CSD*Bulletin*

Culture and Power

CONTENTS

Fred Halliday *analyses the implications for the study of international relations of the work of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci*

Despite a tendency to treat culture or identity as independent entities, there is a large literature that seeks to relate culture to concepts of power, structure, and interest. My own approach can be termed that of 'comparative contingency'. It sees cultural values and ideologies as contingent in two senses: as *dependent* on, or needing to be shaped, introduced, and reproduced by, other social factors; and as *variant*, the variation being decided upon according to which rendering suits those with power. In an attempt to clarify the debate on nationalism, civilization, and culture, International Relations could profitably take further the research agenda present in such work. Such an agenda might include:

- the comparative study of culture in systems of power - i. e. the role of culture in establishing and reproducing different forms of power.

- instrumentalism and culture: the ways in which states, or those aspiring to take hold of states, have used and indeed defined cultures to meet their political ends and articulate interests. This is the basis of some fine work on Islamism as both anti-state and statist ideology (see, for example, Ervand Abrahamian's *Khomeinism* (1989).

- the comparative study of cultural transnationalism, the mechanisms of its diffusion, and its impact on state and society, prior to and including contemporary globalization.

- the role of culture in challenges to hegemony, and the successes and failures in this regard. A good example of this kind of work is Graham Fuller's 'The Next Ideology' (*Foreign Policy*, no. 98, Spring 1995), in which he counterposes to Samuel Huntington the argument that movements of third world hostility are based on economic and social causes.

- the comparative study of concrete cases of cultural collectivities, showing, without constructivist or transhistorical presuppositions, how such collectivities actually developed. (This is, of course, the challenge facing all those who oppose perennialist or essentialist histories of nationalism. It *is* more difficult to do this, more complex, but the others *are* wrong.)

- the development of the normative position that breaks with the constraints of nationalist, or communitarian, relativism.

None of these approaches would assume that culture had an autonomous impact, nor that the relation between culture and the state or economy were constant as between different epochs. In the face of a tide of literature that is either analytically or epistemologically keen to establish its premises, these questions, and many others, should remain open.

One way to provide such an anchoring would be to address the discussion of culture and its implications for politics and International Relations in the work of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1896-1937). As many of his followers have emphasized,

Gramsci sees all societies as involving two forms of power. In what he classifies as western Europe, consent is assured by 'hegemony': that is, both a certain kind of social alliance between the rulers and other social groups, and a particular set of values that reinforce a given political and social system. One reading of Gramsci's work is not so much that hegemony is counterposed to coercion, or what he calls 'domination', but rather that, while in what he classified as eastern Europe rule is *predominantly* by coercion (for consent is found in even the most extreme dictatorships), in the 'western' case coercion is a last resort. Hegemony works by creating a cultural system that promotes consent. It thereby serves to legitimate the position of the rulers.

Gramsci distinguishes between two kinds of cultural hegemony, each pertinent to the end of social stabilization: the diffusion of the values of the rulers, i.e. getting their culture accepted as natural or at least tolerable by all groups in society; and the creation and reproduction of non-hegemonic, subordinated, or 'corporativist' cultures, values specific to oppressed groups which reinforce subordination and so prevent them from articulating a challenge to ruling groups.

Gramsci believed that only when those opposed to the existing political system had successfully articulated their own *hegemonic* project, including in this an alternative reading of tradition, would it be possible to challenge established systems of rule. Any cultural alternative had to be at the level of the culture it was opposing, equal to the challenge of power and the constitution of a new, emancipatory, hegemony. Gramsci did not lapse into vapid adulation of every alternative, or into a feckless, but in the end corporativist, identity politics. Equally, far from rejecting high culture as 'elitist', he worked to appropriate it for all social groups.

For Gramsci, therefore, culture is part of the reproduction of systems of social and economic power. His approach is consistent neither with theories of culture as autonomous or opposed to states, nor with 'semiocentric' approaches of the postmodernist kind, but is compatible with approaches that analyse the instrumental, confected nature of ideologies, and of nationalisms and other cultural products in particular. Part of the challenge to this kind of hegemony is, precisely, to question the naturalness of such values and the social consequences they embody.

The implications of this for a critical study of the international system are many. First, Gramsci's approach provides a means of seeing culture not as disembodied from power relations, let alone as an alternative to them, but as itself part of power, and of the conflict between social and political forces within and between societies. Culture, far from being a way of denying social reality or the relevance of such categories as state, structure, or class, is a way to better identify their means of operation and reproduction. For example, nationalist elites create, through nationalism and the instrumental use of tradition and identity, particular forms of hegemony (or, when they are out of power, counter-hegemony). What is presented as an explosion of nationalism, or ethnic politics, or identity, can also be seen as a situation in which multiple rival groups com-

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peting for wealth and power use culture to mobilize and intimidate: this was very evidently the case with the emergence of post-communist nationalist elites in Yugoslavia or the Transcaucasus. More broadly, culture in the contemporary world, and in international relations, cannot be divorced from the interests of those with power, both political and economic.

Secondly, it can be argued that Gramsci's distinction between the eastern and western forms of rule corresponds broadly to a narrow (pre-1945) and universal (post-1945) concept of international society. While colonialism certainly involved an element of cultural hegemony, diffusing elements of the metropolitan culture to subjected peoples, it rested predominantly on coercion, both direct as well as mediated via local collaborating elites. In the contemporary system of states there is a deep structure of inequality. This is masked, however, by the appearance of equality and naturalness and, via a hegemonic system, through the diffusion of the values of the powerful states to others. All states pay tribute to this appearance, which is embodied in the United Nations and in the system of sovereign states.

This diffusion of values takes many

forms, but in broad terms we see the creation of a hegemonically defined international civil society based on the power of Western cultural norms. Beneath the international security system and a well-defended system of economic structures lie assumptions about the inevitability and naturalness of current social and economic orders. Culture in every sense is part of this hegemonic order.

The implications of Gramsci's work for counter-hegemony are equally striking. There are many cases in the contemporary world of hegemony both in the sense of the acceptance of values by the subordinated, and of the adoption by the subordinated of values that, while rejecting hegemony, only confirm that system of rule. The diffusion of one of the world's ten thousand languages - English - across the globe, and the acceptance as inevitable or natural of a certain definition of the market, are examples of the first. Cultural nationalism, and, in several countries, movements of religious fundamentalism, are examples of the second: far from enabling their societies to escape the constraints of the international system they disable them, in part by rejecting precisely that reappropriation of classical and universal culture that is essential to a plausible hegemonic project. Equally corporativist are, as in current UK debates, demagogic counterposings of a national economic policy to the entrapments of European integration.

Culture is present from the beginning in one form or another in thinking on international relations. However, discussion of culture must be embedded both in awareness of the history of ideas on this topic, and in the conflicting messages of history itself. Equally, such a discussion presupposes an epistemology and a theory of power that, while recognizing the importance of culture, avoid the illusions of semiocentrism and decontextualised overstatement. As Gramsci so cogently argued, culture is not an alternative to concepts of economic and political power but a constituent part of their reproduction.

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The Great Disruption

The advent of the 'information age' was marked by a weakening of social bonds and common values. But social order is returning, argues **Francis Fukuyama**.

Over the past half-century, the United States and other economically-advanced countries have gradually made the shift into what has been called an 'information society', the 'information age', or the 'post-Industrial era'. Futurist Alvin Toffler (in *The Third Wave*, 1980) has labelled this transition the 'Third Wave', suggesting that it will ultimately be as consequential as the two previous waves in human history, from hunter-gatherer to agricultural societies and then from agricultural to industrial ones.

The shift consists of a number of related elements. In the economy, services increasingly displace manufacturing as a source of wealth. Instead of working in a steel mill or automobile factory, the typical worker in an information society has a job in a bank, software firm, restaurant, university, or social service agency. The role of information and intelligence, embodied both in people and in increasingly smart machines, becomes pervasive, and mental labour tends to replace physical labour. Production is globalized as inexpensive information technology makes it increasingly easy to move information across national borders, and rapid communications via television, radio, fax, and e-mail erode the boundaries of long-established cultural communities.

A society built around information tends to produce more of the two things people value most in a modern democracy: freedom and equality. Freedom of choice has exploded, whether of cable channels, low-cost shopping outlets, or friends met on the Internet. Hierarchies of all sorts, whether political or corporate, come under pressure and begin to crumble. Large, rigid bureaucracies, which sought to control everything in their domain through rules, regulations, and coercion, have been undermined by the shift towards a knowledge-based economy which serves to 'empower' individuals, giving them access to information. Just as rigid corporate bureaucracies like the old IBM and AT&T gave way to smaller, more participatory competitors, so too did the Soviet Union and East Germany fall apart from their failure to control and harness the knowledge of their citizens.

The shift into an information society has been celebrated by virtually everyone who has written or talked about it. Commentators as politically diverse as George Gilder, Newt Gingrich, Al Gore, the Tofflers, and Nicholas Negroponte have seen these changes as good for prosperity, good for democracy and freedom, and good for society in general. But while many of the benefits of an information society are clear, have all of its consequences necessarily been so positive?

DECLINE

People associate the information age with the advent of the Internet in the 1990s, but the shift away from the Industrial era started more than a generation earlier with the 'deindustrialization' of the Rust Belt in the United States and comparable shifts away from manufacturing in other industrialized countries. This period, from roughly the mid-1960s to the early 1990s, was also marked by seriously deteriorating social conditions in most of the industrialized world. Crime and social disorder began to rise, making inner-city areas of the wealthiest societies on earth almost uninhabitable. The decline of kinship as a social institution, which has been going on for more than two hundred years, accelerated sharply in the second half of the twentieth century. Fertility in most European countries and Japan fell to such low levels that, without substantial immigration, these societies will depopulate themselves in the next century; marriages and births became fewer; divorce soared and out-of-wedlock childbearing came to affect one out of every three children born in the United States and over half of all children in Scandinavia. Finally, trust and confidence in institutions went into a long, forty-year decline. While a majority of people in the United States and Europe expressed confidence in their governments and fellow citizens during the late

1950s, only a small minority did so by the early 1990s. The nature of people's involvement with one another changed as well - while there is no evidence that people associated with each other less, their mutual ties tended to be less permanent, less engaged, and with small groups of people.

These changes were dramatic, they occurred over a wide range of similar countries, and they all appeared at roughly the same period in history. As such, they constituted a Great Disruption in the social values that prevailed in the industrial-age society of the mid-twentieth century, and are the subject of the first part of my book *The Great Disruption. Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order.* It is very unusual for social indicators to move together so rapidly; even without knowing why they did so, we have reason to suspect that they might be related to one another. While conservatives like William J. Bennett are often attacked for harping on the theme of moral decline, they are essentially correct: the break-

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down of social order is not a matter of nostalgia, poor memory, or ignorance about the hypocrisies of earlier ages. The decline is readily measurable in statistics on crime, fatherless children, reduced educational outcomes and opportunities, broken trust, and the like.

Was it just an accident that these negative social trends, that together reflected weakening social bonds and common values holding people together in Western societies, occurred just as economies in those societies were making the transition from the industrial to the information era? The hypothesis of my book is that the two were in fact intimately connected, and that with all of the blessings that flow from a more complex, information-based economy, certain bad things also happened to our social and moral life. The connections were technological, economic, and cultural. The changing nature of work tended to substitute mental for physical labour, thereby propelling millions of women into the workplace, and undermining the traditional understandings on which the family had been based. Innovations in medical technology like the birth control pill and increasing longevity diminished the role of reproduction and family in people's lives. And the culture of intensive individualism, which in the marketplace and laboratory leads to innovation and growth, spilled over into the realm of social norms where it corroded virtually all forms of authority and weakened the bonds holding families, neighbourhoods, and nations together.

The complete story is, of course, much more complex than this, and differs from one country to another. But broadly speaking, the technological change that brings about what economist Joseph Schumpeter called 'creative destruction' in the marketplace caused similar disruption in the world of social relationships. It would, indeed, be surprising were this not true.

SOCIAL CREATURES

But there is a bright side, too: social order, once disrupted, tends to get remade once again, and there are many indications that this is happening today. We can expect this to happen for a simple reason: human beings are *by nature* social creatures, whose most basic drives and instincts lead them to create moral rules that bind themselves together into communities. They are also by nature rational, and their rationality allows them to spontaneously create ways of cooperating with one another. Religion, while often helpful to this process, is not the *sine qua non* of social order as many conservatives believe. Neither is a strong

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and expansive state, as many on the Left argue. Man's natural state is not the 'war of all against all' envisioned by Thomas Hobbes, but rather a civil society made orderly by a host of moral rules. These statements, moreover, are empirically supported by a tremendous amount of research coming out of the life sciences in recent years, in fields as diverse as neurophysiology, behavioural genetics, evolutionary biology, ethology, as well as biologically-informed approaches to psychology and anthropology. The study of how order arises, not as the result of a top-down mandate by hierarchical authority, whether political or religious, but as the result of self-organization on the part of decentralized individuals, is one of the most interesting and important intellectual developments of our time. Thus the second part of my book - 'On the Genealogy of Morals' - steps back from the immediate social issues raised by the Great Disruption and asks the more gen-

eral questions: Where does social order come from in the first place, and how does it evolve under changing circumstances?

The idea that social order has to come from a centralized, rational, bureaucratic hierarchy was one very much associated with the industrial age. The sociologist Max Weber, observing nineteenth-century industrial society, argued that rational bureaucracy was in fact the very essence of modern life. We know now, however, that in an information society neither governments nor corporations will rely exclusively on formal, bureaucratic rules to organize the people over whom they have authority. Instead, they will have to decentralize and devolve power, and rely on the people over whom they have nominal authority to be *self-organizing.* The precondition for such self-organization is internalized rules and norms of behaviour, which suggests that the world of the twenty-first century will depend heavily on such informal norms. Thus while the transition into an information society has disrupted social norms, a modern, high-tech society cannot get along without them and will face considerable incentives to produce them.

SOURCES OF ORDER

The third part of the book - 'After the Great Disruption' - looks both backward and forward for the sources of this order. The view that society's moral order has been in long-term decline is one long held by certain conservatives. The British statesman Edmund Burke argued that the Enlightenment itself, with its project of replacing tradition and religion with reason, is the ultimate source of the problem, and Burke's contemporary heirs continue to argue that secular humanism is at the root of today's social problems. But while conservatives may be right that there were important ways in which moral behaviour deteriorated in the past two generations, they tend to ignore the fact that social order not only declines, but also increases in long cycles. This happened in Britain and America during the nineteenth century. It is reasonably clear that the period from the end of the eighteenth century until approximately the middle of the nineteenth century was one of sharply increasing moral decay in both countries. Crime rates in virtually all major cities increased; families broke down and illegitimacy rates rose; people were socially isolated; alcohol consumption, particularly in the United States, exploded, leaving per capita consumption in 1830 at levels perhaps three times as great as they are today. But then, with each passing decade from the middle of the century until its end, virtually each one of these social indicators turned positive: crime fell; families began staying together in greater numbers; drunkards went on the wagon; and new voluntary associations sprouted up to give people a new sense of communal belonging.

There are similar signs today that the Great Disruption that took place from the 1960s to the 1990s is beginning to recede. Crime is down sharply in the United States and other countries where it had become epidemic. Divorce rates have declined since the 1980s, and there are now signs that the rate of illegitimacy (in the United States, at any rate) has begun to level off, if not fall. Levels of trust in major institutions have improved during the 1990s, and civil society appears to be flourishing. There is, moreover, plenty of anecdotal evidence that more conservative social norms have made a comeback, and that the more extreme forms of individualism that appeared during the 1970s have fallen out of favour. It is far too early to conclude that these problems are now behind us. But it is also wrong to conclude that we are incapable of adapting socially to the technological and economic conditions of an age of information.

Another Great Transformation

Richard Rose *considers what the new Europe looks like, ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall.*

The fall of the Berlin Wall and its consequences are transforming a continent that was divided for 40 years. Western Europe was the 'ideal' Europe, for freedom and prosperity could be found there. The lands behind the Iron Curtain had a better claim to be the 'real' Europe, for authoritarianism and oppression by an alien ruler could be found there. While intellectuals sometimes speak of the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland as returning to a golden age Europe, ordinary people in post-communist societies do not want to return to the dictators, wars and poverty that characterized earlier European history.

Ten years into this transformation, what kind of a Europe is emerging at the start of the new millennium? Central Europe - which includes Sweden, Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, and even parts of Italy - is once again central to the continent. To the west are countries such as Britain, for whom post-communist lands are, to invoke the words of Neville Chamberlain before Munich, far away countries about which we know nothing. To the east are countries haunted by the ghost of Russian power.

The fall of the Wall has created a *Drang nach Osten* ('push to the East'), of which the movement of Germany's capital to Berlin this year is an apt symbol. The new German parliament will meet in the new Reichstag; the old building has been transformed by the design of a British architect. The problems of the unified Germany - in the Rhineland as well as along the Elbe - are a reminder that transformation has costs as well as benefits.

Ten post-communist countries have already re-oriented their attention from Moscow to Brussels, applying to join the 15 member-states already in the European Union (EU). The five leading candidates are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia; Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia make up the second flight; Russia, Ukraine, and Croatia are still outside the pale. If these ten countries gain membership, Europe's population centre - the point equidistant from the population of the entire continent - will be Ulm, a pleasant town in southern Germany with the tallest church spire in Europe and the birthplace of a quintessential modernist, Albert Einstein. The river that runs through it does not flow toward Bonn or Berlin: it is the Danube on its journey to the Black Sea.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF A DECADE

Whereas England and Sweden took centuries to evolve into democracies, and Germany stabilized democratic rule only under foreign occupation, many of the new regimes in post-communist Europe have shown substantial evidence of becoming normal democracies in a decade. In all ten countries there has been at least one change of government through the ballot box, and often two. For example, in 1990, anti-communist governments were elected in Hungary and Poland. The ex-Communists then showed their consistency - 'Once an opportunist, always an opportunist' - and won elections campaigning as social democrats. The ex-Communists, in turn, have been defeated at the polls and replaced by right-of-centre governments.

Voters have consistently rejected undemocratic alternatives. In Hungary, the radical right party of István Csurka cannot be sure of winning enough votes to gain any seats in Parliament. In the autumn of 1998 Slovak voters rejected Vladimír Meciar, who had led the country to a peaceful separation from the Czech Republic but then shown anti-democratic tendencies. In Latvia, a popular referendum rejected proposals that, in effect, would have prevented most of its Russian residents from ever becoming citizens. Only in Romania does the total vote for fragmented anti-democratic parties begin to approach the vote won in established democracies by parties with dubious democratic credentials, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front in France or Jörg Haider's Freedom Party in Austria.

The costs of economic transformation have been substantial; establishing a market economy where none had existed for over 40 years is much more difficult than ending a recession in a country with well-established market institutions. However, the costs have been much exaggerated. In the days of the command economy shortages were frequent, choice was non-existent, and bribery and party favouritism often determined who got what. People learned to augment their standard of living by household production or by working in 'second economies'; these skills have helped tide them over the worst of the move to the market.

The benefits of transformation by trial and error are now evident throughout

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most of post-communist Europe. Most countries where the officially measured Gross Domestic Product contracted and inflation raged in the early 1990s have now reversed their course. Poland and Slovenia have already surpassed their 1990 GDP levels, and the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia will soon do so. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania suffered severe dislocations because they were formerly part of the Soviet Union, but in each of these countries the economy is now growing. Only Bulgaria and Romania have yet to

demonstrate consistent growth. All of these economies have far better prospects than they had a decade ago, because Moscow and the edicts of bureaucratic planners no longer determine what happens. Instead, realistic prices, foreign imports, and consumer choice are rewarding efficiency.

The break up of multi-national communist regimes has reduced a classic source of political conflict in the region by creating successor states that are much more ethnically homogeneous. Czechoslovakia broke up through a 'velvet divorce', not bloodshed. In Estonia and Latvia the attitudes of Russians, legal residents but not citizens, are far more moderate than those of their self-appointed spokespersons in Moscow and elsewhere. What Russians in the Baltic states value most is the right to work and to draw social security benefits. The right to vote and to participate in politics is a low priority - more ethnic Russians see their future as best secured by living in a Baltic state than by integration with the Russian Federation. Ethnic minorities are now just that, a small percentage of a country's population, and the threat they pose to peace and security is diminishing. In 1992, New Democracies Barometer surveys in seven post-communist countries found that an average of 40 percent were concerned that ethnic minorities could be a threat to order. In 1998, the proportion expressing anxiety had fallen to 25 percent.

The bloody conflict in the successor states of Yugoslavia is no more representative of Europe than Albania (under communism or today) is a typical 'European' country. The European Union recognises this. Slovenia, the one Yugoslav successor state that has peacefully moved toward democracy, is negotiating for EU membership, while the other post-Yugoslav states, for the indefinite future, are outside the pale.

CATCHING UP

Most people are inclined to make comparisons with their own national past. By this standard, most citizens in every post-communist country see themselves as enjoying much more freedom than under communist rule. This is the view of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states, of the Baltic peoples themselves, and of a majority of citizens in such imperfect democracies as Bulgaria and Romania too. While none of the post-communist countries receives the

top score on Freedom House's Comparative Survey of Freedom, the five countries furthest ahead in joining the European Union are given the same high rating as Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and rank above Greece.

No post-communist country has achieved the standard of living of

Luxembourg or Denmark, the countries with the highest living standard in the EU. But 13 other countries of the European Union have also 'failed' to match that level; the living standard in Greece and Portugal is barely half that of the richest EU countries. It is only a matter of time before continuing economic growth pushes countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia past the current level of the least prosperous EU member states. Other post-communist countries will follow. And since post-communist countries grow faster than established market economies, the gap will close quickly.

Health provides another way to evaluate welfare. While health improved in every communist society over 40 years, the non-communist countries of Central Europe improved at a much faster rate: Hungary lagged behind Austria, and health in East Germany improved more slowly than in West Germany. While transformation caused some initial disturbances in health, post-communist countries are beginning to catch up with, or even surpass, some established market

economies. The Czech Republic, for example, now has an infant mortality rate (six deaths per thousand live births) lower than those in some EU countries, and substantially lower that in the United States, where there are eight infant deaths per thousand.

People in post-communist countries would like an American standard of living,

> 'People in post-communist countries would like an American standard of living, a Swedish welfare state, and democratic British institutions overnight.'

a Swedish welfare state, and democratic British institutions overnight. But life under communism has taught a lesson in keeping expectations low and being patient - that is, suffering in silence. Today, time horizons are long-term. When Central and East Europeans are asked how long it will be before they have reached a standard of living with which they are content, the median person says 'ten years', and two in five either say they don't know or think they will never be content. The same pattern is found when people are asked how long they think it will take the government to sort out the economic problems of their country as a whole.

The biggest problem that post-communist countries face is escaping the legacy of 40 years of communist rule. In the late 1940s, Stalinist regimes disbanded competing political parties; imprisoned, exiled, or executed opposition politicians; and made adherence to the party line, (whatever it was at the moment), a condition of appointment to leading positions in universities, the media, and trade unions.

As a result, representative institutions such as political parties, trade unions, and even parliament are widely distrusted or viewed with scepticism today. People find it easier to name a party that they would never vote for than to name a party they like. At election time, the median voter casts a ballot for a party that he neither trusts nor identifies with.

Under communism, the old Central European ideal of the *Rechtsstaat* (a state that rules by right, not might or ideology) was replaced by 'socialist legality'. Courts did not have to weigh evidence to arrive at a verdict; the party-state knew what the 'correct' verdict was. A maze of bureaucracies combined the worst features of party control and Kafkaesque indifference. Individuals became highly skilled at bending, evading, or breaking the law. While Communists lost their leading role, the personal networks that they created have encouraged *nomenklatura* privatization; the currency for getting things done has changed from a party card to dollars or Deutschmarks.

The level of corruption varies greatly in post-communist countries, as it does in established democracies. Among the 85 countries covered by the 1998 Transparency International Index of Perceived Corruption, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Estonia all rank in the upper half for honesty, equal to or above three EU member states, Belgium, Greece and Italy. Russia is among the world's ten most corrupt countries, ahead of Pakistan and not far behind Indonesia.

NEW MEMBERS, NEW CLUB

The European Union is an inclusive club; it must admit any applicant that is a democracy and adheres to the laws and practices of a market economy. The consideration of ten post-communist countries for membership shows how far transformation has come; this would have been unthinkable a decade ago. While transforming a communist system requires more time than it took Spain and Portugal to move from dictatorship to EU membership, by the end of the next decade the EU will have been transformed into a union of more than 20 states.

The current member states disagree over how fast the EU should be enlarged and on what terms. Hesitation can be motivated by national interest, such as a desire to protect the status quo in agricultural subsidies, which are so great that they cannot be paid to new members like Poland too. It can reflect realistic political anxieties about an inrush of job-seekers from neighbouring countries, given the free movement of labour within the single EU market. Before any new member states can be admitted, existing states must give up the right of any one to veto an EU decision, and decide what voting rights small new member states will have vis-à-vis big states. Here, the interests of Germany, France, Italy, and Britain diverge from those of Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland.

Loss of sovereignty, a major issue among the neo-Thatcherites in Britain and neo-Gaullists in France, is not a major concern in post-communist countries. They all experienced this during World War II, and their post-war history left them far more fearful of Moscow than of any directive from Brussels. By pooling sovereignty in the EU, small post-communist countries will gain the right to sit in decision-making councils with larger countries and sometimes set the agenda for meetings.

EU enlargement will fundamentally change what it means to be a European democracy. English critics who mutter 'But they are not like us!' are correct insofar as the abrupt post-communist route to democracy follows centuries of undemocratic rule. But it is Britain, not the Czech Republic or Poland, that is the exception here. Only six of the EU's 15 current member states have made an English-style evolutionary transition to democracy. In an expanded EU, countries that have abruptly returned to democracy or have 'boot strapped' their way to this goal will be the vast majority. Just as West Germans who lived through the Third Reich broke with their history of authoritarian rule, so the peoples of the post-communist countries, after centuries of war and undemocratic rule, are anxious to live together in peace and freedom.

> 'While Communists lost their leading role, the personal networks that they created have encouraged *nomenklatura* privatization; the currency for getting things done has changed from a party card to dollars or Deutschmarks.'

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Carter, Reagan, and Human Rights

Ali Tajvidi *compares the human rights policies of two recent Presidents*

The American constitution gives the President the final say in foreign affairs. The administrations of Jimmy Carter (1976-80) and Ronald Reagan (1981-88) provide us with two contrasting examples of the executive's role in the translation of American human rights aspirations into foreign policy decisions.

Carter was genuinely interested in the promotion of human rights, and his administration took concrete steps to institutionalise human rights in the American political system, adopting a more active human rights-oriented foreign policy. Though well aware of the limitations of such a policy in practice, Carter believed 'that it is a mistake to undervalue the power of words and of the ideas that words embody. In the life of the human spirit, words are actions'. Among other measures, his administration opposed the Byrd Amendment permitting trade with Rhodesia and supported UN mandatory sanctions against the Ian Smith government; voted in favour of a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa at the UN Security Council; accepted the existence of socio-economic human rights in principle; and submitted the two UN Covenants on human rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Convention on Racial Discrimination, to the Senate. On the other hand, the Carter administration sold arms to Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt without attaching any human rights conditions to the sales. US aid to South Korea continued on a massive scale, even though General Park's regime frequently punished political dissent with imprisonment. Only in Latin American countries, where US interests were relatively minor, were arms sales linked to progress in human rights. (In Iran the Shah, in response to US pressure, released some political prisoners and, according to the *Wall Street Journal*, put rugs in some Iranian prisons.)

David Carleton and Michael Stohl (*Political Science Quarterly*, no. 3, 1990) have shown that the most important factor in predicting the amount of money both the Carter and Reagan administrations spent on aid was not the human rights situation in aid-receiving countries but the assistance given in the previous year. They also noted there was hardly any difference in the levels of military aid the two administrations gave. They found that 'there was a great deal of difference between the rhetoric and the reality of the Carter human rights policy as applied to aid distribution. The Carter administration did not significantly withdraw material support from repressive US friends. It made ample use of the "extraordinary circumstances" clause written into human rights legislation'. (This clause allows the President to ignore the prohibition in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act on providing security assistance and on selling arms to countries guilty of systematic and gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.)

Although the Carter Administration was not consistent in its implementation of US human rights policy, it did at least encourage debate in this field, and helped create a bureaucratic infrastructure to encourage improvements in human rights. In 1974 there was only one full-time official in the State Department dealing with human rights. Under President Carter a Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs was created, headed by an Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Of its thirty-strong staff, ten dealt solely with human rights matters, while others covered related issues such as refugees, disappearances, and prisoners of war. An interdepartmental committee, the Christopher Group, chaired by Warren Christopher (later Secretary of State under President Clinton), dealt with the coordination of human rights policy with other policies, especially economic ones.

Humanitarian Affairs was probably the most active member of the Christopher Group. On the other hand, three regional bureaux represented in the Group - those dealing with Africa, East Asia, and Latin America - generally opposed Humanitarian Affairs's approach. They preferred to engage in private diplomacy to improve the observance of personal rights and, in some cases, political rights. Consequently, the primary conflict in the Group was between these three geographical areas and Humanitarian Affairs. Countries covered by the European, Near East, and South Asian bureaux were rarely discussed.

The Carter strategy of pressuring countries where the United States had influence caused concern that Washington was ignoring the worse records of other, less friendly, states. Even the high level Christopher Group was not able to establish clear policy criteria. According to Judith Innes de Neufville (*Human Rights Quarterly*, no. 4, 1986), 'doubts about the basic advisability of human rights policies were fed by scepticism that such policies could be applied consistently or fairly'.

ROLLING BACK HUMAN RIGHTS

Only a few weeks after Ronald Reagan's inauguration as President in January 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig stated that 'international terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern because it is the ultimate of abuses of human rights.'

Reagan and his advisors saw the Carter Administration's policy as a primary cause of the United States's recent setbacks

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abroad, particularly in Nicaragua and Iran. The intellectual foundations of the administration's policy were laid by Jeane Kirkpatrick, a professor of government at Georgetown University. Her doctrine, summed up in an article entitled 'Dictatorship and Double Standards', advocated preferential treatment for 'authoritarian allies' over 'totalitarian adversaries'.

While the Reagan Administration maintained the human rights infrastructure at the State Department created under Jimmy Carter, it was clear that the Administration's interest in human rights was both limited and mainly instrumental. The Administration's first candidate for the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, Ernest

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Lefever, was rejected by a Republican-dominated Senate Foreign Relations Committee: he had criticized President Carter for 'trivializing' human rights by not seeing the issue as part of the Cold War; and he had expressed the view that, for the same reason, Congressional

human rights legislation should be rolled back. Lefever had also accepted money to circulate views favourable to white minority rule in South Africa.

The Administration's successful candidate, Elliot Abrams - like Jeane Kirkpatrick and Alexander Haig - believed that human rights should be subordinated to larger geopolitical concerns. In a 1981 State Department memo he stated bluntly that the purpose of a human rights policy should be to convey to the public, at home and in Europe, just what the difference was between East and West. He encouraged the President to use human rights as a rhetorical weapon against Moscow. In 1982 he told reporters that it 'is not enough to ask who is in power and what is he like. We also have to ask what is the alternative, what are the likely prospects for improvement'. In December 1983 he was even more explicit: human rights 'are not a free-floating goal to be considered in isolation each morning. We do not betray the cause of human rights when we make prudential judgements about what can and can't be done in one place at one time'.

The Reagan Administration introduced its own double standard for human rights. On the one hand, it adopted Kissinger-style 'quiet diplomacy' for its authoritarian friends. In the words of Elliot Abrams, 'traditional diplomacy has the drawback of being least visible precisely where it is most successful.' On the other hand, when it came to unfriendly dictatorships, the Administration raised human rights issues as loudly and clearly as possible. As a result much attention was paid to human rights situations in communist countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Czechoslovakia, as well as in the 'evil

empire' i.e. the Soviet Union, while the Administration was silent about Turkey, Kenya, South Africa, Honduras, and Indonesia.

This did not go unnoticed. In 1987 Human Rights Watch and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights accused the Reagan administration of only paying attention to human rights violations committed by its opponents. While some argue that this kind of charge may have been the reason for the (extremely surprising) critical observation in the 1988 State Department 'Country Report' on the performance of the Israeli army in the Occupied Territories, it is more likely that this criticism was motivated by political expediency: the US government thought a more balanced approach to Israel would strengthen its mediating role in the coming Middle East negotiations. (The US decision to open talks with the Palestine Liberation Organization was made in the last days of the Reagan administration.)

LIMITED ASPIRATIONS

American values and universal human rights share the same theoretical roots. But the human rights aspirations of the United States' government are limited in scope, and dominated by what the governing elites perceive as being in the country's

> 'For policy-makers the ideal situation is one in which considerations of power politics and moral-ethical issues coincide.'

national interests. For policy-makers the ideal situation is one in which considerations of power politics and moral-ethical issues coincide. Bill Clinton's approach to Iran falls into this category. His Administration regards human rights as an important instrument in its policy of containment towards Tehran: the promotion of human rights does not contradict what the Administration perceives to be US national interests.

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Workfare, Danish-style

Denmark's social-democratic government is proud that registered unemployment dropped from 350,000 in 1993 to under 200,000 in 1998 with no rise in inflation (and without any reductions in real wages and social benefits). This miracle - rising employment with stable inflation - is explained by the new active labour-market policy introduced by the social-democratic government in the early 1990s. This policy is an essential part of the transition underway in Denmark from a Keynesian National Welfare State (KNWS) to a Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime (SWPR).

Despite the fierce anti-welfare rhetoric of the Thatcher government in Britain and the Reagan administration in the USA, New Right governments did not succeed in dismantling the welfare state. Yet more than a decade of fierce retrenchment strategies did contribute to a steady retreat from the priorities of the welfare state. Demands for the expansion of social rights and for full employment were less frequent, and politicians started to look for new goals and tasks. In short, the gradual weakening of welfarism has opened up a new strategic terrain, one on which the struggle is not about retrenchment but restructuring, about redefining the basic tasks of the welfare state in the direction of 'Schumpeterian' and 'workfarist' regulation.

FROM KEYNES TO SCHUMPETER

The form of socioeconomic reproduction dominant in Western countries from the 1950s to the 1970s can be called the *Keynesian Welfare National State*: 'Keynesian' because it aimed to secure full employment within a relatively closed national economy through demand-side management; a 'Welfare' state because it tried both to generalize norms of mass consumption beyond those employed in the Fordist sectors so that all national citizens might share the fruits of economic growth, and to promote forms of collective consumption favourable to the Fordist mode of growth; 'National' because the national state had the primary responsibility for developing and guiding Keynesian welfare policies on different scales; and 'State' because state institutions (on different levels) were the chief complement to market forces in the operation of the 'mixed economy', and had a dominant role in shaping the institutions of civil society.

Since the early 1980s, the KWNS has been giving way to a *Schumpeterian*

Jacob Torfing *argues that Denmark's new workfare policy empowers the unemployed and strengthens democratic citizenship*

Workfare Postnational Regime. This aims to promote permanent innovation and flexibility in open economies by intervening on the supply-side ('Schumpeterian'); subordinates social policy to the demands of greater labour-market flexibility and lower public social expenditure - i.e. social wages are treated as a cost of production rather than as a source of domestic demand ('Workfare'); hollows out the national state as old and new state capacities are displaced upward to supranational levels, downward to subnational levels, and outward to trans-local levels, and leads to an increasing 'relativization of scales' ('Postnational'); and sees an increasing role for de-centred and multi-tiered governance networks in providing state-sponsored economic and social policies ('Regime').

These are ideal-types, of course: actual welfare states contain elements of both Keynesian macroeconomic policy and Schumpeterian strutural-economic policy, and of both welfare and workfare. They should be analysed in terms of their *macro-structural mix* and their *welfare-workfare mix*. Nevertheless, where welfare policies predominate so, generally, do macroeconomic policies, and changes in the welfare-workfare mix in the direction of workfare are most often associated with a greater emphasis on structural-economic policy.

Both macro-economic and structural-economic policies, and welfare and workfare policies, can be pursued *offensively* or *defensively*. The first approach tries to deal with socio-economic problems proactively in order to produce a positive-sum solution. An offensive strategy is inclusive and hegemonic and avoids both 'restructuring for capital' and 'restructuring for

> 'the gradual weakening of welfarism has opened up a new strategic terrain, one on which the struggle is not about *retrenchment* but *restructuring*'

labour'. By contrast, a defensive strategy solves problems more reactively: it provides zero-sum solutions that give in to short-term partisan interests or ideological concerns. Actual examples of KWNS and SWPR will combine offensive and defensive strategies. However, that should not prevent us from judging the overall character of the hegemonic strategy.

There are different *national variants* of KWNS and SWPR: *neo-liberal variants*, which aim mainly to promote a market-led regime by reinforcing the market as the privileged decision-making mechanism in both private and public sectors; *neo-statist variants*, which rely on a state-guided approach to societal regulation in and through state-promoted governance networks; and *neo-corporatist* variants, which promote *ex ante* concertation of economic decisions and activities through relatively open and inclusive policy networks.

NEW DISCOURSES

Some see the transition from KWNS to SWPR as a functional response to economic developments in the form of the introduction of new technologies, the advance of a new post-Fordist accumulation regime, and the increasing globalization and 'triadization' of the global economy (the latter term referring to the emergence of a triad of economic powers or regions: the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Pacific Rim). One can counter this functionalist explanation by highlighting the presence of intentional social agents who are capable of restructuring the articulation of state, economy, and civil society in and through political strategies and struggles. These social agents are not simply responding to objective economic

pressures on the basis of pre-existing interests; rather, they are actively constructing the political discourses which shape their identity and guide their actions. The implicit economism of such arguments can be countered by pointing to political and social developments that are pushing us away from KWNS and towards SWPR.

It is political strategies and struggles, guided by a new set of political discourses, which have produced the current changes in the mode of regulation. These discourses construct dislocatory economic developments in terms of a particular set of problems and possible solutions. Hegemonic struggles for political as well as moral intellectual leadership produce an authoritative response to what is perceived as new economic necessities.

In many western European countries new discourses of 'structural competitiveness' and 'structural unemployment' guide the restructuring of the welfare state. That is, 'competitiveness' is no longer defined merely in terms of wage levels and exchange rates, but includes a whole range of economic and non-economic factors. Similarly, 'unemployment' is no longer explained merely as the result of a down-swing in the business cycle, but also in terms of structural rigidities that prevent the labour-market from clearing. Dislocatory economic developments are interpreted from within these discourses, and new forms of Schumpeterian and workfarist regulation are seen as attractive answers to the question of how to enhance structural competitiveness and lower structural unemployment.

> 'The Danish government has managed to disarticulate workfare from its neo-liberal 'origin' and to rearticulate it with Denmark's social-democratic legacy.'

SWPR, DANISH-STYLE

In the 1960s the Danish welfare state had the following characteristics. It was *Fordist without Ford*: the prototypical Fordist industrial plant using efficient mass production techniques is almost non-existent in Denmark, but Fordist forms of production prevailed as an ideal at the discursive level, and the Danish wage regulation and consumption patterns were Fordist in an almost ideal-typical way. It was *expansionist Keynesian*: the dominance of Keynesianism in economic and political discourse was almost total, but the primary effect of this was the legitimization of a large and expanding public sector rather than strict Keynesian demand management. It offered *universalist welfare*: welfare was a civic right unconnected to labour market performance. The state promoted equality at high standards rather than merely satisfying minimum needs. It had a *national orientation*: though the economy was small and open, national forms of economic and social welfare were preferred. And it was a *strong state in a negotiated economy*: while the state's economic state capacities were generally weak, the tradition of involving, through negotiation, interest groups in economic decision-making ensured that policy-making was a consensual process and that policy implementation was efficient.

In Denmark the transition from KWNS to SWPR has been slow. The result has been a transition to what one might call a SWN(p)R(s). This indicates that, whereas there has been a clear transition towards Schumpeterianism and workfarism, the shift towards 'postnational' and 'regime' are not complete. The *national* (N) still

dominates over the *postnational* (p), and, although the regime aspect (R) is becoming stronger, there is also a tendency towards a strengthening of the role of the national *state agencies* (s). Danish integration in the EU is, at least in some areas, rather hesitant, reflecting the fact that Danes are reluctant Europeans. Likewise, the state has not been reduced to being merely one amongst several actors in a series of policy networks; rather, it is strongly engaged in meta-governance.

THE WELFARE-WORKFARE BALANCE

The restructuring of the Danish welfare state is most far-reaching in the area of social and labour-market policies. The economic crisis of the early 1970s coincided with the enactment of the most ambitious, universalist, and generous law on social assistance in Danish history, and with the rise of unemployment benefit from 80 per cent to 90 per cent of wages. Public social expenditure grew rapidly as unemployment rose from about 2 per cent in 1973 to 12 per cent in 1993.

Until the mid-1980s unemployment policies consisted mainly of (1) attempts to increase the demand for labour power through wage subsidies; (2) attempts to reduce the supply of labour by expanding a series of early retirement schemes; and (3) the provision of generous social transfer payments for the unemployed.

From 1978 the long-term unemployed were offered a subsidized job for nine months in either the private or public sector, or a place at an educational institute. The main motivation behind the Job and Education Offer Law was to prevent the long-term unemployed from dropping out of the unemployment insurance system.

In the second half of the 1980s official policy discourse began to emphasize workfare. However, initial changes in discourse only produced insignificant policy changes, and it might even be argued that during this period the Danish welfare state came close to realizing a citizen-income model.

The shift from welfare to workfare came after a series of white papers claimed that the need to enhance structural competitiveness and reduce structural unemployment made essential a shift from the passive funding of unemployment to the active funding of 'activation' programmes that facilitate labour-market integration. 'Activation' entails a flexible offer of counselling courses, subsidised private or

public job training, 'quota-jobs' (2-3 year, publicly-financed jobs - of which there are a fixed number - in the social, cultural, and environmental sectors), individual job training, education, or subsidized self-employment). The Law on Active Labour-Market Policy of 1993 (which sets out regulations for the insured unemployed) and the Law on Active Social Policy of 1997 (for the uninsured unemployed) mark the introduction of workfare into the Danish welfare state.

The Law on Active Labour-Market Policy severed the previous link between activation and the continued right to unemployment benefit and fixed a maximum length for receiving unemployment benefit: seven years (now four). It requires that the labour exchange and the unemployed draw up a needs-orientated individual action plan; it states that anyone unemployed for four years (now one year) must be 'activated' for three years; and it requires that an unemployed person under 25 without further education must participate in an educational programme (on 50 per cent of unemployment benefit) for 18 months if they have been unemployed for more than six months in the last nine.

The Law on Active Social Policy emphasizes everyone's right and obligation to use and develop their working skills, and requires that all those receiving money be activated - including those who suffer problems other than unemployment. Those under 30 must be activated within 13 weeks of becoming unemployed; those over 30 within one year. Anyone activated can keep a part of their extra earnings.

The Danish workfare strategy is *offensive* in that it emphasizes: 1) activation rather than benefit and wage reductions; 2) improving the skills and work experience of the unemployed rather than merely increasing their mobility and job-searching efficiency; 3) training and education rather than work-in-exchange-for-benefits; 4) empowerment rather than control and punishment; and 5) inclusive workfare programmes rather than programmes which only target the unemployed. It is in essence a *neo-statist* strategy as the state is the main player in the new welfare-workfare mix. There is an increasing reliance on 'regulated self-regulation' (in which socio-economic actors in a pol-

> 'Restructuring is most far-reaching in the area of social and labour-market policies.'

icy network regulate themselves and their policy area within an overall framework regulated from above by the relevant ministry) but the element of central state regulation is stronger than the self-regulation of the regional governance networks.

The introduction of workfare policies in Denmark was inspired by the British and American workfare strategies that emerged in the late 1980s. But while Anglo-Saxon countries have adopted a defensive, neo-liberal workfare strategy that dissolves rather than conserves welfare, the Danish government (inspired by the Swedish experience) has managed to disarticulate workfare from its neo-liberal 'origin' and to rearticulate it with Denmark's social-democratic legacy. Danish workfare strategy tends to conserve rather than dissolve welfare.

> 'The social bond between the individual and the community is strengthened.'

SOCIAL AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

In Denmark social rights have been linked to citizenship: 'social citizenship' has been defined as the right of the individual to maintain a certain standard of living. A positive result of this is that the country has the OECD's lowest poverty rate. The individual has had no obligations to the community, except to pay taxes.

The new workfare policy, with its emphasis on the right and obligation of the unemployed to activation, has changed this. The unemployed now have a right both to social transfer payments, and to receive a fair offer of activation; they are also legally obliged to become activated.

Of course, everything depends on how this sanctionable obligation is constructed and implemented. In Denmark, where the obligation is not constructed as a means of punishment and sanctions are seldom enforced, the new workfare policy makes a positive contribution to social citizenship. Rights and obligations are balanced, with the result that the social bond between the individual and the community is strengthened.

By emphasizing the social and political empowerment of the unemployed, the new workfare policy also strengthens democratic citizenship. The law states that the unemployed must be actively involved in the drafting of their individual activation plans; the unemployed can now complain to an independent legal body if their activation offer does not live up to a certain standard; and the social empowerment of the unemployed is strengthened by the formation of regional social partnership organizations (in the executive committees of which the uninsured unemployed are represented) which assume responsibility for the activation of the uninsured unemployed. Activation leads to political empowerment.

Undoubtedly, activation involves a good deal of discipline and punishment, but it breaks the isolation of the unemployed and helps them to improve their technical skills, their social resources and capacities, and, not least, their self-confidence.

The lesson of the Danish case is that discursive struggles can alter the content of workfare reforms so that workfare is not essentially repressive, and not necessarily detrimental to welfare.

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Charismatic tradition?

Stephan Feuchtwang _looks at what happens to the concept of charisma when it is treated anthropologically_

We have all had the experience of coming across an exceptional person, one who is admired for originality of vision and purpose. In English, it is now common to call such a person 'charismatic'. But the sociological topic is of a relationship in which there is an extraordinary quality of leadership and followership. The word is in origin religious, meaning to have received a divine gift.

Weber, the German interpretative sociologist, turned the Christian idea of charisma into something which could be subjected to empirical analysis. In Weber's sociology, religion is separated from a more encompassing sociology of authority and obedience. The idea of charisma becomes a key type in this more encompassing conception. One of three pure types of authority which command voluntary obedience, charisma is the gift of the peculiar strength of a person's character or the grace of a supreme authority seen to be present in a person. Another pure type is traditional authority, to which obedience is offered because this authority is hallowed by the aura of repetition and precedent, of what always has been, and therefore always should be, done. The third pure type is legal-rational authority, which commands obedience to rules and their administration; obedience to law as such. It is also bureaucracy, where the rules and procedures are rationally and impersonally justified as efficiency. Both traditional and legal-rational authority tend towards historical stasis, routine, and institutionalization. In relation to them both, charismatic authority, in Weber's scheme, has a special and privileged position, for it is the principle of creativity, of innovation, and of renewal. Charisma may be destructive or creative, but it is historical life where the other two spell his-

torical death. Charismatic personality and following arise in situations of crisis within the other types of authority, create a new legitimacy, and move them on. There is something peculiar about this. Charisma is still like the god outside the social machine, moving and changing it. It is the principle of social invention and of the making of history.

ENLIGHTENMENT AND SLEEP

Fifty years ago Gerth and Mills noted, in _From Max Weber_, that the concept of charisma served Weber as 'a metaphysical vehicle of man's freedom in history'. It is a concept of leadership by personality, still

> 'Charismatic personality and following arise in situations of crisis within the other types of authority, create a new legitimacy, and move them on.'

very similar to divine election. One of the most ambitious reconsiderations of Weber's 'charisma' is by an anthropologist, Charles Lindholm (see his _Charisma_, 1990). Lindholm instructively widens the concept of charisma beyond Weber. In particular he introduces Durkheim's theory of collective sentiments and the theories of crowd psychology which partly informed it, and he sees how they and Freud's metapsychology treat the ecstatic quality of the charismatic relation between leader and followers. Two charismas emerge - the opposite ecstasies of Enlightenment and Sleep. The first type could include the invigorating and inspiring dynamic of a performance of a play, a

piece of music, or an improvisation of any kind in conversation or in jazz, in which everyone rises to the occasion, led by a master or the example of a master, a composer, a performer, but raising her or him as well as each other to new heights of performance and new insights. The improvisation may not be led at all. Note that such mutual inspiration is also a result of learning, the discipline of practice. Note too, that it is a wish or even an expectation that something like this will occur - the desire, expectation and the discipline of producing something exceptional. But it is the ecstasy of sleep which preoccupies Lindholm. In this form of charisma, the wish for collective unity in projective identification with a leader creates a followership which selects a borderline personality capable of great certainty and passion, inducing an ecstatic loss of self in the collective following, similar to a state of hypnosis or of trance.

Lindholm applies this concept to a number of examples, the first of which is that of Adolf Hitler. In this example, Lindholm stresses the desire for communion and a disaffection from all established institutions, including the family, among youth in post-World War I Germany. They formed groups with similarly disaffected youth, making themselves into new, idealized brotherhoods and sisterhoods. But Lindholm omits the historians' longer view.

One historian in particular stands out. Describing his own approach to writing several histories of Nazism, George Mosse (in _Nazism: A Historical and Comparative Analysis of National Socialism_, 1978) talks about the activation of the myths we live by in a dialectic between historical tradition and current reality. Nazism was an activation in a current reality of a tradition which contained communal expectations. Other traditions in Germany, such as those of Christian ecstatic piety, or of revolutionary socialism, produced different kinds of enthusiasm, hope, community, and heroism.

Of course, Lindholm is right to point to a crisis of self-definition, as well as to political and economic crises, as the ripe conditions for the acting out of this tradition of epoch-making expectation. But, like Weber, he is in search of the pure type, or the essential germ of charisma, which he finds in the detached ecstatic crowd or in a sectarian community and its leader; whereas, if we follow Mosse, who describes himself as an anthropologically

informed historian, we must conclude that charismatic ecstasy and communion involves a reproduction and transformation of a tradition.

NOT QUITE CHARISMA

Other anthropologists move us further in Mosse's direction, towards understanding Weber's and Lindholm's charisma both as myth and as concept. Stepping out of Europe, to a collection of studies of Sufi Islamic brotherhoods in Africa (*Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*, edited by D. B. O'Brien and C. Coulon, 1988), we find Donal Cruise O'Brien wryly observing how it has not been possible either in studies of Muslim or of Christian saints to find examples of Weber's pure type; it is only possible to find NQC: Not Quite Charisma. His cases are all studies of what Weber would count only as routinised charisma, even though it often erupts into rebellious social movements and new lines of succession. One of the most important points to be drawn from the Sufi examples is the ascetic discipline involved in the making of a charismatic inspiration. We can find over and over again, in these and other examples, that mental and physical exercises, sometimes aided by medicines and the hard practice of learning scriptures or performance techniques, are the groundwork for both creativity and authoritative innovation.

CARGO CULTS

Thirty years earlier, the sociologist and anthropologist Peter Worsley had conducted a comprehensive and brilliant analysis of millenarian cargo cults in Melanesia (*The Trumpet Shall Sound*, 1957). In every sense of charisma, they should have fitted Weber's concept. They were led by prophets, they were ecstatic, and they expected imminent and radical change. But Worsley found that Weber's concept was more a hindrance than a help to him. He objected to Weber's general concept of rationality and the underlying sociology of action which takes the subjective orientation of actors as the starting-point for every social analysis. Worsley preferred to treat conflicts and contradictions of different rationalities as an objective reality, in a single social field. He wanted to interpret the beliefs and practices of Cargo Cults as knowledge and expectation which was pragmatically altered according to experience, whereas by Weber's methodology he would have had to treat them as an irrational incursion into the rationality of the prevalent social order. But, apart from this general methodological objection to Weber, Worsley had some substantive objections which imply a new concept of charisma.

The movements he studied did not have a single, central leadership as they should have had according to Weber's concept, which hinges on the personality of one leader. Instead, they were federations of several inspirational leaders. Of equal importance is Worsley's observation

> ' One of the most important points to be drawn from the Sufi examples is the ascetic discipline involved in the making of a charismatic inspiration.'

that the inspirational leaders were usually paired with political leaders who were organizers authorized by their messages. The prophet himself was usually a retiring individual. In short, Worsley found that charisma is not so much a personality as a message which has been recognized because it resonates with and gives authority to followers' expectations and assumptions. The inspirational leader conveying the message is selected in situations where expectations of great change have been boiling up or have been frustrated. Charisma is amplified and enhanced by the absence or death of the prophet. The story of the charismatic leader, rather than his personality, becomes the authorizing symbol for several local leaders, or for several factions dividing the movement into many.

If the implicit new concept were spelled out it would be that charisma is an expectation of the extraordinary, which produces prophetic and authorizing messages and stories of a great leader, which are multiplied and enhance the authority of actual political leaders. How does this revised concept illuminate case studies from other parts of the non-European world?

KANO

One of the studies in O'Brien's collection, by the anthropologist Murray Last, has the merit of describing the transformation of a tradition of charisma in one place, the great commercial and military city of Kano in what is now northern Nigeria. It is a tradition of military kings defending not only a capital of mercantile commerce but also the source of their own charisma, the Prophet Mohammed. It is a tradition of holy war, *jihad.* Last's chief source is a chronicle of the rulers of the city, kept by their guardians and teachers of charismatic authority, Muslim scholars: in other words, it is the local charismatic tradition in its own narration. The military rulers of Kano were never safe in their wielding of physical force. It had to be accompanied by the magic and medicine of Muslim scholars. But even this was no guarantee. The city was in a permanent state of instability, as Last comments, because, unlike neighbouring kingdoms, it had no agrar-

ian base. Defeat and the downfall of kings were, according to their chroniclers, sometimes due to the superior size of the foe's army, but usually also to the failure of the king's charisma or to the greater power of his foe's medicine. Here charisma is the mystical power cultivated in the careers of the scholars and in the king's own generosity, as well as in his physical forces. It is also in the manufacture - expected of the same Muslim scholars - of the medicine or alchemy of charisma. Confidence in all three - mystical power, medicine, and force - were needed to legitimize the taxes which the merchants paid for the maintenance of the king and the scholars of his charisma. They would otherwise go to another city, or switch allegiance to another ruler. As Last writes: 'King after king is shown as seeking, often desperately, to stave off military defeat, to retain or extend political power. . . . Their search stimulated much innovation and experimentation, most of which has undoubtedly dropped from the record. What remains clear, however, is how fluid and contingent success, and the power to achieve it, were seen to be - and indeed were'.

Defeat by Christian West Africans regimented by colonial powers had a dramatic effect on this tradition. Islam became an ideological - but not a military - bastion against colonialism. Since independence, with the transfer of the monopoly of physical force to a secular state, both Muslim and other kinds of moral medicine have been sought by politicians who depend on a mass following. Rumours and fear of a leader's possessing a strong medicine, which outsiders call magic, are now an alternative to the cultivation of Sufi sanctity. Both are current in popular culture, alongside bio-medicine and a secular scepticism associated with Europeans. And all these exist alongside the more orthodox and legally-

> 'There are simply different traditions of charisma, each with their distinctive cosmology, their ideas of transcendental reality, and their ethics.'

minded Muslim establishment. There has been a proliferation of cures, and of therapies, including those of spirit-possession cults, for success in everything from childbearing, business, and physical prowess, to political following. Last concludes that this 'expansion is but part of a wider search for success, linked not so much to

austerity as to opportunity, a product of boom, not recession. Success in these conditions is not "luck"; nor is charisma a chance "gift", but an essential ingredient in an individual's ability to exercise power'. Last seems to be saying that mass politics and a capitalist economy have multiplied the sources of charisma and spread expectations of exercising power over one's life, whether the search is for small or great success. Charisma has become personal power aided by medicine, and only some of the medicines are linked to moral teaching and religious authority. At the same time, the legitimacy of physical force wielded by a post-colonial state depends on a combination of beliefs in its success from among these proliferating sources.

FOREST SAINTS

In an earlier anthropological study - outside Islam and the monotheistic religions which informed Weber's theory of charisma by divine election - Stanley Tambiah introduced the idea of a charismatic career to make sense of what Weber had written and of what he found in the Thai Buddhist tradition (*The Buddhist Saints of the Forests and the Cults of the Amulets*, 1984). Forest saints of Thailand pursue a career of ascetic discipline to reach what Tambiah calls a state of transcendence in which the saint in compas-

sion receives lay donations. According to Buddhist exegesis a field of merit extends around a saint which laymen may plough and harvest for a return. That harvest is a collection of amulets which act as reminders of the saints' virtue, an equivalent to the Kano scholars' medicine. In short, the Buddhist charismatic career of a forest saint, like that of a Sufi saint, demands a reconceptualisation of charisma as having a tradition. It also demands a reconceptualisation of Weber's idea of traditional authority itself. For the saint's career is in a tradition which includes innovation, and not simply repetition.

Tambiah concludes that there are simply different traditions of charisma, each with their distinctive cosmology, their ideas of transcendental reality, and their ethics. If the concept of charisma is to be retained, as Tambiah intends, we must look in other traditions for the equivalent of the gift of invention and intervention. In that case, a tradition of charisma is not routinised charisma, it is a tradition of breaks with routine. This sounds like a paradox, but it is a fact that traditions of hope for salvation and miracle, and for creating a better world, exist everywhere. In the Sufi *jihad* tradition of Kano it is a joining of ascetic career with physical and social medicine. In the tradition of Thai forest saints it is an ascetic discipline reaching a state of generosity where it has a lay following. Each is exploited by political leaders seeking to gain and prove their success. Each is also a tradition of hope for transformation, which legitimizes an alternative to existing authority, or for innovation, even though as tradition it presents itself as restoration.

We can in addition conclude that traditions of charisma proliferate alongside bureaucratic rationality and faith in the application of the sciences of social and managerial efficiency. Expectations of deliverance from illness or poverty into health and prosperity are, indeed, propelled not only by traditions of hope of a great leader but also by the ideal of fairness, if not also of social justice, which the ideology of bureaucracy, a career open to merit, promises.

Dr Stephan Feuchtwang is a professorial research associate in anthropology at the London School of Economics. This is an edited version of a paper he gave to the CSD Research Seminar in November 1998.

Doing Research

Patrick Burke

Exits and Entrances: Political Research as a Creative Art
Lewis Minkin
Sheffield Hallam University Press,
1997, £13.99

Learning, Teaching and Researching on the Internet: A Practical Guide for Social Scientists
Stuart Stein
Addison Wesley Longman, 1999, £14.99

Lewis Minkin - best known for a highly praised body of work on the relationship between the Labour Party and the trade unions, culminating (to date) in *The Contentious Alliance: trade unions and the Labour Party* (1992) - has written a fascinating book on creativity in research. Throughout, he illustrates his argument with examples from his own research experience of over 30 years.

The book's main theme is this: it is important not just to acknowledge the role that creativity plays in academic research but also to acquire the techniques to develop it for, and apply it in, research. By addressing this topic, Minkin wants to help make good 'the relative lack of systematic dialogue about the personal creative process in academic research'. Why is it important to do this? Because reflection on this process - 'thinking about our thinking' - is a precondition for improving it.

'Creativity', of course, as Minkin concedes, is hard, if not impossible, to define. He offers this: 'the process of bringing something original and appropriate into being', a process in which obvious elements - 'methodical, scrupulous, precise enquiry' and 'focused mental application' - combine with others less so: 'non-intellective factors', an 'experimental and toying activity of the mind', and 'imaginative vision'.

'Non-intellective' - psychological - factors shape our research, for better or worse: see, for example, our ability, or lack of it, to cope with failure; or, closely related, our level of motivation; or simple doggedness. But though being aware of our psychological disposition is crucial, even more so is exploiting it. '"What do

we deserve credit for?"', asked Francis Crick about the discovery of DNA. A 'willingness to discard untenable ideas', and: '"persistence"'. Or take failure (about which Minkin has a lot to say): this should not just be endured, but used. Research production, for Minkin, 'has been full of uncertainties and hesitations, mistaken assumptions and wrongly taken paths, zigzags in approach and revisions of strategy'. At times this has been demoralising, certainly. But he has learnt to see it as 'both integral and conducive to creative research'. 'Learn from your mistakes' - he wants to remind us - should not be an empty admonition.

Particularly instructive - and entertaining - are the chapters in which Minkin demonstrates one form that the 'experimental and toying activity of the mind' can take: the adoption, at appropriate points in the research process, of Walter-Mitty like roles: the Detective - a curious, determined, even obsessive questioner; the Patternmaker - the theorizer, who tries to make a coherent shape out of the material collected by the Detective; the Awkward Sod - who, well, asks the awkward questions the researcher, immersed in his work, might normally not think of; and so on. This at first apparently whimsical, even irritating 'theatre of the mind' technique has various functions: it forces the researcher to be aware of the many different elements involved in research; it makes him - because he has consciously adopted roles - think of the research process as something which he has created and over which, therefore, he has control; and, of course, it encourages the researcher to think of himself as creative and inventive, not dull and pedestrian. As such, it is not just a way to be imaginative and to think differently about one's field, but a precondition for doing so.

Minkin aims to encourage the researcher to do better work. Yet, at the end, he strikes a low note, too. The research culture which should be discussing creativity now faces 'degeneration'. The culprits are the lack of funding and one of the main techniques chosen to cope with this, the Research Assessment Exercise, which helps the government

decide how much money to allocate for research.

David Cannadine, in his inaugural lecture in April as the new director of the Institute of Historical Studies in London, fingered underfunding and the bureaucratic overload generated by the RAE as responsible for the decline in creativity in British universities. Minkin makes the same point, to most effect when he simply quotes a proponent of the new cost-benefit system: 'The changes invite and reward academics who willingly restrict their work to duties and activities that provide the greatest measurable, visible output for the lowest risk and least effort.' That - from the disturbingly-titled 'Professor of Organisational Analysis' at Manchester School of Management - is as good 'a definition of an anti-creative culture' as one can imagine.

But the note of gloom does not put the reader off. This is a rich and rewarding book. Many researchers - not just in Politics, not just post-graduates - will find it useful. It should certainly be on the reading list of any 'How to do research' course.

Stuart Stein's book is a very different kettle of fish. The author gives us three-hundred-odd pages of 10 point Times with too many sentences like 'By default the database search on the latter will be carried out as if you had requested that records should be returned that include all of the words entered in the query' (p. 137). This book needed an editor, someone who could have turned the huge amount of valuable information Dr Stein has collected into a format that busy, technically semi-competent, social scientists who want a friendly and clear guide to the Internet would find not only simple but *enjoyable* to use. Nevertheless, if the reader has patience, she will find a lot here: from explanations of Web Browsers and searches, through detailed guides to newsgroups, to an invaluable tour - with addresses - of many of the resources available on the Net (grouped by subject: for example, 'Data Archives'; 'History Resources'; 'Political Science and government resources' [UK and non-UK]; and so on.) This reference book is hard work, but it *is* important: every library should have one.

Patrick Burke is a PhD candidate at CSD and editor of the CSD Bulletin.

> 'Minkin wants to help make good "the relative lack of systematic dialogue about the personal creative process in academic research"'.

Democracy, Statehood, Globalization

Milton Tosto

Re-imagining Political Communities - Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy
Edited by Daniele Archibugi , David Held, and Martin Köhler,
Polity Press, 1998, £14.99

Three legacies of the ideologically divided twentieth century - all of which challenge the nation-state's capacity to exercise jurisdiction within its boundaries - may play a prominent role in shaping political struggles in the twenty-first: the end of a bipolar interstate system; the widespread acceptance that states must be democratically legitimated; and the accelerating speed at which a global economy is developing. The essays in *Re-imagining Political Communities* - most by European academics - discuss political models for a less belligerent and more accountable international system. This is not the only attempt to imagine a new, balanced, world order but - according to the authors, at least - it is the first to do so on the basis of a pragmatic and feasible conception of democracy.

The book is divided into three sections: transformation of the interstate system; citizenship, sovereignty, and transnational democracy; and the prospects for cosmopolitan democracy. In the first part David Held, James Rouseau, David Beetham, Mary Kaldor, James Crawfort, and Susan Marks describe the various challenges that globalization poses; the inability of the state-centred paradigm of democracy to deal with environmental problems; the limits of Westphalian international law in defending cultural and ethnic rights; the uneven development of human rights since the wars; the indifference of states to transnational and subnational mechanisms of participation; and the anarchic violence of paramilitary and mercenary groups. These controversial issues, they argue, require a reform of the UN: for example, more states should be included in the Security Council's decision-making procedure; a second chamber should be created in which regions would be represented; and an international military force, which would provide effective peace-keeping, should be established.

The second section tackles theoretical problems. Andrew Linklater, Ulrich Preub, Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione, Janna Thompson, and Daniele Archibugi discuss the unclear meaning of European citizenship, which is rooted in the contradiction between national and supranational rights; the current debates among libertarians and communitarians about the concepts of rights and justice; the search in recent decades in Europe for nationhood and communal values; the challenge posed by nationalist movements to the normative aspects of cosmopolitanism; and the thesis that a cosmopolitan communitarian democracy can be a political device with which to mediate conflicts and interests.

The last section deals with the applicability of the cosmopolitan project within an international framework. Martin Köhler, Gwyn Prins, Elisabeth Sellwood, Pierre Hassner, Derk Bienen, Volker Rittberger, Wolfgang Wagner, and Richard Falk analyse the prospects for cosmopolitan citizenship; the changing roles of public space and civil society; the importance of the media in spreading information; the rapidly developing mechanisms for fostering international cooperation; the dilemmas created by cross-cutting global security problems; the challenges posed by international refugees; the loss of confidence in established institutions and party politics; the democratization of the state by international non-governmental organizations; and neo-liberal economic policies at the 'international level of governance' (WTO, IMF, and so on).

The authors outline regional and international mechanisms for tackling the complex and interconnected issues that threaten democratic values throughout the world. They discuss theories in order to explain concrete cases and make sense of the current political function of international organizations, and they propose reforms with which to counterbalance the natural anarchic character of the international order. Yet the authors do not address other important topics. These include, for example, the need for an international institution that could tax capital flows in the global financial market (the income from which could be used by the IMF to help newly developing countries); or the UN's budgetary dependence on the US which limits the UN's autonomy outside the North American sphere of influence.

These essays argue that the establishment of democracy precedes the creation of a new international order, and that democracy itself can only flourish in a democratic world. However, much research has yet to be done not only to help us understand how globalization undermines the foundations of the nation-state, but also to support the argument that the apparatus of the state is not essential in balancing power among subnational groups.

If such research confirmed that the nation-state is indeed collapsing, this would still not in itself underpin the argument for a world government with military authority. Liberal, cosmopolitan arguments should give sustenance to economic and political developments that support democracy, not call for the creation of a barely accountable international army.

Milton Tosto Jr is a PhD Candidate at CSD.

CSD Project on Democracy in the Muslim World

Public seminar series: The Future of Democracy in the Muslim World

1 June 1999
Professor Muhammad Arkoun (Sorbonne), 'Democracy: A Challenge to Islamic Thought'.

Forthcoming speakers:
HE Sayyid Sadiq El-Mahdi (President, Sudanese Umma Party; former prime minister), 'The Future of Democracy in Sudan'.

Dr Abdelwahab El-Affendi (CSD), 'Terrorism and the Democratic Imperative: Reflections on the Future of Muslim Politics'.

Dr Abdalla El-Nafisi (University of Kuwait), 'The Future of Democracy in the Arab Gulf States'.

To book a place, and for further details, contact the CSD office (with your name and address): csd@westminster.ac.uk

THE WESTMINSTER SEMINARS
DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Although Britain is a long-established democracy, it is now undergoing major constitutional changes intended to make British government more 'democratic'. Debates among political theorists emphasize that this term does not have an agreed meaning, and there are potential conflicts and even contradictions between competing values. A look at other established democracies shows that the practice of democracy can take many forms, and often they are 'un-British', for example, the use of proportional representation. Concurrently, other democracies have often spoken admiringly of what is distinctively British in government.

A good way to understand the operation and consequences of 'un-British' institutions is to talk to people who are accustomed to using these institutions, in order to see what may be learned - positively or negatively - from what is happening in countries that are not governed by the Westminster model.

To open up the discussion of reform, the Westminster Seminars have been created to provide a forum bringing experts from abroad to discuss ideas and institutions relevant to the current British debate. In this way, people of diverse views can hear and question people with firsthand experience of different representative institutions.

The seminars are intended to inform discussion and not to promote a single point of view. There is an all-party advisory committee with David Butler, President of the Hansard Society, Lord Holme, Professor Lord Norton of Louth, Professor Lord Plant, and Professor John Keane, Centre for the Study of Democracy. Funding has come from the British Academy and from the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster.

The convenor is Professor Richard Rose.

Two dates have been fixed for spring:

Governing In Europe: Effective And Democratic? Professor Fritz Scharpf, Max Planck Institute, Cologne. 25 May, 5.30pm, British Academy, 10, Carlton House Terrace, London SW1 (by Duke of York steps).

The New Zealand Experience Of Electoral Reform. Professor Jack Vowles, University of Waikato, New Zealand. 21 June, 6pm, Palace of Westminster. (NB: The precise committee room will be confirmed a fortnight in advance. Consult: Sara Amos, email: csd@westminster.ac.uk, or the British Academy web site. www.britac.ac.uk/meet.index.html.)

The Seminars will continue in autumn and through next winter. The following speakers have accepted in principle:

Focus Groups And Deliberative Polling: Representing Or Mis-Representing Public Opinion? Professor Jim Fishkin, University of Texas.

Problems Of Non-Concurring Majorities. Prof D. Neil MacCormick FBA, University. of Edinburgh.

Consensual vs. Majoritarian Democracy. Professor Arend Lijphart FBA, University of California San Diego.

Elected Mayors. Professor Paul Peterson, Harvard University.

Placing Candidates On The German Party List. Co-sponsored with Centre for German Studies, Univ. of Birmingham.

How A Coalition Government Works. Appropriate Swedish speaker.

CSD

The Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD) is the post-graduate and post-doctoral research centre in Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster. CSD supports research into all aspects of the past, present and future of democracy, in such diverse areas as political theory and philosophy, international relations and law, European Union social policy, gender and politics, mass media and communications, and the politics and culture of China, the European region, the United States, and Islam. CSD is located in the School of Social and Behavioural Sciences (SBS) in the Regent Campus, and works alongside the influential Policy Studies Institute. It hosts seminars, public lectures and symposia in its efforts to foster greater awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of democracy in the public and private spheres at local, regional, national, and international levels. It offers a number of MAs on a one-year full-time, two-year part-time, basis (see back page for details). CSD's publications include a series of working papers entitled *CSD Perspectives* and this bulletin. *CSD Bulletin* aims to inform other university departments and public organizations, and our colleagues and undergraduates at the University of Westminster, of CSD's research activities. The *Bulletin* comprises reports of 'work in progress' of our research students and staff and contributions from visiting researchers and speakers. Comments on the content of this Bulletin, or requests to receive it, should be directed to The Editor, *CSD Bulletin*, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR. As with all CSD publications and events, the opinions expressed in these pages do not necessarily represent those held generally or officially in CSD or the University of Westminster.

CSD Research Seminars

APRIL 1999
11 Rafik Bouchlaka (CSD)
'Secularism and Despotism'

27 Jim Skea (PSI)
'Climate Change and Diplomacy: European Cohesion and Global Environmental Agreements'

MAY
4 Kosovo Round Table: Isuf Berisha; Barry Buzan; Quintin Hoare; Richard Whitman

11 Judith Squires (University of Bristol)
'The Future of Political Theory'

18 Jane Sharp
(King's College, London),
'Western Policy in the Balkans'

JUNE
1 Simon Joss (CSD) '"Procedural Justice" for Science and Technology Policy'

8 Patrick Burke (CSD)
'The Peace Movement and the Cold War'

17 Francis Fukuyama
'The Great Disruption'
Public lecture (see p. 5 for details).

CSD PERSPECTIVES

A series of monographs published by University of Westminster Press.

The Betrayal of Bosnia, Lee Bryant. No. 1 (1993). ISBN : 1 85919 035 9.

Nations, Nationalism, and the European Citizen, John Keane. No. 2 (1993). ISBN : 1 85919 040 5.

Universal Human Rights? The Rhetoric of International Law, Jeremy Colwill No. 3 (1994). ISBN : 1 85919 040 5.

Islam and the Creation of European Identity, Tomaz Mastnak. No. 4 (1994). ISBN : 1 85919 026 X.

Uncertainty and Identity: the Enlightenment and its Shadows, Chris Sparks. No. 5 (1994). ISBN : 1 85919 031 6.

The Making of a Weak State: The Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1906, Mehdi Moslem. No. 6 (1995). ISBN: 1 85919 071 5.

The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: Perspectives on European Integration, Richard Whitman. No. 7 (1995). ISBN: 1 85919 002 2.

Renewing Local Representative Democracy: Councillors, Communities, Communication, Keith Taylor. No. 8 (1996). ISBN: 1 85919 082 0.

European Democracy at the Russian Crossroads, Irene Brennan. No. 9 (1996). ISBN: 1 85919 077 4.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Obstacles and Prospects, Richard Whitman. No. 11 (1996). ISBN: 1859190480.

Managing Variety: Issues in the Integration and Disintegration of States, Margaret Blunden. No. 12 (1997). ISBN: 1 85919 0685.

On Refugees and Violence, Pierre Hassner. No. 13 (1999). ISBN: 085919 084 7.

Between the Living and the Dead: The Politics of Irish History, Bernard Rorke. No. 14 (1999). ISBN: 0 85919 079 0

On Communicative Abundance, John Keane. No. 15 (1999). ISBN: 0 859 19 089 8.

The *Perspectives* are priced at £7.50 each. For further information, including how to order, please contact University of Westminster Press, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 OEH. Tel: + 44-171-468-0468; fax: -468-2211.

MASTERS DEGREES AT CSD

MA INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY

This taught MA (one year full-time, two years part-time), which aims to dissolve a number of conventional sub-disciplinary boundaries, provides a framework for integrated study that embraces Politics, Political Theory, International Relations, and cognate disciplines such as communications in an innovative and intellectually challenging way.

Modules: International Relations Theory; The State, Politics and Violence; The Human Sciences – Perspectives and Methods; European Integration and the Development of International Society; Option Module; Dissertation/ Thesis.

Students may begin the course in September or February.

For specific enquiries contact Dr Richard Whitman, CSD, University of Westminster, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR, UK. Tel: +44 171 468 2257; fax: + 44 171 911 5164; email: whitmar@westminster.ac.uk

MA/MPHIL/PHD DEGREE IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL CHINESE STUDIES

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MA modules include: Problems and Perspectives in Cultural Studies; Chinese 'Nation-States' in Cross-Cultural Perspective; The Politics of Contemporary Chinese Art; Gender and Sexuality in Contemporary Chinese Culture; Contemporary Chinese Writing; Dress and Cultural 'Identities' in Chinese Societies; the Internet as a Research Resource for Contemporary Chinese Societies.

For specific enquiries contact Dr Harriet Evans, CSD, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR, UK. Tel: +44 171 468 2254/911 5138; fax: 911 5164; email: evansh@wmin.ac.uk

NEW MAs

Beginning in October 2000, CSD will be offering the following MAs (one year full-time, two years part-time):

MA International Relations
MA Contemporary Political Theory
MA Political Theory and European Studies
MA European Studies and International Relations.

Contact Dr Richard Whitman (see box below left) for details.

FURTHER INFORMATION AND APPLICATION FORMS

For MA International Relations and Political Theory and for MA/MPHIL/PhD in Contemporary Chinese Cultural Studies:
Admissions and Marketing Office, University of Westminster, 16 Riding House Street, London W1P 7PB. Tel: +44 171 911 5088; fax: +44 171 911 5175; email: regent@westminster.ac.uk

Further details on the Internet: http://www.wmin.ac.uk/csd