct attacks on it for its inability to act effectively, the government remained secondary to the nationalist ideology surrounding the issue.

Nevertheless, the Diaoyutai Islands issue was a very significant blow to the legitimacy of the Kuomintang (KMT; the ruling party) and its (absurd) claim to represent all of China. The KMT clearly understood that US support for Japan's

claim and its disregard for ROC concerns marked the beginning of a shift in US policy away from Taiwan and toward normalization of relations with the PRC.

In Václav Havel's terms, the issue highlighted the difference between 'living in truth' and 'living within a lie'. A falsehood had existed at the centre of political and social life in Taiwan, namely, the KMT's claims to represent China and to be creating Taiwan a model Chinese society on which could be carried back to the mainland. Political, social and cultural institutions had all been moulded to reflect that falsehood. The Diaoyutai Islands issue exposed the lie, as well as the impotence and ultimately the irrelevance of the Chinese Nationalists. In Havel's terms, the Diaoyutai Islands issue broke

through the exalted façade of the system and exposed the real, base foundations of power. . . . [It showed] that it is possible to live within the truth. Living within the lie can constitute the system only if it is universal. The principle must embrace and permeate everything. There can be no terms whatsoever on which it can

'The Diaoyutai Islands movement is best understood not as an anti-government protest but as a Chinese nationalist movement.'

coexist with living within the truth, and therefore every one who steps out of line denies it in principle and threatens it in its entirety.

However, though there are parallels between totalitarian states in the former

Eastern Bloc and Taiwan under military dictatorship, Taiwan under the KMT was not the purely self-referential 'system of ritual signs' that Havel describes. Rather, it was one part of a nationalist ideology with a history going back to the end of the nineteenth century. The students were operating independently of a government which claimed to control all social life, yet their 'truth' was structured by the broader history of Chinese nationalism.

NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

The Diaoyutai Islands movement is best understood not as an anti-government protest but as a Chinese nationalist movement. The Islands issue was located, in the first instance, within the bitter historical relationship between China and Japan. The themes of the Protect the Diaoyutai Islands Movement – oil, history and sovereignty – created a moral distinction between Japan's opportunism and China's national suffering. In this moral relationship, the Japanese were only interested in the oil reserves and were carrying out another rapacious assault on Chinese national dignity. Simultaneously – as the *Zili Wanbao* editorial argued – while the issue was one of national sovereignty and dignity, not oil rights, China had a right to the Diaoyutai oil anyway.

This moral framework placed the issue outside the narrowly imagined ideology of the KMT and within the broader ideological history of Chinese nationalism and Japan's place in it – from the Qing's defeat by the Japanese in 1894 through

the bitter war with Japan that began with the latter's annexation of Manchuria in 1931, to the invasion of China in 1937.


The China whose sovereignty was being violated was neither Nationalist nor Communist, but a broader Chinese nation. The point of identification was the China which had fought and suffered in the War of Resistance Against Japan. This conceptualization of China referred to the nationalist ideology of Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese Republic in 1911, and to its elaborations through the 1920s. It took a transnational form among Chinese communities form, with the protest movement using a language of outrage over the violation of Chinese sovereignty and lamentation over China's betrayal and humiliation by foreign powers, rather than the post-1949 Nationalist language of restoration or the Communist language of revolution. In this way the issue was only partly within the orbit of the language of both Nationalist China and the People's Republic. This aspect of the dispute was reflected in both Nationalist and Communist China expressing strong opposition to the Japanese claim for the Diaoyutai independently of each other.

BLOOD PETITION

Though the blood petition as a form of protest occurred at least once again, at the end of October 1971, when students protested on university campuses at the ROC's loss of its seat at the UN, writing in blood as a formal act of protest has no well-known historical precedent in, for example, the May Fourth movement that began in 1919 (or subsequently, for instance in the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989). The petition was an instant when the limits of Chinese nationalist practice were being defined.

By writing in their own blood, the students were, first, expressing a connection between the body, as represented by blood and the nation. Using their blood referred to the giving of life for the nation, and presented the blood as the nation's foundational component. The meaning of blood is fundamental to the Sunist imagining of the Chinese as a single people, and the blood petition reached as far into that imagining as possible. Sun Yat-sen, wrote:

The greatest force (of nationality) is



common blood. Chinese belong to the yellow race because they come from the blood stock of the yellow race. The blood of ancestors is transmitted down through the race, making blood kinship a powerful force.

For the students at Taiwan Normal University the unique aspect of their protest was the writing with blood. The petition used writing to mediate between the students' blood and the nation. The act of writing, particularly with a calligraphy brush, separated the students' protests from those of more extreme bodily violence or other bodily practices by locating the practice of modern nationhood within

'By writing in their own blood, the students were, first, expressing a connection between the body, as represented by blood and the nation.'

the history of Chinese imperial practices, in particular the Confucian *Book of Rites*.

Watson and Rawski (in *Death Ritual in Late-Imperial and Modern China*, 1988) have debated the relative importance of practice and belief in the maintenance of late imperial power in China. For Watson, orthopraxis, or correct actions in particular ritual activities associated with the *Book of Rites*, or *li*, were the crucial element of imperial power. For Rawski, belief and

practice were both important parts of imperial power.

Zito, however (in *Of Body and Brush*, 1997), has criticized the distinction that Watson and Rawski, and anthropologists generally, make between the practice and the ideology of social and political life. She argues for a Foucauldian approach in which practice and belief are understood as discourse: 'a constitutive practice whose traces we find in its products, one of which is subjectivity itself'. Zito has done extensive work on the constitution of subjectivities in late-imperial China through the *Book of Rites*, in which the *li* can be understood as a discourse which constituted subjectivities and the relations between subjectivities.

Following Zito one can suggest that the use of writing by the students was a discursive trace of just the kind of subjectivities that she describes as constituted by the *Book of Rites*, or more broadly in the notion of *wen* ('being "civilized"') with its attendant themes of civilization, education, and discipline. By writing in such a public and ritualistic way, the students were inscribing a trace of the constitution of an imperial subjectivity through the correct practice of imperial arts.

However, while it is possible to suggest a trace of the idea of *wen* in the students use of calligraphy brushes, the *Book of Rites*, which defined *wen*, is a highly elaborated discursive structure, of which there is no equivalent in the discourse of Chinese nationhood. The students' writing, therefore, should be seen as a kind of improvised ritualization of Chinese nationhood. In discursive terms, it made a reference both – through the use of calligraphic writing – to the ideal imperial Chinese subjectivity and also, through the students' blood, to the ideal national Chinese subjectivity.

However, there is nothing codified or formalized about the blood petition as a nationalist practice. Indeed, after these events in 1971, it has not occurred again as a way of enacting nationhood in the Chinese context. The blood petition says a great deal about the way subjectivity can be improvised by being constituted out of faint traces drawn from history and modern political practices.

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North and South of the Border

Bernard Rorke *on the different forms of Irish nationalism*

Irish nationalisms since 1968 have been characterized by the stark contrast between the ideological consensus around the national idea in the Republic of Ireland, and the forms of nationalism that have emerged within the statelet of Northern Ireland, a fragile political entity burdened by critical democratic deficits and a crisis of legitimacy. Despite the shared aspirations and overlapping rhetorics, nationalism in Northern Ireland is quite distinct from its counterpart in the South, the product of conflict within an entirely separate system and structure of governance.

By the late 1960s, nationalism in the South had evolved into a banal and sentimental ideology: the Republic's citizenry and political leaders, largely unconcerned about the plight of the minority in the North and oblivious to the concrete situation of the Unionist majority, were content to live in a twenty-six-county state and dream of a thirty-two-county nation. Partition was understood as unfinished business in the historical quarrel between England and Ireland. The nationalist assumption that for democracy to endure partition must end and that 'practical, hard-headed' Unionists would quickly recognize their real interests and simply adjust to the new order in a 32-county nation took something of a battering in the 1970s. The scale of Unionist coercion in response to the civil rights movement and of Unionist resistance to reforms, as well as the extra-parliamentary and paramilitary responses to any form of 'Irish dimension', marked the passing of this illusion. The deployment of massive Unionist force and intimidation to scup-

per the Sunningdale Agreement on power-sharing in 1974, the Loyalist campaigns of sectarian assassination, and the mobilization of vigilante forces in ominous shows of strength by 'slightly constitutional' political leaders, served notice to all concerned that the Ulster people – so-called – were, in the words of Lloyd George, 'an entity to be dealt with'.

The Republic's options – as a small state with limited coercive resources at its disposal, no jurisdiction over the primary locus of the conflict, and little in the way of diplomatic prowess – were severely restricted. The initial waves of public sympathy for the plight of the minority in the North gave way in the 1970s to an acute anxiety about political stability in the Republic as the violence in the province escalated into a seemingly intractable three-sided war of attrition. The interests of state took precedence over dreams of nation in a decade beset by dismal economic performance and punctuated by paramilitary atrocities. Over the next twenty years the policy priorities of mainstream nationalist parties in the Republic, once they took office, remained fairly consistent: first, to take security measures commensurate with maintaining the integrity of the polity; and, secondly, to bolster constitutional nationalism in the North and to exert diplomatic pressure on

Britain to deliver reforms and to accept an all-Irish dimension to the resolution of the conflict in the North.

Against this background of unprecedented political crisis, nationalist thinking among the political elite in the Republic of Ireland underwent a painful and protracted evolution. The national idea began to move beyond traditional friend-foe dichotomies towards a more liberal variant of nationalism, embellished with vocabularies of pluralism, accommodation, and recognition. The aspiration to unity was retained but it was articulated as a legitimate, long-term goal to be pursued in a pragmatic way; precedence was ceded to the pursuit of agreed conditions of coexistence and accommodation with northern Unionism. Constitutional nationalism evolved into an increasingly reflexive political position, characterized by an acute awareness of its limitations and with a flexibility that privileged liberal and democratic manners over ideological imperatives. This transition would become apparent when, on 22 May 1998, 94.39 per cent of the Republic's voters ratified the Good Friday Agreement.

The argument that the benign form of collective national identity that prevails in the Republic today is 'post-nationalist' is belied by the fact that the leaders and members of the major political parties unselfconsciously identify themselves as nationalists, and continue to pay lip-service to the aspiration of Irish unity. The aspiration comes with genuine caveats; it is conditional upon the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland; it respects and recognizes the Unionist 'tradition'; and it accepts that national unity remains a long-term goal to be pursued by entirely peaceful means. Nonetheless, despite the civic, pluralist and democratic qualifiers, it remains nationalism. And, for as long as the bearers of this ideology adhere to its foundational ideal of Irish unity, they remain for many Unionists – in Schmittian terms – the irredentist Other, the stranger, 'existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible'. (Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*.) The concrete situ-

'The national idea began to move beyond traditional friend-foe dichotomies towards a more liberal variant of nationalism, embellished with vocabularies of pluralism, accommodation, and recognition.'

ation and historical experience of Northern Unionists have scarcely afforded them the luxury of viewing Irish nationalism with any semblance of detachment. Nevertheless, the politics of the national idea in the Republic have changed over the course of three decades to the extent that the extreme case is scarcely imaginable.

NORTHERN NATIONALISM

Northern Ireland, for so long an insulated and isolated hinterland, found itself, in the 1960s, at odds with political transformations in a wider world that was pregnant with vocabularies of minority and human rights. The exhaustion of reformist options and the marshalling of the forces of Loyalist reaction laid bare not just the critical democratic deficits of the northern state but revealed the friend–enemy antithesis (understood in its ‘concrete and existential sense’ as referring to the real possibility of physical killing that underpinned Unionist hegemony). This was the political context in which a resurgence of militant republicanism occurred and a sophisticated and dynamic constitutional nationalist party emerged.

Critics of nationalism in general and of northern Irish nationalism in particular, have tended to underplay the intensity of the quarrel between constitutional nationalists and militant republicans over means and ends, between those who embrace and those who eschew violence; and they overlook the fact that throughout the conflict the majority of northern nationalists have aligned themselves with the wholly democratic and pacific Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP).



THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOUR PARTY

Established in August 1970, the ‘mainly Catholic’ SDLP was born into a polity where two communities were fundamentally divided over the very existence of the entity. From a Unionist perspective, since the primary aim of every nationalist was unity with the twenty-six counties, all talk of reform, reconciliation and minority participation was damned as a succession of Jesuitical ploys to trundle the Protestant people into a United Ireland. Therefore ‘not an inch’ was to be ceded to the devious entreaties of the SDLP. What made the SDLP different was its politics of compromise and reason and its explicit acceptance that, without majority consent, there could be no united Ireland. The difficulty for the SDLP was that it was born into a polity dominated by a regime undisposed towards compromise and disinclined towards reason. In the face of the refusal of Unionists to contemplate partnership in government, SDLP politics became more nationalist in tone and strategy. Embittered by the collapse of the power-sharing executive in 1974, the idea of a purely internal settlement began to be questioned.

Under John Hume’s leadership the SDLP developed a sophisticated constitutional-nationalist strategy, directed at European and American audiences receptive to a moderate and reasoned political vocabulary that was at odds with the shrill intransigent rhetoric of Unionism and the nihilistic alternatives proffered by Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries. Hume’s future-oriented, progressivist language, his invocations to forge reconciliation between traditions, and his repudiation of violence were the defining features of a new, and increasingly confident, nationalism. Determined not to be locked by his opponents into something more like ethnic enmity than politics, Hume sought to apply external pressure to transform Anglo–Irish relations, advance the politics of northern nationalism, and, as a consequence, force the Unionists to reevaluate their place in the world. The signing of the 1985 Anglo–Irish Agreement was the first major triumph of Hume’s strategy.

Those hostile to all forms of nationalism tend to underplay the significance of the democratic content of this ‘new nationalism’ (Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland*) in transcending the Schmittian concept of the political which had so

bloodily defaced public life in the province. In the most inauspicious circumstances the SDLP remained committed to the notion that, as Mouffe defines it, ‘democratic order requires that, within the context of the political community, the opponent should be considered not as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an adversary whose existence is legitimate and

‘The SDLP developed a sophisticated constitutional-nationalist strategy, directed at European and American audiences receptive to a moderate and reasoned political vocabulary.’

must be tolerated’ (*The Return of the Political*). By the 1990s, it became evident that, in the search for peace, nothing more could be gained by buttressing or expanding the middle ground, and that it was necessary to engage the main antagonists. Hume initiated a dialogue with Gerry Adams. Though widely rebuked, he persisted doggedly and, in time, British civil servants and prime ministers, Irish Taoisigh and presidents would follow his example and engage with militant republicanism.

THE IRA AND SINN FEIN

The campaign of the Provisional IRA should be understood as a parasitic form of organized political violence which fed on nationalist disaffection and profoundly changed the very nature of the Troubles. It was not the product of a spontaneous call to arms to defend communities from obliteration, nor the cutting edge of a wider campaign to redress the injustices long endured by the minority population. Neither was it a manifestation of communal atavism ignited by ancient hatreds. The IRA’s campaign of violence was a minority militarist grouping’s plan to frustrate – by using terror – all attempts at democratic reform, to polarize both communities, and to pursue a limited war with the ultimate objective of precipitating British disengagement from Northern Ireland.

While the Provisional IRA were adept exploiting the widespread disaffection among the minority community in the North, they also found it necessary to bru-

talize their 'own' community in order to assert their authority. As Fintan O'Toole has pointed out:

While the British Army killed 138 members of the Catholic community, the IRA killed 198. Even in its own stronghold of West Belfast . . . the IRA managed to kill more local people than the Loyalists did. And this is without taking into consideration the thousands of beatings, maimings, and tortures that make up the paramilitaries' continuing system of local 'justice'.

Yet, despite the seemingly irrational ideological mindset of many of the protagonists, and the apparent futility of much of the violence, it became evident that Gerry Adams and his coterie possessed an acute concept of the political; they remained aware that every deed of war needed to be, in Clausewitz's words, 'an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will'.

GERRY ADAMS

Adams, though ideologically uncomplicated, is a shrewd and complicated political animal, a Machiavellian well versed in the arts of dissimulation, who has managed to move the main body of extremist nationalists from a purely militarist struggle into the political mainstream. Sinn Fein and the IRA moved from simply killing, bombing and declaring every year 'the year of victory', to building a grass-roots network of political support for a long war. This was followed by the famous 'dual strategy': a combination of IRA killing and Sinn Fein electioneering. The calculation that more could be gained through the political process than from the barrel of an AK47 led eventually to a ceasefire and a qualified observance of the democratic 'rules of the game'. All the while, Adams maintained his leadership of the republican movement, and emerged at the century's end as the 'parapolitical' arch-statesman of militant republicanism, credited by many, after three decades of waging war, as one of the principal architects of peace.

As Sinn Fein and the IRA inched towards historic compromise, the threat of violence, the promise of calling a halt to violence, the prospect of renewed and intensified violence, and the reality of actual violence became Sinn Fein's principal leverage in negotiation. However, as the Republican movement became ever more engaged in the intricacies of



politics, an uneasy consensus began to emerge that political engagement could deliver tangible rewards, whereas continued 'armed struggle' would mean isolation.

The overtures of the Irish government, the dialogue between Hume and Adams, the covert and eventually overt negotiations with the British government – all of which created the conditions for a ceasefire and eventually the 1998 Good Friday Agreement – were not born of craven appeasement. Nor, on the Irish side, were they the product of a 'sacral pan-nationalism' in pursuit of a peace on purely nationalist terms. Rather, the British and

'The IRA's campaign of violence was a minority militarist grouping's plan to frustrate — by using terror — all attempts at democratic reform'

Irish governments made a realistic and hard-headed assessment that there could be no peace without engaging Sinn Fein and the IRA in discussion, securing the terms for a ceasefire, and involving Sinn Fein in the political process. They gambled that, the more Sinn Fein immersed itself in the political process, the more remote would be the prospect of an IRA return to war. The risk was that the involvement of Sinn Fein in the political process, and the necessary concessions to secure a durable peace, might contaminate the democratic content of that process.

Four years on from the Good Friday

Agreement, Sinn Fein thrive in a context of interminable political crisis, as the Northern Ireland Assembly survives despite suspensions, disruptions by anti-Agreement Unionists, and Sinn Fein's cynical foot-dragging on decommissioning. It remains to be seen whether Sinn Fein's recognition of the legitimacy of its adversaries' positions will become something more than an instrumental, tactical device to mask its fundamental antagonism towards all forms of Unionism, and whether its immersion in the mundane and quotidian business of 'normal politics' marks the closing of the final chapter of the militant republican saga of killing and maiming for Ireland.

At this juncture, the gravest threat to this frail democracy comes not so much from the violent and murderous dissent expressed by Loyalist extremists, but from the growing disaffection of moderate, pro-Good Friday Agreement unionists. Shootings, pipe bombings, and orchestrated mob violence have tended to obscure the fact that the disaffection goes deeper than the naked sectarian violence emanating from low-income, front-line Protestant enclaves such as Rathcoole.

The peace is a fragile and tense construct. The friend-foe dichotomy will not vanish, the legacy of bitterness and suffering cannot be wished away overnight. But the crucial point is that this antagonism has been displaced by those committed to making politics work.

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Only Connect

Ali Paya *on the benefits of dialogue*

Can dialogue have an impact on the real world? The inefficacy of dialogue, cynics argue, is evident in the sheer number of violent clashes between nations, ethnic groups, divided communities, rival social factions and the like. A quick browse through the web and the quality print media, on the other hand, provides ample evidence that many people believe dialogue can benefit humanity.

Since it may be the case that those who express these conflicting views understand dialogue differently – so that they are actually disagreeing about different issues – it is important first to clarify the concept.

David Bohm (in *On Dialogue* and elsewhere) distinguishes between related concepts, for example, communication, negotiation, discussion, and dialogue. Etymologically, communication,

from the Latin *communicatio*, means ‘to share, to make common’. ‘To communicate’, therefore, means to convey information or knowledge from one person to another as accurately a way as possible. In a dialogue, by contrast, people are creating something *together*.

Negotiation, from the Latin *negotiat*, (‘do in the course of business’), is mostly concerned with overcoming obstacles. It has a pragmatic goal and is far more limited in scope than dialogue.

Discussion, like ‘percussion’ and ‘concussion’ from a Latin root that means striking and shaking, connotes breaking things up. It emphasizes analysis. Dialogue, however, involves joining thinking and feeling together to create new meanings which continually evolve. (The differences between dialogue and discussion are listed in the

diagram on the page opposite.)

The word dialogue comes from the Greek *dia-logos*. ‘Dia’ in this context means ‘between or among’. ‘Logos’ – ‘the word’ – implies reasoning of any kind expressed through speaking or writing and retained in the form of a concept or a theory. In this sense dialogue is, therefore, an interplay of words, a flow of meaning between or among a number of people, out of which may emerge some new understanding.

Dialogue, in its modern sense, is the end result of a number of changes in man’s epistemological outlook. Modern man has realised that there is no such a thing as absolute and certain communicable knowledge; that ‘knowledge’ is in fact a never-ending series of conjectures and refutations for understanding reality; that progress in knowledge depends on continuous criticism and critical appraisal; and, more important, that knowledge is not the exclusive preserve of any one individual.

Dialogue is a human construct. It is not a given. It is not even a necessary feature of the social life. Like all other social constructs, it does not have a fixed and immutable essence. It does however, have a function, or a set of functions, which can be ascribed to it by social actors.

Among the socially constructed entities, dialogue enjoys a distinct status. It is perhaps the only one of such entities that can be used by a lone Robinson Crusoe: even a single and isolated person can have a dialogue within himself. (Though this would be dialogue in a very impoverished sense.) Dialogue also helps to create new institutional facts.

IMPOSSIBLE AND INEFFECTIVE?

There are many writers who, on philosophical, pragmatic or empirical (historical) grounds, maintain that the different viewpoints which should come together to form a dialogue can never be ‘coherent’, and that, as a result, there can never be proper dialogue between or even within communities. Note that the position taken by these writers is different from that of the cynic, who only casts doubt on the efficacy of dialogue.

These writers, to varying degrees, deny the very possibility of establishing dialogue.

Postmodern approaches towards ‘discourse’ and ‘meaning’ have further emphasized the impossibility of dialogue between members of different civilizations, cultures, traditions, and the like. If we regard culture as a set of shared meanings, which, like glue, bind people together, and if we take dialogue as the flow of meaning between interlocutors, then a doctrine – such as that of postmodern philosophers – which regards meaning as, in principle, inaccessible would imply that dialogue among different cultures and civilisations is impossible.

The thesis of the ‘impossibility of

‘An insistence on the “impossibility thesis” and on the incommensurability of cultures will only produce a debilitating relativism – which will inevitably result in a breakdown in understanding and thus in violence and destruction.’

dialogue’ can be opposed on a number of grounds. For example, it can be argued that, as a result of advances in communication and information technology, our world now increasingly resembles a global village. The inhabitants of a village, if they want to manage their affairs, have no choice but to enter into dialogue with each other. Or again, one can argue – with Thomas Hobbes – that, from a purely pragmatic point of view, people’s desire for self-preservation would encourage them to enter into dialogue. The fact that the vast ecosystem which is our planet is threatened with disintegration – by the population explosion, the increase in the number and efficiency of weapons of mass destruction, and the

Dialogue	Discussion
Seeing the whole among the parts Seeing the connections between the parts Inquiring into assumptions Learning through inquiry and disclosure Creating shared meanings	Breaking issues/problems into parts Seeing distinctions between the parts Justifying/defending assumptions Persuading, selling, telling Gaining agreement on one meaning

rapid depletion of natural resources – strengthens the cogency of both of these arguments.

To refute the ‘impossibility thesis’ one can also argue against those philosophical positions which have been used to establish it. It can be argued, for example, that the argument for the alleged incommensurability of different cultures, paradigms, epistemes or traditions is untenable: members of different cultures or traditions, have, because they are human beings, many things in common. These common features provide the minimum condition for embarking on a process of mutual understanding. Moreover, physical reality, which, despite the claims of some postmodern writers, is not socially constructed and is independent of social agents, serves to correct false beliefs. With these aids at their disposal, and by taking a rational and critical approach towards their own views and theories as well as to those of others, members of different cultures and traditions can start on a journey of enquiry. In this journey, they are not, of course, obliged to agree with the views entertained by the adherents of other paradigms or traditions. However, the least that such an activity will show is that, by and large, understanding what other people believe, though difficult, is not impossible.

It must also be borne in mind that an insistence on the validity of the ‘impossibility thesis’ and on the incommensurability of cultures and the like will only produce a debilitating relativism. Such relativism will inevitably result in a breakdown in understanding and thus in violence and destruction. In a world in which, because of mankind’s

increasing ability to destroy all life on the face of the planet, survival has become almost identical with understanding, a philosophical position which preaches the impossibility of


understanding and dialogue is paving the way for catastrophe on an enormous scale.

The above arguments, no matter how cogently they may reject the ‘impossibility’ claim, can hardly impress the cynic, who is concerned only with the efficacy (or lack of it), not the possibility, of dialogue. The cynic argues that the proof of the pudding is in the eating: the strongest reason for arguing that dialogue does not work is that it indeed does not work in the real world.

Against this view, it can be argued that, in real-world situations, it is not always possible to measure the effectiveness of dialogue. This is not because, as the cynic claims, dialogue has no causal power, but because, in such cases, there are many factors at work influencing an outcome. It might well be that other, opposing, causal powers are offsetting the causal power of dialogue, or that the effects of dialogue, by comparison with those other social factors, are hard to discern. The cynic may not be able to determine the effect of dialogue because he has failed to produce a proper closed system in which such an effect could be measured without the undesirable interference of other factors.

A TOOL FOR SOCIAL CHANGE?

The ‘impossibility’ and the ‘inefficacy’ theses concerning dialogue are



untenable. What can be said about the argument that dialogue is an all-powerful tool for social change?

One can easily imagine a possible world all of whose inhabitants conduct their affairs by means of dialogue. However, the real world is far from being such an ideal. To create an environment in which dialogue will have much greater causal power and a far more prominent status than it has today, the number of those who share a 'collective intentionality' about the merits of 'dialogue' must be grown, as must the coherence of their shared intentionality.

To fulfil these two requirements, and thus to increase the chances of meaningful dialogue being successful, two tasks must be undertaken. On the one hand, the benefits of dialogue as an institutional fact need to be explained to social agents. On the other hand, the conditions conducive to successful and sustainable dialogue – conditions that must be observed by those who take part in dialogue – need to be spelled out.

The benefits of dialogue are, inter alia, that it:

- * Prompts us to enquire more deeply, and collectively, into our thinking processes and the nature of thought itself;

- * Builds systemic perspectives and help us to solve complex problems and dilemmas that have until now confounded us; and

- * Assists us in resolving conflicts at different levels: national, regional and international.

The conditions for a sustainable and successful dialogue include an emphasis on the significance of silence and active listening. Silence creates a coexistential space in which dialogue can develop.

In order to start a successful dialogue, there is no need that the participants share similar views, be in either full or even partial agreement with each other, or share basic assumptions or a common background. The minimum condition for an authentic dialogue is respect for the 'other'. Each of the participants in a dialogue should regard 'the other' as equal in humanity and should have respect and tolerance for their views. To regard one's own views, culture, or tradition as superior reduces the other

interlocutors to a position of insignificance and subordination and thus diminishes the possible benefits of dialogue. (Viewing 'the other' in this light means that one does not treat them as a potential source of knowledge, as somebody with a unique window on reality whose ideas will be of benefit to one's own well-being.)

It can still be asked what the real prospects for genuine and sustainable dialogue are in the real world. It is not too optimistic to claim that in recent decades there has been a growing trend towards recognizing the importance of 'dialogue'. The number of people and organizations

'To regard one's own views, culture, or tradition as superior reduces one's interlocutors to a position of insignificance and subordination and thus diminishes the possible benefits of dialogue.'

world-wide that are promoting the virtues of 'dialogue' seems to be on the increase.

However, this does not mean that the majority of the world's population has been converted to using dialogue in their daily

interactions. Neither does it mean that even those who, to varying degrees, have recognized the benefits of dialogue are always ready to sustain it, especially in the face of intolerably adverse circumstances. There are many examples of cases where opposing parties have entered into dialogue only to break it off and resort to violence.

We can use dialogue to promote dialogue. And since the creation, expansion and continued existence of any socially created entity, including dialogue, requires official representation as a status indicator, all efforts to promote the benefits of dialogue to a wider public will help to strengthen its position.

The task of spreading the word rests with those rational agents who are convinced of the merits of dialogue. This is a Herculean task. Yet it is a task fit for modern men and women who are now largely able to shape their habitat according to their own wishes and designs. It remains to be seen whether, in an environment which is mostly a cultural product of modern man, the light of impersonal reason can, at last, control the heat of personal self-interests.

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Diversity Within Unity

Amitai Etzioni and others *argue for an approach to immigration and ethnic minorities that eschews both assimilation and unbounded multiculturalism*

We note with growing concern that large segments of the people of free societies – well-established nations and those with democratic governments, including those in Western Europe, North America, Japan, and Australia – sense that they are threatened by massive immigration and by the growing minorities within their borders that hail from different cultures, follow different practices, and have separate institutions and loyalties. We are troubled by street violence, verbal outbursts of hate, and growing support for various extremist parties.

These are unwholesome reactions to threats people feel to their sense of identity, self-determination, and culture, which come on top of concerns evoked by globalization, new communications technologies, and a gradual loss of national sovereignty. To throw the feelings of many millions of people in their faces, calling them ‘discriminatory’, ‘exclusionary’, ‘hypocritical’, and worse, is an easy politics, but not one truly committed to resolution. People’s anxieties and concerns should not be dismissed out of hand, nor can they be effectively treated by labeling them racist or xenophobic. Furthermore, telling people that they ‘need’ immigrants for economic reasons or because of demographic shortfalls makes a valid and useful argument, but does not address their profoundest misgivings. The challenge before us is to find legitimate and empirically sound ways to constructively address these concerns. At the same time, we should ensure that these sentiments do not find antisocial, hateful, let alone violent expressions.

Two approaches are to be avoided: promoting assimilation and unbounded multiculturalism. Assimilation – which entails requiring minorities to abandon all of their distinct institutions, cultures, values, habits, and connections to other societies in order to fully mesh into the prevailing culture – is difficult to achieve and unnecessary for dealing with the issues at hand. It is morally unjustified because of our respect for some normative differences, such as to which gods we pray.

Unbounded multiculturalism – which entails giving up the concept of shared values, loyalties, and identity in order to privilege ethnic and religious differences, presuming that nations can be replaced by a large number of diverse minorities – is also unnecessary. It is likely to evoke undemocratic backlashes, ranging from support for extremist, right-wing parties and populist leaders to anti-minority policies. It is normatively unjustified because it fails to recognize the values and institutions undergirded by the society at large, such as those that protect women’s and gay rights.

The basic approach we favour is diversity within unity (DWU). It presumes that all members of a given society will fully respect and adhere to those basic values and institutions that are considered part of the basic shared framework of the society. At the same time, every group in society is

free to maintain its distinct subculture – those policies, habits, and institutions that do not conflict with the shared core – and a strong measure of loyalty to its country of origin, as long as this does not trump loyalty to the society in which it lives if these loyalties come into conflict. Respect for the whole and respect for all is at the essence of our position.

In numerous situations, differences arise concerning matters that are relatively limited in importance in their own right, but acquire great symbolic meaning regarding the rejection, or partial or full acceptance, of people of diverse cultures. These include dress codes (for example, regarding girls wearing headscarves), boys and girls swimming together, the display of ethnic as against national flags, areas in which ethnic celebrations can take place, noise levels tolerated, and so on. In effect, practically any issue can be turned into a highly charged symbolic one, although some issues (such as flags) tend more readily to become such.

The contested symbols serve as hooks on which people hang their resentment of those of different cultures (including the dominant one) and of the need to adapt to a different world. These symbols serve as expressions of people’s sense that their culture, identity, national unity, and self-determination are being challenged. Only as these deeper issues are addressed might societies be able to work out satisfactory resolutions of the symbolic issues.

A DWU position indicates that we understand why people feel the way they do, but also assures them that the cultural changes that they must learn to cope with will not violate their basic values, will not destroy their identity, nor end their ability to control their lives. Indeed, it is the prime merit of the DWU approach that it

allows such a framing of the issue, not as a public relations posture or a political formula, but as a worked out model of laws, policies, and normative concepts that gives substance to such assurances.

Once this basic position is established, we note that adhering to old patriotism, which demands an unquestioning

‘Diversity Within Unity presumes that all members of a given society will fully respect and adhere to those basic values and institutions that are considered part of the basic shared framework of the society.’



embrace of a nation's past, is just as inappropriate as calling for the dismantling of national identity in order to accommodate diversity. Thus, to expect immigrants from previously colonized countries to see great glory in the imperial past is not compatible with the DWU model any more than is calling on a nation to give up its shared values, symbols, and meanings and to become merely a thin and formal affiliation. Arguments to 'rethink what it means to be British' (or French, etc.) are welcome if they mean to redefine commonalities and to point to legitimate differences, but not if they are code words for abandoning shared substantive meanings and values. Nor should one assume that even in a fully-fledged European federation, national identities and cultures will vanish in the foreseeable future, thus dissolving the deeper issues at hand.

The assimilationist model favors stressing the nation's shared fate and glorious achievements in textbooks (especially those concerning history), national holidays, and rituals. Some champions of unbounded diversity call for redefining history as long periods of lessons in national disgrace (for example, one scholar suggested that American history be taught as a series of abuses of minorities, beginning with Native Americans, turning to slaves, then to Japanese Americans during World War II, and so on). Others favour separate ethnic and

religious holidays, such as Christmas, Hanukkah, and Kwanza, to replace rather than supplement shared national holidays.

The DWU position on these issues remains to be worked out. As far as the teaching of history is concerned, surely many would agree that to the extent that textbooks and other teaching materials contain statements that are truly offensive to minorities, they should be removed or corrected, and that recognition of minorities' contributions to the society should be added. In addition, history of parts of the world other than one's own should occupy an important part in any curriculum. Still, the teaching of history is a major way that

'The challenge is to ask how the realm of unity can be thick enough without violating the legitimate place of diversity. The answer may be found in part in secular humanist values and ethics and thicker communitarian values that spell out our obligations to one another.'

shared meanings and values are transmitted and it should neither be 'particularized' nor become a source of attack on the realm of unity.

The most challenging issue of them all is to consider, beyond changes in symbolic expressions and even in laws and policies, what would be encompassed in a modified but unified core of shared substantive values. Commitment to a bill of rights, the democratic way of life, respect

for basic laws (or, more broadly, a constitutional faith or civic religion), and mutual tolerance come (at least relatively) easily. So do the communitarian concepts that rights entail responsibilities, that working differences out is to be preferred to conflict, and that society is to be considered a community of communities (rather than merely a state that contains millions of individuals). However, these relatively thin conceptions of unity (and those limited to overlapping areas of consensus among diverse cultures) constitute an insufficient core of shared values to sustain unity among diversity.


The challenge for the DWU model is to ask how the realm of unity can be thick enough without violating the legitimate place of diversity. The answer may be found in part in secular humanist values and ethics (including respect for individual dignity and autonomy) and thicker communitarian values that spell out our obligations to one another. It may encompass a commitment to building still more encompassing communities (such as the European Union), to assisting those in need in the 'have-not' countries, and to upholding the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The DWU approach is a work in progress. It does not claim to have all or even most of the answers needed to bridge the schisms that have opened up between many immigrants and the majorities in the free societies in which they live. It does offer, we state, a basic orientation that respects both the history, culture, and identity of a society and the rights of members of the society to differ on those issues that do not involve the core of basic values and universally established rights and obligations.

This is an edited extract from Diversity Within Unity, a Communitarian Network position paper (Communitarian Network, 2002), written by Amitai Etzioni and scholars from the United States and various West European countries. Professor Etzioni presented the ideas in the paper at the meeting 'Diversity Within Unity', organized by CSD and the Communitarian Network, held at the University of Westminster in April 2002. Other speakers at the meeting were CSD members John Keane and Bhikhu Parekh, and Professor David Hollinger of the University of California at Berkeley. The full text of the paper and a list of endorsers are available on <http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/DWU.html>

Transatlantic Ties

Paolo Ruspini on the current state of EU-US relations



In the ten years since 1992, the process of European integration has tended to foster scepticism in the USA. The main US current affairs journals (see Di Leo, *Il primato americano*, 2000) portray European Governments as being weak in internal affairs (that is, above all, they have welfare states they cannot dismantle) and in

competition with each other in foreign affairs (either they are jockeying for the leadership of Europe or they disagree about initiatives by individual members towards 'rogue states' such as Iraq, Iran and Libya): in Washington's view, Europeans need the USA's help on the international stage.

The notion that Europe should have an autonomous role in the international arena arouses concern in the USA. Simon Serfaty (in testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, 10 November, 1999) noted that:

[t]he central lesson of the twentieth century is that America's problems in Europe result from Europe's failures: a war 'they' start which they cannot end, a revolution they launch which they cannot control, or, closer to us, a currency they launch which they would not be able to stabilize and sustain . . .

our main fear about Europe should be . . . that [it] is weak and divided, and our main hope should be . . . that [it] does become stronger and more united.

STEREOTYPES

When the relationship is going well, Europeans and Americans talk about common values and stress that they are the world's joint champions of human rights, trade and democracy. When things go badly, they fall back on some surprisingly negative stereotypes. Americans caricature Europe as economically sclerotic, neurotic, and addicted to spirit-sapping welfare schemes and a freedom-infringing state. Europeans stereotype the USA as a gun-slinging, Bible-bashing, Frankenstein-food-guzzling, behemoth-driving, planet-polluting country in which politicians are mere playthings of mighty corporations.

The European and American approaches to the world reveal two different mindsets. The European project is a product of international treaties, collective institutions and mutual entanglements. When Europeans search for a common foreign policy, they apply the principles of multilateralism that have worked well at home. By contrast, Americans in general – and the Bush administration in particular – tend to see the world in traditional great power terms. National interest, diplomatic leadership and the projection of military might are what matter; international treaties and global norms merely constrain America's sovereignty. Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution has written that 11 September 'confirmed the world-view' of the Bush administration, namely, that this 'was a dangerous world . . .

Europe thinks the threats are more diffuse and complicated. Furthermore, Europe emphasises norms, treaties and institutions, partly because they don't have an alternative. The US emphasises power.' (*The Guardian*, 26 February 2002).

Seen from the European capitals, the problem is one of American unilateralism. Even Britain, which in moments of crisis usually sides instinctively with the United States shares this view. Americans, on the other hand, often see Europe as grandstanding free-riders. Henry Kissinger, for one, worries that some Europeans are using antagonism towards the United States as a way of defining their own identity.

The USA spends 40 per cent of the global defence budget. The Pentagon's budget is now more than ten times that of Britain, the next biggest military spender in NATO. This resources gap translates into a technology gap, as Europeans have found in Afghanistan. Europe is worried about both the application of that power and its own relative weakness.

At the same time EU productivity has fallen in the past two years from 74 per cent to 72 per cent of that of the USA, while per-capita wealth in America remains more than 40 per cent higher than in the EU. Edward Bannerman of the Centre for European Reform comments that many 'Europeans like to think of their continent as a global economic

'The relationship between Europe and the USA will not break down. Institutional, economic and cultural ties between America and Europe remain stronger than those between America and other parts of the world.'

superpower, but compared to the US over the last decade or so, Europe looks like a laggard'. (*The Guardian*, 16 March 2002.)

STRONG TIES

The relationship between Europe and the USA will not, however, break down in acrimony. Institutional, economic and cultural ties between America and Europe remain stronger than those

between America and other parts of the world. Europeans are already showing that, despite their introversion, they are prepared to help the United States outside Europe. In any case, Europe and America do not really want to change the way things are. As recently stressed by *The Economist* (9 March 2002):

The Europeans do not want to give up their butter for more guns, not least because they feel there is no threat at present that would justify attempting to close such a yawning gap in capability. Americans have not been unduly worried about Europe's failure to compete, since it increases their own freedom of action. Indeed, they might be far more alarmed if the Europeans were really to make their promised EU defence force credible, and demand a greater say in decision-making as a result. Hence neither side has a strong interest in rebalancing the relationship.

The United States is committed to EU enlargement, is keen on NATO expansion and has learned to live with the WTO. *Newsweek* foreign editor Michael Hirsh has written that, on 11 September, one of America's founding myths – its self-image as a people apart – died forever: the nation now had to embrace the global community it had reluctantly fathered and too often orphaned. Americans had 'built a global order without quite realizing it, bit by bit, era by era, with the usual schizoid approach: alternating engagement and withdrawal (*Newsweek* special issue, December 2001-February 2002). John Ikenberry, in *After Victory* (2002), argues that the reason a serious challenge to US hegemony has not emerged in the post-cold war period is that the cold-war structures – the US-engendered institutions like the United Nations, NATO, Bretton Woods and so on – have become institutionalized. Despite its many problems, the existence of this Americanized global structure explains why the most dire predictions for the post-cold war world have not come true: neither Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' nor Robert Kaplan's 'Coming Anarchy'.

Paolo Ruspini is EU Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations at the University of Warwick. This is an edited extract from the talk he gave to the CSD Seminar in Marh 2002.

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We are gradually making back issues of the *CSD Bulletin* and past titles in the *CSD Perspectives* series available on our website (wwmin.ac.uk/csd).

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CSD TRUST FUND

In support of its long-term development plan plans, the Centre for the Study of Democracy has established an interest-earning known fund as the CSD Trust Fund.

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The establishment of the CSD Trust Fund, and the launching of an appeal to raise an endowment to support these various appointments and activities, was initially supported by a modest grant from the University. The CSD Trust Fund operates strictly under the auspices of the University of Westminster Prizes and Scholarships Fund, to whose Trustees it is directly accountable. Decisions about fund-raising and disbursements are initially formulated by a CSD Trust Fund Working Group, which includes several CSD staff, senior University representatives, well-placed patrons of the appeal, and a representative of the CSD Council of Advisers. In principle, the functions and activities of the CSD Trust Fund are kept quite separate from the governing institutions of the Centre, including its commitments to the wider University structures.

Requests for further details and offers of financial support should be directed to: Dr Richard Whitman, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR.

Staff News

John Keane has been awarded \$50,000 by the Ford Foundation for a new project on the history of democracy. In March 2002 he presented a public lecture ('Whatever Happened to Democracy?'; available on the CSD website) at the London-based think tank, the Institute for Public Policy Research. His new book, *Global Civil Society?*, will be published later this year by Cambridge University Press. He is currently preparing two new books: *Civil Society: Berlin Perspectives*, and a new and fully revised edition of *Reflections on Violence*.



Chantal Mouffe has been appointed Associate Researcher at GEODE, the Groupe d'Etudes et d'Observation de la Democratie, at the University of Paris X; and adviser to the research programme on Democracy and European Integration at the Austrian Ministry of Science.

John Owens and Erwin Hargrove of Vanderbilt University have edited a special issue of the US journal *Politics and Policy*, to be published in June 2002. The edited collection explores comparatively the importance of political leadership skills in context and includes case studies of presidential and congressional leadership in the US, as well as executive leadership in Britain, Germany, France and the European Commission. John Owens will present a paper on leadership skills in the context of US congressional politics to the Research Committee of Legislative Specialists of the International Political Science Association at Bilkent University, Istanbul, in June 2002.

CSD

The Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD) is the postgraduate and post-doctoral research centre of Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster. Well known for its inter-disciplinary work, CSD is led by a team of internationally recognized scholars whose teaching and research concentrate on the interplay of states, cultures and civil societies. CSD also supports research into all aspects of the past, present and future of democracy, in such diverse areas as political theory and philosophy, international relations and law, European Union social policy, gender and politics, mass media and communications, and the politics and culture of China, Europe, the United States, and Muslim societies. CSD is located in the School of Social and Behavioural Sciences (SBS) on the Regent Campus, and works alongside the influential Policy Studies Institute. It hosts seminars, public lectures and symposia in its efforts to foster greater awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of democracy in the public and private spheres at local, regional, national, and international levels. It offers a number of MAs on a one-year full-time, two-year part-time, basis (see back page for details). CSD's publications include a series of working papers entitled *CSD Perspectives* and this bulletin. *CSD Bulletin* aims to inform other university departments and public organizations, and our colleagues and under-graduates at the University of Westminster, of CSD's research activities. The *Bulletin* comprises reports of 'work in progress' of our research students and staff and contributions from visiting researchers and speakers. Comments on the content of this *Bulletin*, or requests to receive it, should be directed to The Editor, *CSD Bulletin*, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR. As with all CSD publications and events, the opinions expressed in these pages do not necessarily represent those held generally or officially in CSD or the University of Westminster.

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