Islamic radicalization in Russia

Roland Dannreuther

To what extent does the Russian Federation face the threat of Islamic radicalization? It is undeniably a serious threat and has been a source of some of the most critical challenges to the integrity and stability of Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Chechnya, Moscow has confronted a secessionist struggle which has become increasingly islamicized and integrated into the global transnational jihadist movement. The conflict has also spread beyond the North Caucasus. Moscow and a number of other cities and regions in Russia have suffered a series of deadly Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks, such as the Moscow theatre hostage crisis in 2002 and the Beslan siege in 2004.

For some analysts, there is a real threat that Islamic radicalization is inexorably advancing, driven in particular by Putin's repressive and centralizing policies, and that it could ultimately overwhelm the Russian state. Gordon Hahn argues that 'Russia is experiencing the beginning of an Islamist jihad' and that the radicalization of the North Caucasus is inexorably spreading to the Volga-Urals region and into the main cities of Russia, such as Moscow and St Petersburg (*Russia's Islamic Threat*, 2007).

Some Russian analysts have similarly raised the alarm of an overwhelming 'Islamic threat', the incipient 'Islamization of Russia' and the threat of an alliance between liberals and Muslims which could lead to a 'orange-green revolution'. Close to the surface of such assessments is a demographic element – the fact that the ethnic Russian population is in severe demographic decline while the Russian Muslim population is growing rapidly. In the West, Paul Goble has raised the prospect of a Muslim majority in Russia by 2050 (*Washington Times*, 26 November 2006).

There are interesting parallels between these projections of an Islamic threat in post-Soviet Russia with similar projections made during the Soviet period. In the final two decades of the Soviet Union, a number of Western sovietologists argued that Islam represented a powerful counter-ideology to communism which represented, with the increased demographic weight of Muslims in the Soviet Union, a serious threat to the Soviet regime. The fact that these predictions fell short and that the most serious challenge to the Soviet state came from European nationalist movements suggests that a similar caution should be exercised in projecting a generalized Islamic threat to the post-Soviet Russian state. As some scholars of Soviet Central Asia understood, there was no necessary contradiction between being a Muslim and being a loyal

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Soviet citizen; most Soviet Muslims had no ambition to challenge or overthrow the Soviet state. In post-Soviet Russia, it is similarly important to take care not to treat the Russian Muslim community as a monolithic bloc which is in existential opposition to the Russian state and where Islam is understood primarily as a counter-ideology to Russian national identity and statehood.

We need to question the perception of an inevitable trajectory of increased Islamic radicalization in Russia, and challenge the assumption that Islamic radicalization has inexorably risen in response to the centralizing and repressive policies pursued by Putin from the start of the second Chechen war onwards. In fact, radicalization processes were at their most intense during the Yeltsin period; Putin has been partially successful in stemming or constraining these dynamics, if far from overcoming or resolving them.

Islamic radicalization certainly represented a serious and even existential threat to Russia when Putin first came to power in 1999—2000, with an Islamic insurgency in Chechnya threatening the stability of the whole of the North Caucasus and a series of large-scale Islamist terrorist attacks taking place throughout Russia. Putin's administration did, though, adopt a set of policies which have had some success in stemming this threat, even if they have not resolved the internal contradictions of these policies. A strategy based primarily on the use of force and repression brought a degree of stability in Chechnya and eventually ended the pattern of mass terrorist attacks in the Russian heartland. These repressive actions were also combined with more positive and proactive political and diplomatic measures, which helped significantly to improve Russia's reputation and image in the wider Muslim world, and which provided substantive moral and material support to moderate Muslim leaders and communities within Russia. The Russian leadership has also made strenuous efforts to ensure that the official national ideology remained committed to the principles of multinationality and to inter-

confessional toleration, and which formally recognized Muslims in Russia as an integral part of the Russian state and its national development.

These policies nevertheless have had their limitations and have only been partially successful. Popular nationalism within Russia has been on

'there is no deterministic inevitability in Muslim disloyalty to the Russians state'

the rise: this has included anti-immigrant, anti-Caucasian and implicitly anti-Muslim currents which have increased the sense of alienation of many Russian Muslims, particularly those from North Caucasus. The promotion of a moderate Russian Islam has struggled to counter the appeal of radical Islam, particularly among young Russian Muslims: an avowedly 'traditional' Islam appears to lack theological rigour, deviating from the purist standards of the Salafist movement, as well as being continually compromised by the official state support that it receives. The disunity among the traditionalist Muslim establishments in Russia also enhances the appeal of an Islam which presents itself as universalist and shorn of particularist national or ethnic features. Politically, the re-assertion of the 'vertical of power' under Putin and the growing authoritarianism of the Russian state has undermined the prospect for improvements in political governance. In the North Caucasus, this has helped to sustain the appeal of Islamist jihadists who target the corruption and lack of popularity of the local governments. Among other Russian Muslim communities, the growing centralization of power has undermined the development of a pro-active and vibrant civil society which might help to promote a more pluralistic and mutually tolerant community. As the economic crisis has shown, Russia remains a brittle state and has barely engaged with the deeper reforms which are required for a more durable and sustainable political development.

Overall, Islamic radicalization probably represents a lesser threat to the Russian federation than it did in the late 1990s and early 2000s; nevertheless, the attraction of its ideological appeal, and the underlying conditions which foster support for it, remain strong. Yet there is no deterministic inevitability, as many accounts suggest, in Muslim disloyalty to the Russians state, nor any inevitable contradiction between being a Muslim and a loyal Russian citizen. There is also no need to assume *a priori* that the policies of repression and centralization undertaken by Putin have increased, rather than reduced, the dynamic of Islamic radicalization.

Nevertheless, the picture is mixed. There is a degree of uneasy stability in Chechnya, or at least a reduction in the level of violence in that republic, and there appears to be little threat from Islamist extremism in the Volga-Urals region and in the main Russian cities. But there has been a diffusion of the Islamist insurgency from Chechnya to the rest of the North Caucasus, which is particularly affecting Ingushetiya and Dagestan, with regular attacks on government forces, assassinations of local elites and a general prevalence of societal violence. It is still an open question whether this currently relatively contained conflict might escalate and potentially spread to other parts of Russia. More generally, there remain serious questions as to whether the top-down approach adopted by the Russian government, which has had some success in managing disaffection and alienation, will continue to manage to assuage the demands and needs of the Muslim communities in Russia; and, if not, how future disaffection might be expressed.

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The life and death of democracy

Bridget Cotter *interviews John Keane*

The *Life and Death of Democracy* was published exactly a year ago. How has it been received?

The reception perhaps mirrors the scope of the book – it's an attempt to write the first-ever global history of democracy – and the multiple voices it contains. It's hardly a single-authored book, but very much a collective effort. Conceived during my time at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, it's a summary statement of what I learned from all the things that went on there: the interesting and sometimes fiery debates, the excellent dissertations, the inputs of researchers and the many visitors from home and abroad who made it such a fine place to work. The book's also a collective effort in another sense. Hundreds of people generously granted interviews, submitted tips and materials, and read and made comments on various drafts of the long narrative. I suppose the book's reception has been shaped as well by its attempt to stir up trouble, to prod and poke at the many prejudices that have become affixed to the ideals, language and institutions of democracy.

What kinds of prejudice?

Against previous self-contradictory efforts to justify democracy by resorting to haughty First Principles, the book makes a new ethical case for democracy as the best remedy for human folly, arrogance, lying and the hubris that typically feeds upon First Principles. The book criticises the nineteenth-century myth of democracy's Athenian beginnings. It tables solid new archaeological evidence of the existence of scores of ancient Greek democracies, some of them much older than Athens. The pre-Greek (Mycenaean, Linear B) roots of the language of democracy are examined. The book defends the controversial claim that early democracy had Eastern origins, in the citizen assemblies that first sprang up in ancient Syria–Mesopotamia and were later imported via the Phoenicians into the Greek world. The survival of the spirit of assembly democracy after Athens, for instance within the early Muslim world, is highlighted, along with the medieval origins of democratic government in representative form. The book questions the view of Robert Dahl, John Dunn and others that after Athens democracy faded away almost everywhere, for nearly two thousand years. It pays attention to the long chain of efforts to democratise representative government, many of them forgotten, from the first experiments during the late sixteenth-century in the Low Countries to the later struggles for democratic representation throughout Spanish America and the colonies of Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

> '"monitory democracy" is a large-scale mutation that slowly but surely is transforming the dynamics of the spirit, language and institutions of democracy'

The whole approach is not antiquarian, history for history's sake. It's rather a history of democracy that concentrates on the present and future of democracy. It's designed to underscore democracy's great fragility and mutability as a political form, as well as to persuade readers that almost all current fads in democratic theory – from deliberative democracy and its neo-Hobbesian opponents to talk of 'liberal democracy', cosmopolitan democracy and participatory governance – suffer from amnesia.

There are various reasons for this chronic memory loss, including the grip of empiricism and a preoccupation with teaching the supposed 'classical' texts and authors, but the knock-on effect is unhealthy. Those who have no sense of the past inevitably misunderstand the present, and that's a big quibble I have with current analyses of democracy.

You write about 'monitory democracy'. What does this mean?

I'd like to emphasise that democracy, treated as a political form, as a whole way of life, is unique because it sharpens people's collective sense of the contingency of who gets what, when and how, and whether they deserve their privileges, or their misfortunes. Alexis de Tocqueville was the first writer on democracy to spot its de-naturing effects. Through time, democracy has enabled people – I don't say The People – to question the supposed necessity of tyrants, monarchs, emperors, slave owners, bosses and bullies. It's very odd that contemporary analyses of democracy mostly suppress the point. So the book sets out to democratise our understanding of democracy by heightening our sense of its temporality. It speaks about three historical epochs of democracy: the early forms of assembly democracy; the emergence of democracy in representative, territorial state form; and, since the end of World War Two, the rise of 'monitory democracy', a large-scale mutation that slowly but

surely is transforming the dynamics of the spirit, language and institutions of democracy. Democracy is coming to mean much more than just fair and free elections within territorial state settings. It's a synecdoche for the chastening of power, a signifier that underscores the vital importance of subjecting governments, corporations and other bodies to permanent public scrutiny and control. For the sake of greater equality, democracy is the ongoing attempt to humble power, to keep power on its toes – in between elections, even in cross-border settings.

What did reviewers say about 'monitory democracy'?

The distinction between assembly and representative forms of democracy is familiar, even though I try to explain in detail how and why the distinction came about. The theory of monitory democracy is a different matter. It has stirred up a lot of discussion and has meant different things to different audiences in different contexts. It all started in Britain, where the book appeared in the midst of the gravest parliamentary corruption scandal since the early nineteenth century. MPs 'flipping', bogus invoices for second houses and flats, and petty claims for such items as fox-proof floating duck islands, cake tins and shopping bags costing 25 pence understandably aroused much public indignation.

The first review of the book [in *The Times* by David Aaronovitch] likened the angry hysteria to the grief triggered by the death of Princess Diana. He said, in effect, that the theory of monitory democracy was a great breakthrough because it provided a form of psychoanalytic explanation of the outburst. The book is a type of psychoanalysis of democracy, and the pathologies that have developed around political parties, parliaments and politicians, though I hadn't anticipated that just one section of the book would be seen as its central message. Much the same favourable

reaction to the idea of monitory democracy happened in the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium and Spain, where there's also been discussion of the book's claim that the first recorded parliament was convened at the end of the twelfth century in Leon, in the north of Spain. Spanish journalists and other commentators seemed to delight in the evidence that Westminster can no longer be considered the mother of parliaments.

There's also been a fascinating reception in China. When the book was first conceived, over a decade ago, everybody told me that it could be published only in Taiwan, simply because the authorities in Beijing would consider a lengthy treatment of democracy too dangerous. Well, such is the flux in contemporary China that

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a full-length Mandarin translation is due to appear next year. We'll see whether there are cuts, for instance of the book's analysis of the strong democratic imaginings within the works of Liang Quichao and Sun Yat-sen, or whether there will be airbrushing of the book's analysis of the dangers of post-democracy in China. I don't know what to expect.

Will you allow the book to be published in mainland China if any of it is cut or 'airbrushed'?

Let's see what happens. The reaction in China to the theory of monitory democracy has been fascinating. The term is easy to translate (*jian du shi minzhu*) and it has a clear resonance within two quite different sets of audiences. The supporters and sympathizers of Charter 08 see its radical potential. For them, what is missing in China, a one-party system defined by much talk of 'the people'

and 'democracy', is a secure infrastructure of independent, extra-party mechanisms for publicly scrutinising the power of the authorities, from the municipal level to the very top echelons of power. Yet the theme of monitory democracy has also attracted interest in high official circles, for instance within the China Executive Leadership Academy in Shanghai. Officials there have grasped the need for independent mechanisms for publicly scrutinising corrupted and corrupting power, particularly at the municipal level. They understand well that in the absence of monitory democracy projects like housing construction, transport systems and environmental protection cannot be efficient, effective or legitimate. Whether or not the party authorities will or could embrace the principle of independent public monitoring of their own power is unclear. It's one of the great political questions confronting our world. Can the Communist Party of China transform itself into something resembling the Congress Party led by Nehru, or the ANC led by Mandela? I wish I knew the answer.

What has been the reaction to the book in the United States?

It's been disappointing. The American publisher's explanation is that the recession has tightened the book trade and that British authors living outside the United States no longer get red carpet treatment. The collapsing newspaper business model, which has savaged book review culture, hasn't helped. Review space has declined by more than a third in a decade. On-line reviews hardly compensate for the decline, or that's been my experience with this book. *The Daily Beast* complained about its excessive length. Several others, including the *Internet Review of Books*, said that my treatment of the American founding fathers, especially James Madison, was unacceptably pejorative: I argue that the republican gentlemen who championed the revolution were actively opposed to democracy. I was

struck by the honesty. I suspect the wounded pride caused by the book's treatment of the United States may have fed the silence.

American intellectuals, with some important exceptions, seem to find it hard to think outside their own skins when it comes to democracy. A recent case in point is Stefan Halper's widely discussed claim that China's authoritarian capitalism is 'shrinking the West', and that, given the illusion that capitalism begets democracy is crumbling, what is now urgently needed is a global renewal of faith in the superiority of American-style 'liberal democracy'. His silence is striking about the potential global significance of the new hybrid 'post-Washington' forms of monitory democracy that have taken root in places as different as Taiwan, Brazil, India, South Africa and the European Union. It's as if America is democracy. But America is no longer – as Tocqueville supposed – the lighthouse of democratic norms and institutions. The remarkable democratic breakthroughs in India triggered a different pattern of 'indigenisation'. A global compass swing is happening. The future of democracy will be decided by what happens in the Asia and Pacific region – that's where Tocqueville, if he were still alive, would today have to travel, or so the book argues.

You say that American reviewers were offended by the argument that the Founding Fathers were not democrats. This point is not all that controversial. Why should it have offended them?

The book is pitched against the view of Francis Fukuyama and others that modern 'liberal democracy' has its roots in the American Revolution. That view doesn't square with the fact that all the earliest champions of the new 'compound republic', as Madison called it, regarded a two-tiered, presidential republic guided by periodic election of representatives of 'the people' as the best prophylactic against democracy. No signatory of the Declaration of Independence was a democrat; and literally every delegate at the 1787 Constitutional Convention rejected democracy because they saw it as a formula for social disorder and political tyranny.

The book thus unravels a paradox to show how, with great difficulty, the butterfly of representative democracy

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escaped from the chrysalis of rule by republican gentlemen, many of them slave owners and most of them hostile to indigenous peoples. The unintended consequence of 1776 – a type of democracy unknown to the ancients – was remarkable. The country witnessed the first peaceful handover of government from one party to another and the first grassroots political party calling itself democratic. America survived a brutal civil war between two hostile and opposed definitions of democracy. It was the first country to turn democracy into an enemy of slavery. And so on. American readers should feel pride in the fact that during the nineteenth century the American republic was the world's most important laboratory of democracy. The devil's in the detail, however, for what the book tries to show is the way that the democratisation of the American republic was causally bound up with the growth of empire. Democracy had a darker side. There have been only three democratic empires: ancient Athens, revolutionary France and the United States, which is the first-ever democratic empire in global form. A democratic empire is of course a contradiction in both terms and fact. How is it possible to spread the language, the ideas, and the institutions of self-government through imperial power in soft or hard form, without inside and outside resistance to the hypocrisy and injustice of it all? Ancient Athens and revolutionary France paid a heavy price for their failure to resolve that issue. Will America suffer the same fate?

Returning to the alleged difference between representative and monitory democracy: have we really entered a new historical era? Aren't we talking simply about representative democracy with monitoring institutions added on?

I realise I'm out on a limb here. The task of persuading others that we're living in a black swan moment, that there's a need for a gestalt switch guided by a 'wild' category, monitory democracy, one that brings new descriptive, strategic and normative significance to real-world trends that we can see all around us, isn't easy. It rather reminds me of the old uphill

intellectual battles in defence of the category of civil society. Many observers of contemporary politics speak as if nothing has changed, as if we still live in the era of 'liberal' or 'representative' democracy. We don't, and those living-dead zombie terms are unhelpful in finding our bearings and fixing our priorities, or so I think. The growth of new monitory institutions – I have in mind more than a hundred new types of watchdog institutions born since 1945, bodies such as anti-corruption commissions, citizens' assemblies, summits, human rights networks, democratic audits and election monitors – change the dynamics of democracy as we know it. Helped along by the development of new communication media, parties, parliaments and politicians feel the heat of public criticisms, scandal and disaffection. Membership of political parties plummets. Electoral turnouts become more volatile. Politicians are suspected of being crooks. That's not to say that citizens lose interest in politics. In virtually every democracy it's the opposite; people in fact expect much more of political decision makers and the definition and scope of politics expands, and becomes more 'viral' in quality.

Some conservative reviewers of the book, John Gray and Noel Malcolm for instance, expressed deep fears about the capacity of watchdogs to undermine sovereign state power, but I think that's unwarranted nostalgia. In the age of monitory democracy the powerful – corporations, churches, government agencies – feel the pinch of public scrutiny, sometimes from all sides. Some monitory bodies, human rights networks for instance, operate over great distances. Efforts at chastening power spread underneath and across state borders. The spirit of monitory democracy goes regional, even global. In all this we're talking about a qualitative not a quantitative shift – a rough 'n' tumble alteration of the spirit, institutions and language of democracy, which escapes the containers of both party-centred elections and territorial states.

So you welcome the trend towards 'monitory democracy'?

When measured in terms of the history of democracy, monitory democracy is easily the most vibrant, dynamic and power-sensitive form of democracy we've known. It's a remedy for some of the profound weaknesses within the old model of representative democracy. For instance, monitory mechanisms encourage the greening of our

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societies. These mechanisms empower new representatives, some of them unelected, who speak and act against the old paradigm of treating the biosphere as if it were merely a commodity, or an expendable slave of governments.. When they work well, monitory mechanisms also call into question the abuse of state and corporate power across borders. The global uproars that accompanied the American invasion of Iraq, and the devastation of the Gulf of Mexico caused by the criminal negligence of BP, are pertinent examples of monitory democracy in action.

Least obviously, perhaps, monitory democracy is a remedy for what J.S. Mill and other nineteenth-century critics dubbed the tyranny of the majority. They pointed out that representative democracy, with its promise of equality for all, contained the seeds of its own destruction. They did not see that representative democracy could degenerate into something much worse than tyranny – that it could prepare the ground for what Heidegger, in his winter semester seminars of 1933/34, described and justified as the historical fulfilment of 'the people' in the 'Führer state'. Monitory democracy fuels fears and doubts about such dangerous

nonsense. It begins to democratise democracy – to cut down to size its old principle of the Sovereign People. There are no guarantees that it will succeed in this. Monitory democracy is an unfinished project; to use the words of Derrida it's still the democracy to come. It will forever be the democracy to come. The struggle against hubris can never be won and that's why it must never be abandoned. Whether monitory democracy can or will survive the pressures and contradictions of the world in which it's been born, well, I don't know. Monitory forms of democracy are our best hope for preventing or reversing the evils produced by unaccountable power, but they are certainly not leading us towards paradise on earth. Monitory democracy generates plenty of its own pathologies. Its mechanisms heighten the sense that territorial states and their conventional parliamentary institutions are too weak or illegitimate to handle ever-expanding bundles of problems. The practical failure of monitory mechanisms to make headway in areas such as migration, the arms trade and global finance causes disappointment, hurt and suffering to millions of people. The growth of monitory democracy also stirs up feelings that existing political elites are unrepresentative fools who lie, cheat and break promises. Such feelings are of course the soil in which the new enemies of monitory democracy put down tap roots: authoritarian leaders like Ahmadinejad, Chavez and Berlusconi, anti-democratic populists who act as if they have a right to steal people's hearts and minds.

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Statelessness, sentimentality, human rights

Kelly Staples *critiques Rorty's liberal human rights culture*

Richard Rorty sets the expansion of the liberal human rights culture as a goal for the privileged members of liberal political communities. Liberal communities are central to Rorty's account of justice in relation to community and membership, for the simple reason that they are sustained by languages and moralities in which he is conversant. Rorty, then, is a value pluralist, who is nevertheless willing to offer his own values up for adoption on the basis of their continued pragmatic utility. His call for liberal communities to extend their sympathy to those outside of their sphere of justification can therefore be considered to be ethnocentric, without being relativistic.

Indeed he claims that 'there is a difference between saying that every community is as good as every other and saying that we have to work out from the networks we are, from the communities with which we presently identify'. On that basis, Rorty expresses much of his argument in liberal terms, even as he recognises that there can be no non-circular justification for its practices.

For Rorty, morality refers at the simplest level to the interests of communities over those of individuals. It is 'the voice of ourselves as member of a community, speakers of a common language'. Morality on Rorty's terms is a communal construction for mitigating nature with norms, for curbing nature's worst excesses. In effect, members of the liberal community use a shared vocabulary to summarise what is important about the social goods and protections provided by their institutions, for example their connection to freedom. The act of summarising our culturally influenced intuitions will tend, he thinks, not only to 'increase the predictability, and thus the power and efficiency, of our institutions'; it will also serve to heighten 'the sense of shared moral identity which brings us together in a moral community'. Rorty also shows how the moral vocabulary shared by liberals, which has been shaped over time, can be used to strengthen the force and authority of the institutions which connect us through redescription, and, eventually, to extend the communities of justification which we feel bound to address.

Individuals are then, for Rorty, the agents of justice, and of sympathy. The social nature of morality does, however, require continual communication, while the particularities of liberal morality allow for communication which is unusually open-ended. Discussion with others is possible due to the freedom of self-authorship which liberal communities ostensibly protect. Liberals, as participants in the language of morality, are on his view particularly

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well-placed to converse with non-members, and he hence urges liberals to 'broaden the size of the audience they take to be competent, to increase the size of the relevant community of justification'. The 'community of justification' refers to those to whom we direct our attention in our responses to moral questions; it is hence not restricted to those connected to us by the authority of our existing institutions. It is, however, necessarily the case that communication within and about such communities is mediated by substantively free individuals. This makes it contingent on the optional acts of individuals.

Rorty recognises that it might be distasteful for a more inclusive morality to be dependent on individual actions. He cautions against waiting, idealistically, for the marginalised to make claims to inclusion, but suggests that liberal morality is especially amenable to plurality, and hence greater inclusion, and suggest that we 'downscale our goals and aspirations to a measure commensurable with the limited resources at our disposal'. These resources include our own ability (as members of liberal societies) to impress on our democratic authorities the need and potential for expansion of the human rights culture given that changes are most likely to result from 'powerful people gradually ceasing [...] to countenance the oppression of others'.

He believes then that the language of liberalism is contingently well-placed to incremental reduction of those we see as 'other' or 'less than human', and that it is therefore up to individuals to make moral appeals in respect of the institutions which embody and defend our cultural intuitions. His solidarity, then, is

extended from privileged to the oppressed; from the sympathetic to the marginalized.

As some of the world's most marginalized people, stateless persons might, arguably, benefit from inclusion in the liberal community of justification. There is, however, a question as to whether or not Rorty's account of the liberal human rights culture can really offer hope in this respect. For it to do so, his account of 'sentimental education' will have to provide a mechanism by which the liberal can be forced to hear, and then motivated to repeat to others, the sentimental stories of those wanting of dignity, on the basis of his assumption that 'the emergence of the human rights culture seems to owe nothing to increased moral knowledge, and everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories'. Rorty's account of human rights turns therefore on the potential for 'sad and sentimental stories' to impel privileged individuals to redescribe their cultural intuitions to the inclusion of the embodiments of such stories. Rejecting postmodern pessimism, Rorty argues that there is evidence that sentimental stories have in fact 'induced us, the rich, safe, powerful people to tolerate, and even to cherish, powerless people'.

Rorty's 'sentimental education' is of the kind that:

[…] gets people of different kinds sufficiently well-acquainted with

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one another so that they are less tempted to think of those different from themselves as only quasi-human. The goal of this sort of manipulation is to expand the reference of the terms our kind of people and people like us.

Rorty hopes that the liberal might come to recognise the smallness of the things which divide him or her from others and expand thus the audience to which he or she feels they must make moral arguments. It will then be more difficult for the liberal to justify to herself any cruelty enacted against individuals from whom there seems no cause to withhold sympathy:

Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created […] Such increased sensitivity makes it more difficult to marginalize people different from ourselves by thinking, "they do not feel it as we would," or "there must always be suffering, so why not let them suffer?"

It is Rorty's hope that an inability to countenance cruelty against others will create the conditions for solidarity and an expansion of the (for now) limited scope of the liberal human rights culture.

As we have seen, Rorty finds great resilience in the 'shared moral identity' of the liberal community, which is neither transcultural or ahistorical, but rather a historical product. The existing, contingent institutions of liberal communities have, for Rorty, the effect of facilitating pluralism, in part due to their anti-essentialism. At a practical level, this should make liberal institutions amenable to the possibility of engagement with speakers of non-liberal languages.

In 'Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism' (*The Journal of Philosophy*, 1983), Rorty attempts to show just how liberal morality might work to secure the human dignity of those robbed of it. His optimism that there are effective ways to expand its protections to those deprived of security and sympathy leads him to make the claim that it is (or at least can come to be) 'part of the tradition of our community that the human stranger from whom all dignity has been stripped is to be taken in, to be re-clothed with dignity'. In order for this to happen, it will be necessary to identify the human stranger, as well as his or her relationship to the members of the liberal tradition who might be moved to challenger his or her loss of dignity. This relationship is substantively one of antithesis, in which the 'child found wandering in the woods, the remnant of a slaughtered nation whose temples have been razed and whose books have been burned' is opposed to his liberal ironist, aiming for increasing diversity in the range and scope of the communities with which he or she identifies and engaged in a heroic attempt to transcend the confines of narrowly defined identity.

A loss of dignity is here equated to a

loss of culture, and an implicit loss of language, which is in stark contrast to the position of 'us' as individuals situated in and constituted by liberal tradition and liberal vocabulary. On his account it appears that the exclusion of the 'child found wandering' from his or her own moral culture will probably undermine his or her ability to communicate with the sympathetic and secure liberal. The situation of the person of a slaughtered nation has clear parallels with the alienation Rorty depicts in the situation of Winston Smith in George Orwell's *1984*. In both situations, violence is done to the individual, whose authority over their own final vocabulary is undermined or overridden. In Winston's case, the torture to which he is subjected (in which he is made to accept that 2+2=5) is so abhorrent not because it severs his ties with some objective truth (in which 2+2=4), but rather that it negates his authority to articulate a long-learned vocabulary in which 2 and 2 were 4. The alienated and stateless stranger 'whose temples have been razed and whose books have been burned' has no recourse, then, to the tools of we-intentions necessary for making a case for inclusion in a language already familiar to the sympathetic liberal.

For Rorty it seems clear that statelessness, as the epitome of marginality, is a paradigm of humiliation; even of cruelty to the extent that it represents destruction of the authority of the individual's final vocabulary. Three ill-fitting things become apparent on this basis. First, that Rorty is – it would appear – assuming some shared basis (inconsistent with his pluralist assumptions) for the inclusion of language-less children within the liberal tradition. Second, that he is simultaneously locating them outside of the vocabulary and linguistic practices of that tradition. The language-less child must therefore somehow convey a non-verbal, non-moral story to the embodiments of

that tradition, which is particularly difficult if indeed it is 'the tools of language [...] which enable us to impose ourselves on the world'.

Calder's in-depth discussion of the place of metaphor in Rorty's account of morality is of direct relevance here. It helps make clear the extent to which Rorty anticipates that abnormal discourse will be the impetus for moral redescription. However, as Calder well notes, this potential is at the same time restricted by the requirement for progress to start from existing forms of cognition. This fact serves to fatally undermine the Rortian potential of the sad and sentimental stories he suggests will be the impulse towards extended solidarity within the liberal human rights culture. These stories, as much as the summaries of our culturally influenced intuitions must avail themselves of our existing vocabulary so that they can be understood by the relevant audience of members, namely the existing community of justification. The shortcomings of Rorty's theory become clear to the extent that the stateless stranger – divested of authority over his or her own final vocabulary – is able neither to express him or herself using our vocabulary, nor to bring about any intelligible rupture.

Rorty's conception of morality as 'the voice of ourselves as members of a community, speakers of a common language', however, shows

> 'the stateless stranger is able neither to express him or herself using our vocabulary, nor to bring about any intelligible rupture'

statelessness to be a condition of amorality, and thus (implicit) inhumanity, again situating it outside of the pragmatic yet valuable morality of the liberal tradition of human rights. The only alternative position for Rorty to take is unavailable to him, for without a shared human potential for accommodation within a

community in which the stranger has no contingent part, she has no way to address the would-by sympathiser or solidarist. If self-creation (the conditions of which are the focus of the next section) is bound and constituted by 'the networks we are', why would we care about those who appear in fact as nothing like 'our kind of people'?

The final point to be made here about Rorty's own description of the potential object of sympathy (and its relationship to his liberal subject) relates to the bind it creates for him. For it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that those most clearly lacking the self-authorship central to his idea of personality are precluded from obtaining it in the way Rorty sets out, and that this in spite of the fact that taking them in 'is part of our tradition'. Furthermore, it emerges that the thus-humiliated 'child', without any situated vocabulary, cannot help but reveal the hollowness of liberal claims to sympathy and solidarity.

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The subject of security

Thomas Moore *on Carl Schmitt's fictive account of security*

Does security lie at the heart of our individual and communal existence? Recent debates about operationalizing human security and the construction of international security have focussed on how the content of security needs to be widened to account for the location of security in non-militaristic settings. For many, human security involves a shift in the 'referent object' of security away from the state to individuals and, in so doing, challenges the centrality of political violence to security discourse itself.

Whilst an awareness of the content of security – militaristic as well as human – is fundamental in assessing the nature of a security regime it is also important to examine how security knowledges are legitimated within political communities. Mapping security onto realist debates (Mearsheimer, *International Security* 19/3, 1994) and then rearticulating these from human security perspectives (Græger, *Journal of Peace Research*, 33/1, 1996) does not satisfactorily account for the ways in which security is a public discourse through which the very contours of citizenship within a state are negotiated and understood. In locating security within debates about authorization, rather than 'threat' perception or 'risk' analysis, the emphasis is on how security is legitimated through political communities.

Carl Schmitt's political theory provides a unique perspective on the evolution of security within the modern state, drawing attention to the ways in which security regimes are imagined by the sovereign as a means of ensuring stability over a territorial political entity. Understanding security as an operational discourse of sovereignty reminds us of the need to link practices of security within the modern state to the evolution of the state form itself. An appreciation of the ways in which security can be located within discourses of sovereignty reduces security down to the moment of the decision. It is important for political communities to articulate the

> 'Schmitt's understanding of security demonstrates scant regard for the way in which a security regime establishes its legitimacy through complex processes of authorization'

process by which decisions are authoritatively allocated into the security domain. A concern with the process of authorization – how security decisions are allocated as security – transfers security away from the territory of the sovereign decision towards security as a public, negotiated discourse at the core of political communities.

Whilst 'danger' and 'threats' are central components of security this discussion calls for an examination of security regimes in terms of complex debates about authorization. A concern with authorization is less concerned with the inscription of danger within a security regime (Campbell, *Writing Security*, 1998) and more concerned with the ways in which a security regime establishes itself as the corporate entity which establishes relations of protection and obedience. A comparison of the security regimes found in Hobbes's Leviathan and Carl Schmitt's political theory brings into focus important questions about the epistemic horizon of security today. Hobbes provides an account of security in which a security regime is legitimate by virtue of a complex process of authorization. By contrast, Schmitt's security regime overlooks the contractual basis of security. It is this element of security which is a significant element in the Hobbesian account of sovereignty.

Rather than look to Carl Schmitt's political theory as a paradigm of the contemporary security dilemma, we should resist the tendency to treat security as a natural condition of political community. This naturalization of security in international relations theory involves a neglect of the way in which security operates as a function of political communities.

Security regimes should be understood as knowledges in which authoritative claims about security and danger are constructed and distributed authoritatively within broader discourse. Rather than treat security as an epistemic community, made of policy experts, we should regard it as not only depending on a dialectic of protection and obedience but also as including considerations of the way in which security is authorized within a given political community. In this regard, the Schmittian security regime provides international relations

scholars with a theory of security stripped bare of the social contract. Schmitt's understanding of security is too concerned with the authoritative allocation of decisions within a political community; it demonstrates scant regard for the way in which a security regime establishes its legitimacy through complex processes of authorization.

Rob Walker has recently addressed the question of whether the revival of interest in Carl Schmitt's writings can be linked to a concern over the status of the exception (and the exceptional) within the discipline of international relations since September 11 2001. In asking '[h]ave we been experiencing an exceptionalism of a Schmittean kind?' (*Security Dialogue*, 37/1, 2006), Walker is concerned by recent attempts to indiscriminately map the binary rationality of Schmitt's political and legal thought with developments inside and outside of contemporary security practices today. Walker rightly acknowledges the importance of denying the construction of the security and liberty problematic within Schmitt's writings, calling for a move against Schmitt on three primary fronts. The first involves a rejection of the theological underpinnings of Schmittian thinking on sovereignty in favour of thinking in terms of the 'identities, agencies and institutions' that constitutively limit the subject within discourses of security. The second involves 'a refusal of the choice between particular and general exceptions' which establishes the sovereign as the source of final adjudication about the status of the exception. The third refusal relates to the way in which Schmitt's observations of sovereignty and security are generalized in terms of a universal condition of the world. For Walker, this is a 'refusal of the assumption that the world of modernity that Schmitt takes for granted is indeed the world'.

Replacing theology with historical sociology (Walker's first move), delinking general exceptions from particular exceptions (the second), and refusing Schmitt's ontological claim about the priority of security over liberty (the third move) are indeed important endeavors. It is important to

think beyond Carl Schmitt's sovereign rendering of security within international relations. Similarly, practices of exceptionalism within contemporary security discourse cannot be reduced to the milieu of Carl Schmitt's writings. As Walker has argued 'security analysts are up against some rather profound questions about the limits of modern politics in ways that have been scarcely broached since the 1920s'. Simply parachuting Carl Schmitt into the post-9/11 world of security is insufficient for the task of understanding the conditioned knowledges and practices of security that circulate today. With this in mind, Roland Axtmann's claim that 'if one wants to find an intellectual lineage for George W. Bush and his 'war on terror', we should look primarily to Carl Schmitt' (*International Politics*, 44, 2007) requires careful analysis of both Schmitt's writings as well as the constitutive dimensions of security knowledges. In a similar vein, Bryan Turner's assertion that 'the language of friend and foe that has dominated President Bush's public statements about the war against terrorism have their roots in the neo-conservative legacy of Schmitt and Strauss' (*Theory, Culture & Society*, 19/4, 2002) must take into account the complex historical and political layers within Schmitt's writings.

We need to read closely Schmitt's account of security expressed in terms of the protection—obedience dialectic. Detailing Schmitt's indebtedness to Thomas Hobbes (as well as his departure from Hobbes on the question

of sovereign authorization) allows us to see the ways in which the referent objects of security are always negotiated politically and understood historically. A move against Schmitt's naturalization of security means that, at the level of ethics, the contingent dimensions of security can be understood in terms of discourses of authorization (legitimacy) rather than reduced to questions of pure decision (sovereignty). This is not the same as saying that a decisionist account of security has no role to play in understanding the contemporary dynamics of security. Rather, the emphasis is on developing a critique of security that acknowledges that 'security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion' (Neocleous, *Critique of Security*, 2008). Identifying the location of security within discourses of sovereignty fails to appreciate how security operates within a field of legitimation. It is this field of legitimation (and, ultimately, illegitimacy) that establishes the desolate choice between security and liberty in contemporary security theory. Returning to Hobbesian questions of authorization, a mutual covenant of the multitude, allows us to see how such naturalized accounts of security are sociologically blind to questions of the authorship of security

'we need to read closely Schmitt's account of security expressed in terms of the protection—obedience dialectic'

as part of the formation of political community.

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The politics of Levinasian ethics

Duygu Türk

Emmanuel Levinas (1906—95) was one of the major figures of twentieth-century philosophy. His work on ethics has influenced many philosophers. It is not surprising – given both the pure notion of ethical relationships that Levinas's philosophy advances and the current tendency to 'ethicize' politics – that Levinasian ethics has also inspired political theorists. Yet what kind of practical politics that Levinasian ethics produce needs more critical elaboration.

The originality of Levinas's ethics lies in his radical critique of Western philosophy. For Levinas, Western philosophy (with a few exceptions) has always been dominated by an idea of 'totality', an idea that reduces the 'other' to the 'same'. Western philosophy is a kind of 'egology'; it tends to dissolve alterity into sameness by creating a closed ontology – reducing the Other to a knowable and fully comprehensible object – and by constructing universal notions (for example, 'law' or 'state') that claim to represent totality. In Western philosophy, the uniqueness of the Other is dissolved into the self-image of the I. Levinas addresses both this theoretical-cum-philosophical tendency to conceptualize alterity as an extension of sameness and the diminishing of others in the real world which, in its most extreme form, takes the form of war. In other words, Levinas associates ontology with the notion of reducing otherness to sameness: 'totality' in the sphere of

theory and destructive war in historical reality. This is why he places ethics prior to and above any ontology. He constructs his theory of ethics in defence of the irreducible alterity of the other, and does so on the basis of a (literally and metaphysically) face-to-face relationship that takes place prior to ontology.

Levinasian ethics is based on a distinct understanding of the subject. Despite having some similarities with Kantian morality, Levinas's ethical subject is the opposite of the modern individual as a rational, conscious and an autonomous self. The Levinasian

> 'the Levinasian "self" gains its subjectivity not through free, rational, autonomous action but, above all, through its subjection to "the Other"'

'self' gains its subjectivity not through free, rational, autonomous action but, above all, through its subjection to 'the Other'. The Other comes first and the I, through encountering the Other, is subjected to the ethical command of the Other's face: thou shalt not kill. At that moment, the I assumes the responsibility for the Other – not as an ontological, but as an ethical 'necessity'. The I is not free; he is, rather, subject to that ethical command. It is only by responding to the call of the Other, that is to say, to the ethical command of the Other's face, that the I gains his subjectivity. The I is a subject as long as he is subjected to the Other.

Put differently, the Other is the necessary condition of the I's subjectness, that is, his quality of being a subject. The subject – because of his limitless responsibility for and subjection to the Other – is both the 'host' that welcomes the Other and also the 'hostage' of the Other. For Levinas the Other's face is the source of all meaning, including the I's self-consciousness. The self is ethical in so far as he places his responsibility for the Other above his own free actions. This is why freedom on the basis of ethics is a 'difficult' freedom.

Such an approach to the subject can also be understood as a reversal of Spinoza's conatus essendi, the 'struggle to be alive'. Levinas argues that the struggle to be alive is by no means the main drive of human nature. Indeed, he claims the opposite: responsibility for the Other includes sacrificing one's own life for the Other. Here, the ethical question is no longer – as it was in earlier versions of moral philosophy – how to live a good life, or how to gain happiness, or self-legislative action. Rather, for Levinas the (radical) ethical question is, 'do I have the right to be?'. Thus, the absolute value in Levinasian ethics turns out to be 'giving the other priority over oneself' (On Thinking-of-the-Other: Entre Nous).

THE THIRD BEING

Levinas argues that, if there were just me and the Other, I would be responsible for the Other without any reservations and without any condition of reciprocity. However, in the real world, there is always someone else. The emergence of this 'third being' gives the ethical relationship between the self and the Other an ontological dimension. The existence of the third being necessitates a comparison between the two Others and thus a decision: which one is my Other? That is, who is the neighbour for whom I have responsibility? (*Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*). At this point, the need for institutions emerges and the limitless responsibility of the self is set a limit. The relationship with the third being denotes a kind of transition from the ethical domain to the ontological

realm, where politics, as well as society, law, the state, and so on, are situated.

In his first magnum opus, *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas defines politics as the 'art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means', whilst war itself entails the 'suspension of morality'. In so far as politics is associated with the act of killing or destroying the Other (as the notion of 'war' implies), Levinas's ethical relationship is diametrically opposed to the political relationship. The Levinasian 'ethical' could thus be characterized as the antithesis of the Schmittian 'political'; the latter's distinction between friend and enemy is the polar opposite of Levinas's ethical relationship between the I and the Other. While Schmitt's politics is defined in terms of the 'real possibility' of war and of killing the Other, Levinasian ethics entails the prohibition of killing the Other. While Schmitt's political subject is the 'sovereign who decides on the exception', Levinas's ethical subject owns his subjectivity by means of his subjection to the 'other's exceptional command'.

In short, in Levinas's view, the active and sovereign subject of politics is replaced by the passive 'subject as hostage' of ethics. Levinas seems to be trying to find a way out of the 'evil' character of politics, of politics as it is in reality, by having recourse to an ethics situated prior to ontology. In line with this, it is because 'the law of evil is the law of being' that it is necessary to think 'otherwise than being', that is to say, ethically.

ETHICS AND POLITICS
However, we should note that, in the foregoing argument, Levinas accepts that ontology is necessary; that there is no complete break from ontology or politics. It is therefore necessary, both for Levinas and his followers, to connect ethics and politics and so establish ethics as the limit or the ground of politics. In the relevant literature, there are various attempts to connect these two distinct fields, using the ethical relationship as conceptualised by Levinas as a starting point. Some emphasise 'charity' as a

mechanism for responding to the Other who is in need of benevolence; others focus on the concept of justice as a kind of ideal which can never be completely fulfilled but the attempts to reach which necessitate a continual critique of the existing social reality.

It is true that the word charity appears often in Levinas's texts, although it is not clear why commentators think of it as a political concept. Similarly, the notion of justice needs more critical assessment. Though in earlier texts Levinas associates justice with the ethical relationship between the I and the Other, later he situates justice in the ontological realm and underlines its inseparability from politics. On the one hand, justice denotes the very tension of measuring the immeasurable, a point from which Derrida continues with his notion of 'undecidability'. On the other hand, justice includes the act of deciding about who my neighbour is.

But what happens to the third being? In *Ethics and Politics*, Levinas

> 'Levinasian ethics may inspire a kind of communitarian politics'

refers to the third being as a potential 'enemy'. This makes Howard Caygill (in *Levinas and the Political*) re-read Levinas's texts from the standpoint of Levinas's political judgement, although many other commentators basically ignore this. In the same text, Levinas associates ethical relationship with kinship, which is also an implicit theme in his other texts. In this sense, in so far as the Other is thought to mean the members of my family or community, Levinasian ethics may inspire a kind of communitarian politics. This contrasts with the

common tendency to associate Levinasian ethics with cosmopolitanism.

Moreover, in his interpretations of the Israeli state, Levinas transforms what was a clear distinction between ethics and politics into an alliance between the two spheres by reference to the historical possibility of building a state embodying 'a prophetic morality and the idea of its peace'. Leaving aside the fact that Levinas attributes this possibility solely to one certain state, such an identification of politics with state and such a linking of the state and a messianic role are highly problematic. Thus, the anarchic role formerly attributed to the role of ethics, which threatens the order of being, now becomes a strange unity of order and ethics. What distinguishes ethics here from becoming a means for justification of force? Can any 'judgment' be free from political positions? Such questions can be multiplied. However, as a final point, suffice it to mention the underlying dilemma which is, without doubt, not peculiar to Levinasian ethics: considering the viewpoint of the 'third beings', which is more dangerous: a politics without ethics or a politics that wears an armour of ethical claims?

Duygu Türk was a visiting fellow at DPIR in 2009. She is a research assistant and a Phd candidate at Ankara University.

CSD Interview

Lord Grocott

Bruce Grocott, a member of the House of Lords for the Labour Party since 2001, was the Member of Parliament for Lichfield and Tamworth (Staffordshire) from 1974 to 1979, for The Wrekin (Shropshire) from 1987 to 1997, and for Telford (Shropshire) from 1997 to 2001. He was parliamentary private secretary to Tony Blair from 1994 to 2001 and government chief whip in the House of Lords from 2002 to 2008. **Anthony Staddon** *and* **Lucy Hatton** *interviewed him at the House of Lords on 8 June 2010.*

You worked closely with Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, two figures who dominated the Labour Party and British politics from the early 1990s. To what extent was the relationship and tensions between these two men symptomatic of the fortunes of New Labour?

I can't add much to what's general knowledge. A lot of the time their relationship was just the two of them together; they are the only reliable witnesses. On many occasions, for hours on end, the two of them would meet on their own or talk on the 'phone. Much will remain speculation until one or the other spells it all out – and then I suppose there will be two versions! They obviously knew each other well. There were tensions between them, but there were also good times. I would be amazed if there were not similar tensions and relationships at the centre of previous governments.

Incidentally, I am wary about the term New Labour: as far as I'm concerned, Labour is Labour. I didn't use the phrase New Labour, because by definition one day it would be out of date. The Labour Party has kept itself going very effectively over a long period. I'm sure it will do so in the future.

You were parliamentary private secretary (PPS) to Tony Blair from 1994 to 2001. According to Alistair Campbell's diaries you said in 1995 that a lot of the parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) didn't like Tony Blair and that he was not making enough of an effort to make them like him. Can you tell us about your role as PPS and

reflect on Tony Blair's relationship with his own party?

I worked closely with Tony for a long time and I remain friends with him to this day. He is an extremely easy person to work with. We had many disagreements – I am to the left of Tony in the political spectrum – but we both had identical objectives: to see Labour win an election and achieve policies consistent with its values. It was beyond our dreams to win two further elections after 1997. We had one serious row in all the time I worked with him. I was right, by the way! But he's a big character and he apologized to me shortly afterwards.

Can you reveal what the row was about?

It was about something connected with the (PLP). I think all leaders hope that when they move in one direction their MPs will follow them, but that's not the way politics works. My job as Tony's PPS was to make sure that he knew what the party was thinking; that the party knew what he was thinking; and to act as a conduit between the two. I felt I knew what the PLP was going to think about something before it knew it itself. Its values don't change and MPs have fairly predictable reactions to crises. I love the Labour Party; it has achieved wondrous things in its history, often against the odds. I would reinforce that position in my discussions with Tony.

So the secret was to act as an honest broker between the leadership and the parliamentary party? The 2004 rebellion by Labour MPs against plan to introduce university tuition fees occurred after you were appointed to the House of Lords — but presumably that's the kind of issue where the role of PPS is important?

Yes, as PPS, my job was to make sure that the prime minister knew about any matter that was likely to cause

> 'I think David Miliband is the best candidate. He is more experienced than the others and has the qualities to be a very good leader of the party and a good prime minister'

difficulties in the PLP. That was not difficult. Tony is easy to talk to and I never had a reason to hold something back from him. It helped that I had no great ambitions. I wasn't looking for high ministerial office or anything like that. I was just happy to help Tony in Downing Street. I just told him how it was and we knew each other too well to dissemble.

Gordon Brown has received an enormous amount of criticism after he became Prime Minister. Do you regret the lack of a leadership contest before he took over from Tony Blair?

You can't manufacture a leadership contest. I never doubted that Gordon would succeed Tony as prime minister. They had dominated politics over a long period. When there are two such dominant figures it gets difficult for any younger, newer Members to blossom. This is always a risk. It happened under Mrs Thatcher. Would it have been better if there had been a leadership election? Maybe, but not enough people in the parliamentary Labour Party thought there was a better candidate than Gordon Brown. It's a bit foolish to put anybody up just to be knocked over.

What are the main reasons why Labour lost the election on 6th May?

A generation of voters could only remember a Labour government. A government in power for that long will have people who think it has made mistakes. Also, governments get more managerial when they have been in power for so long. This is particularly a problem for the Labour Party for, at its best, it is almost an evangelical party. Harold Wilson once said it had the nature of a crusade about it. In the daily work of government, however, because issues are too difficult, or because of competing demands, or because of the fallibility of individuals, a more managerial approach can take over. You therefore don't achieve all that your supporters passionately hoped for. The nearest analogy is this: like darts players, the Labour Party should aim for the bullseye. It isn't always able to hit it; that doesn't stop the party aiming at it.

At the general election, people were looking for change. But there was no passion for any of the change on offer. Labour lost the election, but the real loser – in terms of not fulfilling its aims – was the Conservative Party. If it can't do better than this when it faces a government thirteen years old, and in the midst of the most difficult economic period since the 1930s, then you must wonder what it needs to do to win with an outright majority. Indeed, all three main political parties – Labour, the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats – were disappointed, all for different reasons. The best way to describe the outcome is as a joyless victory.

Who amongst the Labour leadership candidates is best placed to renew the Labour Party in opposition and take on the coalition?

I think David Miliband is the best candidate. He is more experienced than the others and has the qualities to be a very good leader of the party and a good prime minister – sooner rather than later, I hope.

There's been criticism that the Labour leadership candidates are too similar. This is part of a general point about the kinds of people who enter politics and reach leadership positions. Do you think the rise of the career politician is a cause for concern?

The thing that bothers me more is how London-centric politics is becoming. More and more new MPs have forged their careers in and around London, working as political advisers or something similar. There is always a place for that kind of thing; but the authentic person is one that is rooted in the various parts of the United Kingdom. In Labour Party history this would have been the miner from a mining area or the shipyard worker from a shipbuilding area. This enriches politics. We need to be careful that we don't lose that.

Politicians have been calling for reform of the House of Lords for 150 years. You were government chief whip in the Lords. Why is reform of the House of Lords so difficult?

Reform is difficult because no one can agree on what form the second chamber should take. The fundamental point is this: how on earth do you create a directly-elected second chamber which does not become a rival to the Commons? Most proponents of change simply refuse to address this problem.

manage the relationship between two houses with virtually equal powers, the difficulties with reform will continue. I am opposed to a directly-elected House of Lords. I am entirely comfortable with an indirectly elected second chamber – one that comes out of trade unions, employers, the professional groups, the regions, Scotland, Wales, and so on, but making the Lords a mirror image of the Commons is a recipe for constitutional gridlock.

The coalition government has promised the biggest shake-up of democracy since 1832. What measures are needed to restore trust in our political system?

To describe whatever is being proposed as the biggest shake-up in our democracy since 1832 is ridiculous. How, for example, can it be more important than extending the franchise? I'm sure Nick Clegg will regret this claim. This is the overweening confidence that can come immediately after an election. It's best to understate, not overstate.

People claim that the formation of the Conservative—Liberal Democrat coalition government has ushered in a 'new politics'. Can anyone define this 'new politics'? What I see the coalition doing is what politicians always do: finding agreements, listening, compromising. These are the characteristics and skills needed to be successful in politics in a democracy. And the idea that consulting with the public is something new in politics is ridiculous. If you represent a marginal seat, as I did for most of my career as an MP, you are in constant communication with the people who elect you.

Electoral reform is on the agenda. Is there a danger that the Labour Party could be seen as less progressive than the coalition on this issue?

Who is it that defines some constitutional matters as progressive and others as non-progressive? It seems to me it is a small minority of people living inside the M25. I am strongly in favour of First Past The Post (FPTP) electoral system. I have lost an awful lot of elections in my life under it so I could be excused for opposing it. But FPTP is the most intelligible system. It produces fewer spoilt ballot papers, it delivers a clear result – there are obvious winners and losers – and voters prefer it. If you look at the elections for the Scottish Parliament, for example, in which people can vote for a party list alongside the FPTP vote, in election after election more people cast an FPTP vote than a party list vote. More often than not FPTP delivers a clear result (even if it didn't do so at the May 2010 general election).

If anyone thinks that the way in which this new government formed itself behind closed doors in a few days after the election was an enhancement of our openness and democrac, or was 'new politics', then I prefer the old politics.

As a former PPS and government chief whip in the Lords, you are well-placed to judge what the parliamentary Labour Party thinks about election reform. Do you think the PLP will support a move away from FPTP?

There is deep scepticism in the PLP about moving away from FPTP because most Labour MPs, indeed all MPs, even Liberal MPs who want to change the system, value and are enriched by the constituency link. The best thing about being an MP is that one is the exclusive representative of a particular part of the country. The one

The House of Lords has enormous powers; it simply chooses not to exercise them. Its powers are pretty well co-equal to those of the House of Commons. If the Lords were elected by proportional representation, which would be the legitimate chamber – especially if one had been elected more recently than the other?

Until someone can say how you

The Department of Politics and International Relations

Established in September 2008, the Department of Politics and International Relations is a relatively young department. It hosts the Centre for the Study of Democracy. The department has an active and dynamic teaching and research profile. It has a growing and increasingly popular undergraduate programme and offers degrees in Politics and in International Relations. There is a suite of 6 Masters degrees with the latest addition being an MA by Research in International Environmental Policy and Politics. The research in the department includes three broad areas:

• Democratic political theory and practice. This research is carried out in the *Centre for the Study of Democracy*; current research projects include agonism, citizenship and democracy; Islam and democracy; US legislative politics; and international democratic state-building.
• Security and International Relations, where a new programme was inaugurated in June 2010. The principal research foci include international security studies theory, intervention and state-building, borders and identities in Europe, China and India, and energy politics.
• Environmental politics. Research in this area, which includes work on eco-cities, sustainable housing and fisheries policy, is incorporated into the Governance and Sustainability Programme.

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Dr Paulina Tambakaki
Political Theory

John Keane takes up the post of Professor of Politics at the University of Sydney in September 2010. In 1989 John Keane founded the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD), which became the University's internationally-recognized postgraduate research centre in Politics, International Relations, and Asian Studies. In 2008 CSD merged with the undergraduate Politics and IR programme at Westminster to become DPIR. In this period John's own work included biographies of Thomas Paine and Václav Havel, *Global Civil Society* (2003), and, in 2009, his acclaimed history of democracy, *The Life and Death of Democracy*. We wish him all the best at Sydney.

John is interviewed in this issue (pages 3-7).

Reader in Democratic Theory

Dr. Ricardo Blaug joins the Department of Politics and International Relations in September 2010 as a Reader in Democratic Theory. His research interests include

the theory and practice of democracy in organizations, critical theory, discourse ethics and deliberative democracy, public engagement and public service reform. His most recent publications include: *How Power Corrupts: Cognition and Democracy in Organisations* (Macmillan, 2010); 'Intangible Value in the Public Sector', The Work Foundation (2010); 'Why is there Hierarchy? Democracy and Organisational Form', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* (2009), and 'Direct Accountability at the End', in Leighton, D., White, S. (eds), *Building a Citizen Society: the Emerging Politics of Republican Democracy*, Lawrence & Wishart (2008).

Staff News

Dibyesh Anand was awarded a grant by the British Academy for a research project entitled 'China's Tibet: (Inter)National Politics of Imagination'. The research will contribute to a monograph *Tibet: Contested Histories and Futures* (Reaktion Books, forthcoming) which will analyse, for the first time, competing Chinese (the focus of the funded project), Tibetan, Western and Indian perspectives. Dr Anand organized a high-profile conference that brought together key international experts at Westminster in June 2010, 'Revisiting the China-India Border Dispute'.

David Chandler has two new books coming out over the summer: a monograph, *International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance* (Routledge, Critical Issues in Global Politics); and a volume co-edited with Nik Hynek, *Critical Approaches to Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations* (Routledge, PRIO New Security Studies).

Roland Dannreuther has completed an ESRC-funded project on Russia and Islam; a book based on this project, *Russia and Islam: State, Religion and Radicalism*, was published in June 2010. He has now started a new €2.7m EU-funded project on the sources of conflict, collaboration and competition over access to oil, gas and minerals; he is taking the lead in the initial theoretical and analytical part of the project. Details of these projects can be found at: www.pol.ed.ac.uk/islam and www.polinares.eu.

Abdelwahab El-Affendi has been awarded a £300,000 grant by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for a study entitled 'Narratives of insecurity, democratisation and justification of (mass) violence.'

Aidan Hehir's *Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction* was published by Palgrave Macmillan in December 2009; and *Kosovo and the International Community: Intervention, Statebuilding and Independence* by Routledge in January 2010.

Maria Holt is writing a book on 'Women and Islamic resistance in the Arab world' (with Haifaa Jawad at the University of Birmingham). Funding from the United States Institute of Peace and the Cordoba Foundation has enabled her to conduct research on this topic in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and Yemen.

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DPIR EVENTS

DPIR

CSD hosts a range of events and academic programmes, including:

The **CSD SEMINAR**, at which speakers from CSD and other academic institutions – in the UK and abroad – present papers on a wide range of subjects in politics, international relations and cultural studies. Recent topics and speakers have included:

'Borders versus Boundaries of Europe: Reflections on the Case of Turkey'
Dr Dilek Cinar
Bogaziçi University, Turkey

'Islam in Russia: Examining the dynamics of (de-)radicalisation'
Professor Roland Dannreuther
DPIR
(See article, page 1)

'On Retaining the Concept of Totalitarianism'
Dr Eric Litwack
Queen's University, Canada

'The Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers and the Countries that Send Them'
Dr Philip Cunliffe
University of Kent

* * *
The annual **CSD ENCOUNTER**, at which CSD members and outside academics discuss in detail the work of a leading thinker in his/her presence. The 2010

Encounter was with *Charles Taylor* (see back page for Amanda Machin's report)

The **GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY RESEARCH PROGRAMME**
Recent events have included:

A symposium ,
'*Eco-Cities: Between Vision and Reality*',
Professors Simon Joss (DPIR) and Robert Kargon (Johns Hopkins University), Dr Arthur Molella (Smithsonian Institution), Dr John Barry, (Queen's University Belfast) Anders Franzén (Head of Planning, City of Växjö) Peter Head OBE (Arup, London), Guillermo Reynes (GRAS Arquitectos, Madrid), Professor Yvonne Rydin (University College London)
(See article, page 26)

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The **WESTMINSTER INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FORUM**
Recent topics and speakers have included:

'Scaling Back Minority Rights? The New Debate about China's Ethnic Policies'
Dr Barry Sautman
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology

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The Department of Politics and International Relations was established in September 2008; it is a merger of the internationally renowned Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD) and the highly successful undergraduate subject area of Politics and International Relations of the former Department of Social and Political Studies.

Although research at DPPIR covers a wide range of topics and issues – including international relations, international security, normative political theory, United States government and politics, European Union politics, identity and representation, and governance and sustainability – we have particular research strengths in three areas: the theory and practice of democracy, particularly in Europe, the Arab world and in the United States; security studies and international relations; and environmental politics.

DPIR is located in the School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Languages (SSHL).

THE ⬤ BULLETIN
aims to inform other university departments and public organizations, and our colleagues and postgraduate and undergraduate students at the University of Westminster, of DPIR's research activities. Comments on the content of this *Bulletin*, or requests to receive it, should be directed to *CSD Bulletin*, DPIR, 32-38 Wells Street, London W1T3UW. As with all DPIR publications and events, the opinions expressed in these pages do not necessarily represent those held generally or officially in DPIR or the University of Westminster.

Staff News
(continued from page 18)

John Owens's latest book, edited with Riccardo Pelizzo of Griffith University, *The 'War on Terror' and the Growth of Executive Power? A Comparative Perspective*, is published by Routledge in June 2010.

Paulina Tambakaki's book, *Human Rights, or Citizenship?* has just been published by Birkbeck Law Press/Routledge Cavendish.

time you get an uninterrupted hearing in the House of Commons is when you are telling the House about issues specific to your own constituency – housing issues and so on. This is what sustains you, where you recharge your batteries.

Time and again I have been in London during the week; troubling issues have arisen and you have debated and discussed them at length; then you go back to your constituency on a Friday, and within minutes of a factory or school visit, or a constituency surgery, you realise that 99 per cent of things you've been talking about all week are of no interest whatsoever to the people you represent. You quickly get your feet back on the ground.

This applies, without exception, to the constitutional issues that we have been talking about. If you read certain newspapers you would think the whole of the country is waiting for a change in the way we elect members of parliament. In well over 50 years of canvassing I've knocked on tens of thousands of doors. I can't remember anyone saying that the thing really holding them back from voting Labour was the lack of progress on electoral reform. It just doesn't happen. Electoral reform is an interesting subject for newspapers and in universities. I have worked in universities and you get great essays from students on the different election systems and who does what where, but this is largely an academic and journalist discussion which does not resonate with the public.

Why did Gordon Brown, who was perceived to be sceptical on election reform, concede a referendum on it?

I would not have done this, but what Gordon's views were on proportional representation I frankly don't know. All I can say is this: the fundamental building block of the British constitution – beautiful in its simplicity – is the relationship between the individual member of parliament and his or her constituents. It is on this basis that governments are formed.

The next few years are likely to be dominated by the budget deficit. The emergency budget on 22 June will provide further detail of the government's deficit-cutting plans. How do you think the Labour opposition should respond to spending cuts and tax rises? Is the argument moving away from the need for growth to where to cut?

I think we have won the argument about economic growth. It is always difficult when you use this kind of language because lots of people have

> 'there is deep scepticism in the Parliamentary Labour Party about moving away from the 'First Past the Post' electoral system because most Labour MPs value and are enriched by the constituency link'

lost their jobs – which is always terrible – but we came through an international recession under Gordon Brown's premiership, and the impact of job losses, businesses going bust, house repossessions, was not as bad as, for example, the recessions in the 1980s and 1990s.

This, at least in part, has to do with the structure of our political system and of the Labour Party in particular. Labour has many MPs who represent areas that tend to suffer whenever the economy gets a cold, and they made certain their voices were heard. This, together with Keynesian economics, was crucial in understanding that the government is the only body that has the power to start to move the economy back towards growth again.

You have a background in academia. You will be aware that most universities are facing real-terms funding cuts, with warnings about job losses, rising class sizes and declining standards. How can the success of higher education be sustained against this worrying backdrop?

I should declare an interest as one of the governors of Birmingham City University. 40-odd years ago I started work in one of the constituent colleges that became the university. I think universities will find ways of dealing with this problem. We would all prefer there to be growth, but there are ways to provide for the student demand that exists and to keep standards high. Obviously universities can't be exempt from the cuts that are taking place in other parts of the economy.

Is a rise in tuition fees inevitable?

I hope not, but who knows? The thing that always bothers me is any measure that increases the gap between the better and the less well off. We all know that historically far more people go to university from better off families. If you look at the more deprived parts of the country the concern is that relatively few students there will go on to university. I will be watching very carefully for any change to the structure, operation and financing of universities that disadvantages the less well-off. I think there are ways in which the costs of universities to the students can be eased. For example, I can't see any fundamental reason why people can't attend universities within easy distance of where they live. Where I live in the West Midlands there are now about nine or ten universities within commuting distance of most homes.

Lord Grocott, thank you very much for your time.

Anthony Staddon teaches European Politics, and Lucy Hatton has just completed a BA in Politics, at the University of Westminster.

Bringing anarchy in

Alex Prichard *makes the case for using Proudhon's ideas to rethink anarchy and the state in Internationals Relations theory*

'The problem is this: how to conceive of an order without an orderer and of organizational effects where formal organization is lacking.' (Kenneth Waltz)

Waltz's statement suggests, somewhat paradoxically, that International Relations (IR) theorists would make excellent anarchist theorists. The 'anarchy problematique', as RK Ashley has called it, set up in the way that Waltz frames it, is quintessentially the anarchist problematique. The paradox lies in the ontological argument that precedes both framings. For Waltz it is states,

constituted as sovereign actors whose relatively harmonious inter-relations need explaining, while for anarchists the concern is to allow individuals and a community of communities to interact without the state.

Surely if the state is not the prerequisite of order in the international realm, since there is no global state, can we not argue that it is not a precondition for order anywhere else? Indeed, if this is the case, two questions follow: first, can IR be a way into anarchist theory? And, secondly, can anarchism provide insights for IR theorists? The answer to both questions is yes. The problem is the ontological centrality of the state. To be more precise, the problem is the tendency in IR to conflate all social relations within a given territory with 'the state'. What I will argue is that by bringing an anarchist ontology of the state to bear on contemporary debates in IR we at once open up the ontology of the international and make it more anarchic, and, by showing the centrality of anarchy to autonomy, open up space for a new politics of the global.

The initial problem is one of ontology: what is the international system made up of? Put another way, what must be the case in order for us to think that the international system is 'anarchic'?

For mainstream IR theorists the answers to these questions are today more or less intuitive – the absence of formal hierarchy means the international system is an anarchy. What seems ironic from an anarchist perspective is that states-as-agents, interacting in a so-called 'anarchical society', as Hedley Bull put it, constitute the quintessential anarchist community.

Yet while anarchism is rarely spared a derisory sideswipe, few consider the international community, an actually existing and relatively ordered anarchical society, to be utopian. Quite the contrary, for Ashley, the 'heroic practice' that is IR is defined by trying to bring this anarchy under control and yet none seem willing to submit all states to a global sovereign. State autonomy is central to international politics, but individual and group autonomy is antithetical to politics. From an anarchist perspective, the international realm is a realm of freedom and possibility while the domestic is one of authority and control.

It is worth remarking here that anarchists well-recognize that in anarchist communities, where there are no formal hierarchies, power still operates and informal hierarchies still emerge. Anarchists simply refuse to formalize hierarchies and actively seek out ways to ensure that hierarchies do not adversely skew group interests or undermine individual and group autonomy. Anarchists point to the institutions of mutual aid and the emergence of cooperation to show how the logic of the state and capital mitigate and purposefully undermine the logic of autonomy at the heart of a spontaneous order.

Anarchists also accept that individuals are always already socialized; that they bring their own identities and values to the group; that they are constrained and enabled by the anarchist community in different ways; and that different anarchist societies in different periods and geographical locations display different internal dynamics and systemic pressures.

In many respects, anarchists do IR theory when they try and better understand anarchist communities.

On the face of it, anarchism would seem to be an invaluable source for thinking about state behavior. But this is not the direction to take simply because it is an assumption to many to assume that states are actors, persons or agents. In order to break down the barrier between anarchist theory and IR theory we have to break down what we think states are. Indeed, as I will show, state theory strongly determines international theory, but few in IR have, for the purposes of understanding international anarchy, reflected on what the state is. Indeed, Alex Wendt has claimed that what the state is, the ontology of state theory, is routinely elided in IR theory. The consequences are that the ontology of the international system remains largely intuitive; we routinely repeat the analogy between states and individuals, or claim the state is an 'actor'; but the possibility remains that our intuitions on this matter may be wrong.

WENDT AND WIGHT

The nineteenth-century anarchist, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's, thought has the potential to help us conceptualise world politics in ways that can break down the barriers between IR theory and anarchist theory. His pluralist group-based social ontology radically undermines the notion of a corporatist state and speaks directly to a contemporary debate in IR theory. This debate is one between Colin Wight and Alex Wendt and this debate centres on the ontology of the state for the purposes of theorising world politics. They both ask: what must be the case in order for us to think of the world as anarchic; are our standard ontologies of IR adequate reflections of reality; and could alternative views of this subject be

both more empirically accurate and more emancipatory? Arguably, Wendt and Wight's debate has become stuck on the question of the ontological status, emergent reality and relative autonomy of groups for the political ontology of IR. What I argue is that by bringing groups, rather than the totality of the state, to the forefront of any ontology of the international would allow us to do two things: first it would give us a more realistic account of the complexity of the emergent properties of the international; secondly, by radically decentering the state in IR we can see that the problem of anarchy is exponentially more acute than we have previously thought. This allows us to do the two things I mentioned at the outset: bring anarchism to IR to help us understand social order in sovereignty-free political orders and, secondly, understand the promise of anarchy for political and social autonomy.

'by bringing an anarchist ontology of the state to bear on contemporary debates in IR we open up the ontology of the international and make it more anarchic'

Wendt argues that the state is a person and that the state's personhood is the emergent product of the collective agency of a national or territorially and functionally defined super-group of individuals. He also argues that much as the identity and agency of an individual is irreducible to their

physical existence (agency and identity are socially and biologically structured and constructed too) states are also emergent properties – fundamentally dependent upon, but irreducible to its constituent units. This organicist doctrine is familiar and entrenches the standard statist ontology of IR. The state as a supergroup supersedes and encompasses all within it. The state's identity emerges from this totality and it is thus that Wendt sees states as agents, persons even. Maintaining an ontology of state personhood allows Wendt to remain well within standard ontologies of world politics. Anarchy becomes 'what states make of it', grouped – as they are understood to be – in mutual antagonism, and crowned with formal sovereignty. But anarchy is only a problem for Wendt at the international level and, true to his argument about the logics of states in anarchy, they too will eventually transcend their particularity and emerge into some form of world state. This, he argues, is 'inevitable'.

Wendt's theory poses what he rather modestly calls 'uncomfortable truths' for liberals: how are liberals to justify state power if states cannot be reduced to individuals? Indeed, if a world state is inevitable, what of the autonomy of states? But if this theory presents 'uncomfortable truths' for By Wendt's own analysis, a world state will be a moral dystopia of epic proportions.

Colin Wight, sees this and argues that we can avoid the absolutism of

Wendt's organicism by understanding the state not as an agent with an identity and a will, but as a structure which constrains and enables real, actually existing humans and groups of humans. However, Wight ends up in much the same muddle since he too argues that the state can be considered a super-structure which, while it has no agency, nevertheless structures all. What is a vital addition and correction to Wendt's theory is that Wight shows, borrowing from Marx, that one's subject position within the 'complex institutional ensemble' that goes to make up political society, where we exist in relation to various structures, determines our life chances. So, whether we are constrained by racialised structures, or enabled by the structures of global capitalism makes a huge difference to our lives and also shapes the given character of any given society. States are not the emergent character of a supergroup, but the structures which constrain and enable unique individuals and groups.

Yet Wight does a disservice to Wendt's theory of corporate agency by dismissing the importance of the collective consciousness of groups. We can dismiss Wendt's organicism at the level of some abstract and metaphysical totality called the state without needing to dismiss the ontological import of empirically identifying groups as the ontological primers of politics. Indeed, Wight's decision to

bifurcate the social world almost exclusively between individuals and structures would seem to denude IR theory of a realistic understanding of collective agency, be this classes, trade unions, NGOs, multinationals or anything else. In an effort to reclaim the individual from Wendt's organicism, Wight posits that it is only individuals and structures that are ontologically significant when discussing state agency – groups have little significant ontological autonomy in explaining world politics.

Because in Wight's structural ontology structures structure all, his political ontology has no 'gaps'. His structuralist vision is a claustrophobic world where autonomy seems all but impossible and structures seem to envelop the whole of the social world; there is

> 'anarchism is not the political ideology of disorder, but of autonomy, and a framework for understanding how groups and individuals can relate without the need for states'

no 'outside' or 'other' in his social ontology. This has implications for how we might seek to defend the autonomy of groups and individuals because where is the group agency if structures leave no room for it? Surely there must be significant cracks between the structures in order that new political groups can change these structures? Moreover, a fetishisation of structures

undermines the radical emancipatory potential of anarchy. It is to this that I will now turn.

The promise of Proudhon's writings here is to find a way in which groups and individuals, structures and institutions can be conceptualised as part of the same social whole, thereby widening and strengthening the normative force of a social theory of world politics. The path I will take, however, has significant implications for what we think IR is. What I will argue is that the radical anarchy I will now set out, places anarchy at the heart of not only IR, but of politics as such. I will argue that political science as such has overemphasised order to the neglect of the study of anarchy. This is where anarchism can come back in.

PROUDHON

Proudhon argued that the state is a group that, like all other social groups, is emergent from and irreducible to the historically and culturally distinct groupings of the individuals of which it is comprised. However, because the state is emergent from the interactions of groups, when a given constellation necessary for the perpetuation of a given state breaks down or realigns, the character of the state changes or the state disappears. Consider the realignment of of the balance of power between social groups precipitated by the French Revolution and juxtapose this with the recent phenomenon of failed states. States, we ought also to recall, are relatively autonomous from society. Indeed, states may vie for control of a similar territory and plural social forces within a given territory may seek to expel or compete over a given state – think Afghanistan or Kashmir.

Global society is comprised of multiple groups, and individuals who are simultaneously members of many groups at the same time. The precise character of a given social complex is determined by the

individuals in the various groups, the relations of the various groups to one another and the context within which these groups interact. The structures which bind groups together – or keep them apart – are historically specific, mutable but relatively enduring.

'political science as such has overemphasised order to the neglect of the study of anarchy'

Looking at the nineteenth-century international system, Proudhon saw that states – not to be confused with the societies they governed as the case of Italy, Poland, Germany, and innumerable other emergent nation states – were groups of aristocratic and bourgeois men (in the main) able to wield disproportionate and unjustifiable control over others. In an outstanding essay *Si Les Traités de 1815 ont Cessé d'Exister* (1863), Proudhon argued that if this autonomy can be regulated without a world state, why could all other social relations not be so too? Looking at France and Italy, Proudhon argued that the centralising tendencies of modern states were extinguishing the internal pluralism of states and the autonomy of region, towns, cities and trades. Indeed, monopoly capitalism was taking the same route, extinguishing the liberty and autonomy of workers. Only in anarchy could the autonomy of social groups be truly defended. Indeed, if sovereignty is a myth codified in law, are not all social relations anarchic in reality if not in principle, in practice if not in theory?

The ontological consequences for a theory of anarchy and world politics are clear: if states are but one, relatively small if disproportionately powerful group among many, and inter-state anarchy is a form of inter-group relations replicated at all social levels, the anarchy problematique is constitutive of politics as such and anarchism becomes the master discipline. Anarchism is not the political ideology of disorder, but of autonomy – the autonomy of groups and individuals – and a framework for understanding how groups and individuals can relate without the need for states. Understanding order in anarchy is the sine qua non of anarchism and for this reason it ought to be central to contemporary curricula.

Ironically, IR theorists are uniquely positioned intellectually (if not necessarily politically) to be the most rigorous anarchist theorists. IR theorists have spent the past fifty years moving from a crude realism to a sense of how social groups cohere and self-regulate or self-govern their interrelations without a sovereign. While a realist might argue that a world of plural social groups would be more dangerous than one with fewer, liberals would surely point to the mollifying effects of institutions, while constructivists and sociological liberals would look to the character of the groups and the norms groups of groups subscribe to, which help regulate and shape their interactions in cooperative ways. Critical theorists would again simply point out how capitalism and the state-group, rather than anarchy per se, produce objective contradictions which bring disequilibrium to the social order.

Anarchism is both a way into IR theory and also provides compelling insights. By foregrounding the group and disaggregating the state, anarchism shows us how central autonomy is to politics and the value of a world without sovereigns. It remains to be seen whether this challenge is taken up in earnest by IR theorists. Given the ontological and political stakes of such a move, it is highly unlikely.

Alex Prichard is an ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Bristol. This is an edited version of a paper he presented to the IR forum at DPIR in February 2010. A full version of this paper is forthcoming.

Eco-cities: a global survey

Simon Joss *outlines the aims and results of the Eco-Cities project*

Efforts to render cities environmentally and socially sustainable are not new. Urban planning and regeneration over the last one hundred years or so have been significantly influenced by attempts to redress the perceived detrimental effects of large-scale urbanisation, such as environmental degradation, social inequalities and urban sprawl. The Garden City, the New Town and the Techno-City are nineteenth and twentieth century exemplars of such attempts to reinvent the city in the (post)industrial era (see Kargon & Molella, *Invented Edens. Techno-Cities of the Twentieth Century*, 2008, reviewed in volume 16 of the *Bulletin*).

More recently, these efforts have culminated in a new phenomenon - the so-called eco-city. The term can be traced back to the mid-1970s, when it was first coined in the context of the rising environmental movement, notably by Richard Register through his Urban Ecology initiative and 'eco-city Berkeley' project. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, it remained mainly a concept, 'a collection of…ideas about urban planning, transportation…housing, economic development…public participation and social justice…' (Roseland, *Cities* 14/4),1997), with practical examples few and far between. As Barton has noted, there was initially a considerable gulf - resulting from various economic, political and behavioural constraints inhibiting the realisation of eco-city developments - between aspiration and actual achievement (*Sustainable Communities - The Potential for Eco-Neighbourhoods*, 2000).

The United Nations 'Earth Summit' held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and the resulting sustainable development programme ('Agenda 21), formed the background to a first wave of practical eco-city initiatives. For example, Curitiba (Brazil) was heralded as one of the first eco-cities,

'urban planning and regeneration over the last one hundred years or so have been significantly influenced by attempts to redress the perceived detrimental effects of large-scale urbanisation'

on account of its advanced, integrated public transport system Waitakere (New Zealand) became known for its attempt to combine Western and Maori concepts of sustainable resource management in its eco-city master plan. Schwabach, a small German city, was selected by the federal government for a pilot study to develop a model for ecological city development. In Sweden, all local authorities were required to implement Local Agenda 21 plans to encourage environmental innovation.

However, it is only in recent years that the eco-city phenomenon has become truly global and mainstream, against the background of a majority of people now living in cities and the growing international recognition of the scale and severity of climate change. (This more recent phase has also given rise to related terms, concepts and movements, such as 'climate neutral cities' and 'transition towns'). Thus, China is currently at the forefront of eco-city development in East Asia, with international projects such as Dongtan and Tangshan; in the United Arab Emirates, Masdar is being developed as a brand-new zero-carbon city to be emulated elsewhere in the Middle East (and beyond); Hacienda Ecocities in Kenya is promoted as a model sustainable city for Africa; and Växjö (Sweden), Freiburg (Germany) and St Davids (United Kingdom) are vying to be the 'greenest city' of Europe, while President Sarkozy recently declared that Paris would become the first post-Kyoto capital eco-city.

AIMS

To date, there has been no global survey of eco-cities (Barton, in *Sustainable Communities - The Potential for Eco-Neighbourhoods*, carried out a survey of eco-

Table 1. Eco-Cities and their key features 2009

No	City	Region	Type	Phase	Driver
1	Arcosanti	North America	I	2	c
2	Auroville	Asia	I	2	d
3	Bahia de Caraquez	Latin America	I	3	c
4	BicycleCity	North America	I	1	b
5	Black Sea Gardens	Europe	I	1	b
6	Caofeidian	Asia	I	2	a
7	Curitiba	Latin America	I	3	c
8	Dongtan	Asia	I	2	a
9	Gwang Gyo	Asia	I	1	a
10	Hanham Hall	Europe	I	2	a
11	Masdar	Middle East	I	2	a
12-13	Rackheath + St Austell	Europe	I	1	a
14	Songdo	Asia	I	2	a
15	Sonoma Mountain Village	North America	I	2	d
16	Sseesamirembe	Africa	I	2	a
17	Aerial Treasure Island	North America	II	3	b
18	Amman	Middle East	II	1	a
19	BedZED	Europe	II	3	a
20	Chalon-sur-Saône	Europe	II	3	a
21	Clonburris	Europe	II	1	a
22	Ecociudad Valdespartera	Europe	II	3	a
23	EcoVillage, Ithaca	North America	II	3	b
24	Greenwich Millennium Village	Europe	II	2	c
25	Hacienda Ecocities	Africa	II	1	a
26	Hammarby Sjöstad	Europe	II	3	a
27	Helsingør/Helsingborg	Europe	II	2	a
28	Johannesburg EcoVillage	Africa	II	1	b
29	Kalundborg	Europe	II	3	a
30	Logrono Montecorvo	Europe	II	1	a
31	MenTouGou	Asia	II	1	a
32	Nieuw Terbregge	Europe	II	2	a
33	Rizhao	Asia	II	2	a
34	Segrate	Europe	II	1	b
35	Thames Gateway	Europe	II	2	b
36	Tianjin	Asia	II	2	a
37	Trondheim	Europe	II	2	a
38	Tudela	Europe	II	2	a
39	Zilina	Europe	II	1	a
40	Erlangen	Europe	III	3	a
41	Ferrara	Europe	III	3	a
42	Freiburg	Europe	III	3	a
43	Glumslov	Europe	III	3	a
44	Gothenburg	Europe	III	1	a
45	Hamburg	Europe	III	1	a
46	Heidelberg	Europe	III	3	a
47	Kampala	Africa	III	3	b
48-53	Kottayam + 5 cities	Asia	III	2	c
54	Loja	Latin America	III	3	a
55	Malmo	Europe	III	3	a
56	Oslo	Europe	III	3	a
57	Portland	North America	III	3	a
58	Puerto Princesa	Asia	III	3	b
59	Reykjavik	Europe	III	3	a
60	Sydney	Australasia	III	2	b
61	St Davids	Europe	III	3	b
62	Tajimi	Asia	III	3	d
63	Tangshan	Asia	III	2	a
64	Toronto	North America	III	3	a
65	Vancouver	North America	III	2	a
66	Vaxjo	Europe	III	3	a
67	Waitakere	Asia	III	3	d
68-73	Yokohama + 5 cities	Asia	III	2	a

Type
I- new development
II- addition to urban area
III- retro-fit development

Phase
1- planning stage
2- under construction
3- implemented

Driver
a- technological innovation
b- sustainable visions
c- urban expansion
d- civic empowerment

neighbourhoods; however, this only included a few examples at city scale). The aim of the Eco-Cities project, therefore, is systematically to map, analyse and compare contemporary eco-city initiatives. The particular focus of this study is on trying to gain a better understanding of the innovation and governance processes driving and shaping eco-city developments. What distinguishes eco-cities from 'normal' cities? Why do eco-cities seem to have become globally mainstream in such a short period of time? How are eco-cities located, designed and implemented? And can eco-cities be socially and democratically sustainable? In order to provide answers to these questions, amongst others, the project is structured in three parts:

(1) an ongoing global survey of eco-city initiatives, the aim of which is to establish the scale and diversity of current developments;

(2) an in-depth comparative analysis of a sample of eco-cities, with the aim of analysing key characteristics, processes and

contexts; and

(3) a critical discussion of 'eco-cities' capacity for innovating for environmental and social sustainability, and of related governance processes.

METHODOLOGY

For the preliminary global survey - the present study - an initial 'horizon-scanning' of recent eco-city initiatives was carried out based on an analysis of relevant literature,

> 'the particular focus of of the Eco-Cities project is on trying to gain a better understanding of the innovation and governance processes driving and shaping eco-city developments'

conference proceedings and websites (such as *www.eco-cities.net* and *www.ecocityworldsummit.org*), using the terms/descriptors 'eco-city' and 'eco-town' (the terms 'urban regeneration' and 'urban sustainability' proved to be too broad as analytical categories for this part of the research). For each of the developments identified in this way a brief profile was compiled. Furthermore, in order to be able to

identify various types of eco-cities and discern current trends and patterns, the sampled eco-cities were categorised according to the following variables: (a) type of eco-city development (brand-new development; addition to urban area; 'retro-fit' development); (b) development phase (at pilot/planning stage; under construction; implemented); (c) key 'drivers' - that is, objectives and rationale informing the development (technological innovation; sustainability visions; urban expansion; civic empowerment).

PRELIMINARY RESULTS

Using the above methodology, 73 eco-city initiatives were identified (by summer 2009). As the table on page 27 shows, these are spread globally. Most are in Europe (31), with Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom and Germany heading the table. The second largest concentration is found in Asia/Australasia (25), followed by North America (8), Africa (4), Latin America (3), and the Middle East (2).

The findings of this preliminary survey demonstrate the extent to which eco-cities have in recent years become a global phenomenon, not limited, as might have been assumed, to developed countries in the Western hemisphere. Innovative eco-city initiatives are as likely to be found in China, Kenya, Japan, South Korea, and South Africa, as in Canada, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, and the United States. Some of the most radical eco-city projects are currently under construction in the Middle East and East Asia.

The findings also show quite how far eco-cities have moved on since the 1970s-1990s: from a relatively loosely defined concept with only a few experimental pilots, to concrete, practice-led initiatives.

It may prove elusive, and arguably misses the point, to try to define narrowly what exactly is, and

is not, an eco-city, especially as there currently is no standard definition in use and as the agenda is fast evolving. This study shows just how diverse the eco-city phenomenon nowadays is. Both conceptually and in practice, eco-cities come in many shapes and forms, from so-called 'retro-fits' to brand new developments; from small town to large city projects; and from technology-driven to community-inspired innovations.

Nevertheless, for the purpose of identifying the key characteristics and rationales of eco-cities and carrying out comparative analyses, the following delineation may be useful: first, only eco-city initiatives that are characterised by sufficient scale and (policy/innovation) significance are considered. By this definition, small-scale projects - such as eco-neighbourhoods/villages, or individual innovations (for example, zero-carbon buildings) - are excluded. Likewise, eco-city initiatives that are found to be merely an idea/concept and/or play a minor, subordinate role - for example, they only serve public relations purposes - are excluded. Thus, an eco-city is defined as a development of substantial size - a town, a large new urban development, or an entire new city - with significant socio-technological innovation and policy co-ordination attached to it. Second, within this definition, eco-cities are broadly categorised into 'new developments' and 'retro-fits', given what the initial research reveals to be significant differences between these two main categories.

The observed 'mainstreaming' of eco-cities in the last five years or so prompts important questions, among others, about the effectiveness and significance of eco-cities in terms of representing a practical response, and providing solutions, to the challenges posed by (the politics of) climate change and population growth. Therefore, in taking research into eco-cities forward, two analytical perspectives seem particularly relevant in trying to find answers to these questions.

The first perspective addresses the issue of innovation. Eco-cities can be understood as sites, or laboratories, of knowledge creation and transfer, through which new technologies and socio-technological innovation processes are developed, tested and replicated. As the above survey shows, various innovation modes appear to be in play, some emphasising particular technologies and/or policy sectors, others using a more 'blended' approach of integrating different technologies,

policy areas and social settings. In addition, some eco-city projects have an explicit remit to foster social learning and education, for example by running demonstration objects, museums, and degree programmes. Thus, research should inquire into who and what drives these innovation processes, what are enabling and limiting factors, and what results are achieved.

The second perspective addresses the issue of governance. Eco-cities are situated in, and have to adapt to, various contexts of social and political governance. This is particularly so in the case of 'retro-fits', where innovation has to take place within often long-established governance structures and processes. A 'clean slate' approach, using new developments, may initially be less restricting in terms of having to fit into pre-determined governance modes. However, during implementation, the issue of governance can be expected to become equally relevant and occasionally problematic. Here, research should inquire into how eco-cities are governed, what tensions and conflicts may arise between technological innovation, urban development and sustainable living, and how these may be resolved within a framework of democratic governance.

Simon Joss works on the Governance and Sustainability programme at the University of Westminster. You can find out more about the Eco-Cities project and the Governance and Sustainability programme here:
www.wmin.ac.uk/governance+sustainability

Iran's tryst with democracy

Ali Paya

In the twentieth century Iran was the only developing country in which two popular revolutions took place aimed at replacing an autocratic and despotic system with genuine democracy: the 1906 constitutional revolution and the Islamic revolution of 1979. Yet a fully functional home-grown democracy remains an unrealized aspiration.

Many of the main architects of the 1979 revolution, including its undisputed leader, grand Ayatollah Khomeini, insisted that, in the post-revolutionary era, all would be equal: there would be no special treatment or privileged status for any particular group, especially the clergy.

Yet the most important document of the Islamic republic, its constitution, violates a cardinal principle of democratic rule, that is, equality of citizens in political decision-making. Articles in the constitution give the Shi'i clergy a privileged status, and as such renders the Islamic republic structurally incompatible with fully-fledged democracy.

An important point of contention – in addition to the constitution – among various social groups since the early days of the revolution has been the compatibility or otherwise of Islam and democracy. While some progressive clergy argue that Islam and democracy are compatible, most conservative clergy maintain that democracy is a western product and has nothing to do with Islamic teachings. Similarly, while most religious intellectuals regard Islam and democracy as compatible and have tried to produce workable models of 'Islamic democracy' for use in a Muslim country; left-wing and non-religious secular intellectuals believe that Islam and democracy cannot be reconciled.

It is difficult to assess critically the quality of these debates as the interlocutors seem to use key terms differently – 'Islam', for example, or 'democracy', 'secularism', and 'people'.

> 'many of the architects of the 1979 revolution, including its leader, grand Ayatollah Khomeini, insisted that, in the post-revolutionary era, all would be equal'

Moreover, in recent years (perhaps because 'democracy' has become respectable in modern political parlance), even some age-old enemies of democracy express their opposition to democracy in ways that suggest they are actually in favour of it. Thus, for example, Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi, an influential conservative clergyman who is a father-figure for radical fundamentalists, distinguishes between three forms of democracy, one of which – the direct democracy in place in 5th century BC Athens – he dismisses as outmoded; another – secular democracy, prevalent in the West – he rejects as inappropriate; a third of democracy, he maintains, is already in use in Iran.

According to Ayatollah Misbah, this third form is the one that gives Muslims who form an absolute majority in an Islamic country the right to choose a righteous leader to govern their state. He argues that, in an Islamic state, leaders are either appointed by God, or by the Prophet, or by the infallible Imams and therefore receive their legitimacy from above. As such, it is the duty of the people to recognize the righteous leaders and offer them their allegiance and support. If they fail to do so, the wrongly chosen leader would be taghout, an unjust and illegitimate ruler. In this case, even if the political systems introduced by these illegitimate rulers are presented as democracy, such a 'democracy' cannot be endorsed by Islam.

Notwithstanding the opposition to the notion of democracy by the conservative clergy and their radical followers, democracy has become one of the dominant discourses in Iranian society since the end of the eight year war with Iraq in 1988. President Rafsanjani, who was elected after the war, pursued a policy of economic reform and political restriction during his eight years in office (1988—96); his successor, however, President Khatami, won a landslide victory on a comprehensive reform agenda, the main theme of which was political openness. It was during Khatami's two-term presidency (1997—2005) that the greatest theoretical leap forward in elucidating and elaborating the idea of democratic rule took place in Iran.

Even a cursory glance at the literature produced during this period testifies to the quality of the conceptual frameworks and sophistication of the arguments in the debates about democracy. It would be no exaggeration to claim that, as a result of these intellectual efforts, not only was notion of 'democracy' clarified analytically; in addition, the idea of democracy, as the

best human construct so far for managing the affairs of the societies, entered the collective consciousness of a large number of Iranians.

The significance of this achievement can only be appreciated if one compares the present public understanding of the notion of democracy with attitudes to it in the first half of the twentieth century or even just a few decades ago.

For many decades both ordinary people and the clergy (Ulama) identified democratic aspirations with Communism and Marxism, and thus regarded them as being opposed to religion. In the case of the Ulama there were further reasons for being suspicious of democracy: apart from being an alien, western product, democracy was a form of government that great Muslim thinkers like Al-Farabi, inspired by Plato's writings, had condemned as 'the rule of the rabble'.

Aversion to democracy was not limited only to the Ulama or found only in the earlier part of the twentieth the century. Throughout the century, during Mohammad Reza Shah's reign and after the advent of the Islamic revolution to the present day, many of the secular intellectuals influenced by the ideas of anti-democratic writers like Heidegger, Nietzsche, Spengler and Jünger, or non-secular intellectuals under the spell of mystical traditions which are by nature elitist, were (and are) not in favour of the idea of democracy.

That the idea of democracy has more or less become a household term in modern Iran is to the credit mostly of a younger generation of Muslim intellectuals and, to a lesser extent, of a new breed of left-wing/secular intellectuals who have freed themselves from the shackles of orthodox Marxism and other outmoded political theories. We only have to compare how many more books and papers on democracy – translations of prestigious foreign texts or works by Iranian writers – have been published since the revolution with the numbers published in the decades preceding it.

The new pro-democracy writers have tried, from different perspectives, to shed fresh light on the issues involved in debates about democracy. Saeed Hajjariyan, a political scientist and one of the main strategists of the reform movement, for example, argues in a recent paper, 'The Nature of Modern State', that the main condition for the emergence of a modern state is the rationalization of power and its accumulation and concentration in a rational fashion in proper institutions.

'throughout the century, many secular intellectuals were influenced by the ideas of anti-democratic writers like Heidegger, Nietzsche, Spengler and Jünger'

Comparing political power with wealth and capital, and referring to Adam Smith – who once noted that in the absence of accumulated wealth any kind of wealth distribution would be tantamount to distribution of poverty – Hajjariyan argues that in the absence of accumulated and rationalized power, any kind of power distribution, which is one of the main aims of democracy, would be tantamount to distribution of weakness and inefficiency.

Having explicated the main feature of a modern state, Hajjariyan then argues that Iranian efforts since the 1906 constitutional revolution to create such a state have not produced the desired objective. The outcome of more than a century of popular struggle has been a 'twin-tracked sovereignty': unable to outmanoeuvre each other, democratic and anti-democratic forces have been forced to accept a precarious coexistence in which each part gains provisional ascendency at certain periods before being pushed out, temporarily giving its place to the other. In Hajjariyan's analysis, anti-democratic forces have had the upper hand for the better part of the last one and a half centuries. These forces, on occasion in the shape of absolutist developmental states, have tried to bring about economic prosperity and industrial development without democratic rule. However, he argues, in the context of modern Iran such a goal is an illusion. While a people who have experienced two pro-democracy revolutions and enjoy a high level of literacy and urbanization may not be ready to support fully a reform agenda for proper democratic rule, they will definitely not extend support to an undemocratic system.

Many political analysts share Hajjariyan's insights concerning the attitude of most Iranians to democracy. However, some observers maintain that powerful structural factors make the road towards proper democratic rule in Iran is much more hazardous than the above arguments claim. Abbas Abdi, a political activist has (in recent exchanges with Hajjariyan) stressed that as long as Iran's economy remains dependent on oil income, and as long as the state, with its monopoly control of oil revenue, does not depend on income from taxes, the prospects for genuine democracy remain bleak.

Others like Abdolkarim Soroush, a

Muslim intellectual who has been involved in a Lutheran-style reconstruction of Shi'i thought [see interview in *CSD Bulletin* 14] argue that certain influential tenets in traditional interpretations of Shi'ism, such as the belief in the illegitimacy of all types of government incompatible with the rule of the infallible twelfth (hidden) Imam, act as powerful hindrances and insurmountable obstacles on the road towards democracy.

Iranian women activist groups also argue that, until women are granted proper socio-political rights, there is little hope for genuine democratic rule in Iran. In a sharp rebuttal of the claims of those reformers who maintain that the immediate objectives of the reform movement should be 'democracy' and 'freedom', not women's rights (these can be achieved later), women activists point out that a 'democracy' in which half of the population is deprived of its rights is not a proper democracy.

Some observers who worry about the power – economic and political – assumed by former or present high-ranking commanders of the Revolutionary Corps. The combination of this power and these commanders' radical outlook spells danger, these observers claim, for the future of democracy in Iran. What has happened in Iran since the recent presidential election (12 June 2009) lends support to this concern.

However, despite all these difficulties, a panoramic view suggests that, in a rapidly changing Iran, in which many players with different vested interests, aims and objectives interact, and in which many powerful institutions exert their influence, the role of 'emerging phenomena' should not be underestimated. It is true that there are powerful figures among the old guard conservative clergy and their allies in the Revolutionary Corps who oppose democracy and would accept nothing less than a thorough theocracy. But one should not discard the role of a younger generation of religious seminary students and ordinary members of the Revolutionary Corps who do not necessarily support the views of their superiors. In the case of seminary students it should be noted that, despite systematic efforts to the contrary, they have broadened their horizons by studying modern philosophy, literature and law, along with their more traditional texts. This new breed of clergy will soon replace the old guard; the old paradigm – as Thomas Kuhn might say – will then become untenable.

The support ordinary members of the armed forces gave to the reform movement during Khatami's presidency, despite strict instructions to do the opposite, is good evidence of the popularity of the reform agenda, even in this sector of the population.

Intellectuals, and in particular Muslim intellectuals, are an important social force for good in modern day Iran. By trying to produce indigenous solutions for social, political, cultural and economic problems, Iranian intellectuals are doing their best to create shared common views with regard to

'Iranian women activist groups argue that, until women are granted proper socio-political rights, there is little hope for genuine democratic rule in Iran'

the best possible solutions for countries problems among the main actors in the political arena, including decision-makers, civil society and NGOs, the bazaar (which nowadays symbolizes the traditional merchant class as well as younger generation of entrepreneurs) and the clergy.

Hajjariyan has suggested that such efforts could lead to a situation not dissimilar to that which existed at the time of the constitutional revolution: the clergy will feel that the new models being proposed by intellectuals are not only compatible with the basic tenets of shari a but could help promote better and more profound interpretations of religion which would greatly assist modern man in an age of a 'crisis of meaning'. Evidence shows that a good number of the conservative elements are gradually being won over by the intellectuals' arguments. Such 'new movements', part of the larger category of 'emergent phenomena', give hope to all those who wish to see a proper democratic state in Iran.

Factors that nurture democratic aspirations include the general desirability of the idea of democracy in a global setting; the changing situation in the Middle East; and, last but not least, an awareness among Iranian socio-political actors that a theoretical separation and a practical division of labour between two aspects of democracy – democracy as a political system and democracy as a social movement – would make their efforts more focused and effective.

In the final analysis, it would seem that, given the sophistication of Iranian society and Iranians' rich and long experience of struggling for freedom, justice and equality, a return to entirely undemocratic, despotic rule would be immensely costly – and therefore highly improbable; By contrast, the road to thoroughly democratic rule, though bumpy, seems to be easier to travel.

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The planet and the public

Carolin Kroenert *argues that, if the EU's Emissions Trading System is to be more efficient, the public must be involved in it*

The European Union's Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the EU's main environmental policy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Initiated by the Kyoto Protocol, the ETS's target is, by 2020, to reduce emissions by at least 20 per cent of the 1990 emission levels.

The EU ETS is the first emissions trading scheme in the world to link several countries. The EU issues emission allowances to European companies which then sell surpluses or buy permits when emissions over a certain level are produced. In theory, the scheme will drive long-term investment in greener and reduced-carbon technology. Directive 2003/87/EC divides the EU ETS into three phases. The first phase (2005—7) was more of a voluntary scheme. Phase II (2008—12) made the ETS binding on all EU member states: each country had to submit its National Allocation Plan determining the total quantity of CO2 emissions; the Plan was then ratified by the European Commission. The total of the 27 EU national caps is the overall emission cap. Phase III will run from 2012; here the aim is to widen the scheme to other greenhouse gases, for example sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs); as well as to other sectors, for example aviation, shipping and the chemical sector. The European Commission will have sole power with regard to Phase III as it requires minimal input by the member states to set National Allocation Plans and to issue emission allowances [OK?]. About 11,000 companies from various sectors participate in the EU ETS. National governments regulate monitoring and compliance mechanisms which businesses have to

> 'about 63 per cent of Europeans think that climate change is a serious issue; only 30 per cent think that the EU does about the right amount to solve this problem'

obey.

The public has no role in the scheme. The system is complex as decisions must be monitored at national, European and international level. It is a big bureaucratic process with a top-down structure; thus it is very time-consuming for the public and businesses to understand. Too many barriers prevent direct criticism, which traditionally comes from below. Yet without the public's involvement the EU ETS will not work properly; and at present it is not working properly, as businesses easily circumvent the EU ETS targets. Businesses still pollute too many emissions – without being sanctioned by the compliance mechanisms – because the obligatory overall emission cap is not tight enough. Surpluses result and companies do not start trading to meet long-term aims. For example, according to Clò (in *Climate Policy*, 9/3, 2009) over-allocation of the emission caps took place in 2006 which made the carbon price drop to zero. However, if the public monitoring process were facilitated it would increase public pressure on a tighter emission cap, thus giving the EU ETS stability outside a purely economic framework.

Member states see a clash between national and European environmental interests. They tend to prioritize national interests such as economic prosperity, full employment and a functioning health care system. The current economic crisis particularly pressures states to provide financial and economic security for their electorate. Thus, the green effort by the European Commission and a stricter emissions cap alone will not be the answer. The EU ETS needs the cooperation of the European public.

John Keane emphasizes the role of the public in form of a civil society, which is a 'complex ensemble of non-governmental identities'. Only if civil society increases pressure will there be a shift in national and European debates to assert environmental responsibility through the EU ETS in order to stop global warming. In fact, a 2009 Eurobarometer poll suggests a European demand for environmental protection: about 63 per cent of Europeans think that climate change is a serious issue; only 30 per cent think that the EU does about the right amount to solve this problem. Apparently the EU ETS did not spring to their minds as effective tool for solving environmental problems.

The public important is important to the success of the EU ETS first because it gives legitimacy to its

governments. The EU ETS provides no mechanisms for public participation – mechanisms that would include all public interests; it is thus not legitimate enough. The EU emphasises democracy (a significant condition for accepting new member states). Its policies, therefore, should not just link states and businesses. The right to vote belongs to over 500 million European citizens: compare this figure with the 11,000 companies that currently participate in the EU ETS. The bigger picture includes the interests of workers, passenger transport and consumers, all of whom are all affected by the EU ETS. We need open debates in which the interests of all sectors are heard and that address all public, political and economic spheres.

Secondly, involving the public creates transparency. Do we really know who makes the final decisions? If we want to criticize the EU ETS, should we be addressing the EU institutions, governments, or businesses? It is hard to single out the main mechanisms of the EU ETS. If the public is involved, more questions will be asked; the public will raise issues and discover potential problems. Checks and balances only work if the scheme is transparent enough for the public. NGOs can play a vital role here: they can act as communicators in order to strengthen civil society. Baker (in *Politics*, 18/2, 1998) explains that associations are important as they help to give civil society a form of autonomy so that the state will be less influential in shaping public demands.

This will raise awareness, increase open access, and might even prevent illegal measures like VAT fraud.

Thirdly, public participation will encourage governments to pursue stricter environmental targets, and will encourage businesses to comply with the ETS and to introduce monitoring mechanisms. Businesses will be aware that their goods are accountable to the public and change their production voluntarily to meet environmental standards. Companies will freely obey decisions by the EU institutions . In addition, if people are personally committed to saving the environment, they will ensure that the EU ETS improves.

The media is the key mechanism for establishing this link between European policies and the public. As an agenda-setter, a channel of communication, and as a forum for promoting public debates, the media can help develop awareness of the significance of the environment. Yet the media gives relatively little attention to European issues.

'public participation will encourage governments to pursue stricter environmental targets, and businesses to comply with the ETS and introduce monitoring mechanisms'

Giddens (*The Politics of Climate Change*, 2009) argues that carbon markets depend on political support, that is, decisions by national governments. National support derives from the public. It is the public that shapes the national interest, for example emphasizing the need for environmental protection by voting for green MPs. As member states have the key powers of implementation, for example, through compliance mechanisms, they remain powerful and could help the public to monitor, criticize and lobby the EU ETS.

There is no one 'public interest'. Civil society incorporates various clashing economic and environmental interests. The 2009 Eurobarometer poll

showed a division of interests between member states. For example, 80 per cent of citizens in Sweden, Luxembourg and Malta act individually to combat climate change but fewer than 40 per cent in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. In Eastern Europe – after the fall of the Soviet Union –

citizens are keenly conscious of the need to develop their economies. Therefore one can only wonder if a single European environmental public sphere can be established.

The EU ETS needs the participation of the public; without this participation, it will not work. Public involvement promotes democracy, transparency and accountability. This will improve the scheme and make it an effective tool for stopping climate change. The public needs to use the media, referendums, national debates and NGOs to influence policy. In the end the scheme should not only link states and businesses but also states and civil society. There needs to be an awareness that the EU ETS can help defend the environment. Only with this awareness and with public participation through elements of a bottom-up model can the EU ETS be effective.

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Kid in a sweet shop

Bridget Cotter *reports on the annual conference of the Western Political Science Association*

With the help of an overseas conference grant from the PSA, I attended the Western Political Science Association annual conference at the Hyatt Regency in San Francisco in early April. As a political theorist, I was keen to sample the offerings of other theorists. My own interests lie in the history of intellectuals and political ideas, so I often find it hard to locate a niche for myself at political association conferences. My preconceived notions of American political theory were that it is mainly made up of two camps: on the one hand, the more conventional analytical theory that seeks to offer models for explaining and predicting political behaviour whilst avoiding all normative judgements; and, on the other hand, the critical theory camp with its penchant for post-modernist language and multidisciplinarity. However, I was pleasantly surprised by the size and scope of what I found amongst the conference-going political theorists of the American academy.

THEORY GALORE
Though only a regional PSA (covering the western states and provinces of the USA and Canada), there were over 1000 participants and 318 panels, each containing four or five papers. Panels were organized by 24 different themed sections with a wide range of interests: Comparative Politics, Legislative Politics, International Relations, Media and Political Communications, Environmental Politics, Politics and Sexuality, Public Policy, and Local Politics – to name but a few. Most sections hosted from 5—20 panels, but by far the largest offering – an impressive 80 panels – came from the Political Theory Section (and a further 15 from a section called 'Environmental Political Theory'), all of which left me feeling like the proverbial kid in a sweet shop. I was later told by a regular participant that this was by far the best American conference for theorists, a claim evidenced by the fact that section chairs came from as far away as Chicago and New York.

The scope of the theory on offer was broad. The panel on Hannah

> 'one participant observed, "political theory is under siege and our discussion here is all part of an attempt to show our relevance to a shrinking academy"'

Arendt where I was placed was populated (aside from me) by very young postmodernist graduate students, and chaired by a young lecturer openly hostile to Arendt. He began his post-presentation discussion by praising my three co-panellists for not succumbing to the kind of Arendt scholarship that focuses on 'an almost Talmudic interpretation of what Arendt meant', and how it was so much better to 'push Arendt around instead of being pushed around by her'. This was exactly the attitude toward the study of intellectual history that I had been expecting, since these days it is more acceptable – in fact expected – to use theorists for 'projects'.

KEY CONCEPTS
I might have ended up with a one-sided view of American political theory had it not been for the other panels I attended, which demonstrated political theory being practised in its many forms: from incredibly erudite and unembarrassed efforts to pick apart meanings in canonical texts, to the use of theorists for solving problems in contemporary politics, to using theory to examine the meaning of key concepts such as democracy. These different approaches to political theory, and the hostility of some forms to others, brought back a perennial question for me: what's it all for? What is the usefulness and what are the purposes of interpretive and normative theory? A roundtable on 'Genres of Political Theory' examined this question in an admirably candid fashion, as theorists tried to characterize and locate political theory as pedagogy and as an activity of research, writing and thinking. As one participant observed, 'political theory is under siege and our discussion here is all part of an attempt to show our relevance to a shrinking academy'. This was the closest any of the panels I attended came to addressing the theme of the conference: 'Politics in the Maelstrom of Global Economic Crisis'.

In this vein, one of the most enlightening talks I went to was not delivered by an academic at all. Mike Casey, the president of the local branch of the hotel workers' union 'Unite Here', gave the WPSA Pi Sigma Alpha Lecture. He spoke passionately and informatively of the hotel workers' struggle to get the most basic of workers rights – to be allowed to form a union without harassment from management – and then to achieve bearable working conditions and pay. Their next target is the Hyatt Regency chain itself.

This was the most glaring evidence of the need for political thinking and action during the economic 'maelstrom' we are experiencing. Unfortunately, as the APSA 2011 is taking place at the Hyatt Regency in San Antonio, Texas, I won't be attending. Of all the benefits one gets from a conference, I can't think of any worth crossing a picket line for.

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The 2010 CSD Encounter: Charles Taylor

Amanda Machin

Academic discussion, it often seems, pushes onward incessantly, towards the next step in theoretical, empirical and technical research. Guided by an awareness that so much remains to be said, scholars constantly search for new ideas. But too often the result is a chasing around in circles, an urgent looping over ground that has already been covered. It is therefore important to pause in order to reflect on the ideas that have already been provided. Certain thinkers have produced a body of work that demands contemplation and a careful retrospect.

This is why the annual CSD Encounter at the University of Westminster has been such an important and inspiring occasion. Over the last 15 years many leading thinkers, including Richard Rorty, Stuart Hall and Julia Kristeva, have been invited to take part in the one-day event, in which other academics, students and members of the public have considered, discussed and critiqued their ideas.

This year, on 15 January, the eminent philosopher Charles Taylor took part in the CSD Encounter. Professor Emeritus at McGill University in Montreal, Taylor is widely regarded as the most important philosopher in the English-speaking world today. He is also a rare example of a politically active philosopher: in the 1960s he stood four times as a candidate for the New Democratic Party in elections to the Canadian House of Commons; and in 2007—8 he co-headed the Bouchard-Taylor commission on the accommodation of minority groups in society. His work addresses identity, community, equality, rights, religion and culture; and he is author of important books such as *Sources of the Self*, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, and, most recently, *A Secular Age*. Throughout his work, Taylor has defended a multiculturalism that asserts the importance of intercultural openness. Taylor rejects both arrogant ethno-centricism and the condescending presumptions of the value of all cultures. Today, as multiculturalism becomes increasingly beleaguered around the world, a close re-examination of these ideas is invaluable.

The CSD Encounter involved two roundtable sessions with invited contributors, and a public lecture in the evening. The morning session, a roundtable discussion, chaired by Chantal Mouffe, with Stephen

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Mulhall, Steven Lukes, Paulina Tambakaki and Raymond Plant, considered Taylor's contribution to political theory. The afternoon roundtable – chaired by Bhikhu Parekh – with Tariq Modood, Grace Davie, Sanjay Seth and Abdelwahab El Affendi, considered Taylor's contribution to the debate on religion, politics and culture.

The main questions around which the discussions turned were: what have we learnt from Taylor's work? and, as Steven Lukes put it, what might we have learnt to disagree with him about? Taylor gives a brilliant critique of the 'negative liberty' of liberal thought, but, it was asked, is promoting 'positive liberty' for cultures understood as 'entities' also problematic? Taylor's 'politics of recognition' suggests that, since an individual's identity is formed in dialogue with others, social equality demands not blindness to difference but rather a respect for people's different identities and cultures. Isn't there here a danger of reifying cultures here? Identities are not fixed; they change constantly and inevitably. Another topic for debate was how we might go about distinguishing those cultural identities we do want to protect from those we don't. And how might a shared political identity be engendered and encouraged today? Do different societies require different models of multiculturalism?

The public lecture that followed the roundtables, 'Secularism and Multiculturalism: Are They Compatible?', was a chance to hear Taylor explain some of his ideas about the accommodation of differences in society. He suggested that secularism and multiculturalism are both confronted with the problem of social cohesion and the difficulties of securing social diversity of all types, not just religious diversity. Taylor advocated the principles of equality of respect, freedom of conscience and a plurality of voices and, at the same time, awareness of the possible tensions between these principles.

For Taylor, multiculturalism isn't something that occurs as a result of immigration; it entails, rather, a change of attitude. The problem for the secular state, he argues, isn't determining the place for religion but rather how to protect diversity. Taylor asks us to pause long enough to check what question it is we are asking is before we attempt to provide answers. It is precisely this pause and this moment for reflection that the CSD Encounter so valuably provides.

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