

Humble Democracy?

John Keane

Is democracy a desirable political ideal? Might it even be a universal norm? Or is it just one of those grubby little values that jostles for our attention, dazzles us with its promises and – for a time – cons us into believing that it is not a mask for power, a tool useful in the struggle by some for mastery over others?

Most political commentators today dodge such questions. Journalists, citizen activists, politicians and political thinkers commonly note that democracy has in recent decades become, for the first time ever, a global political language. Many quietly draw from this the conclusion that democracy has become a *de facto* universal. Although they may spot that democracy is a particular ideal with roots somewhere in the geographic region located between ancient Mesopotamia and the early Greek city-states, they note, with satisfaction, that democracy has triumphed over other political values. All around the world, it has been embraced *as if* it were a way of life that had global validity – as ‘a universal value that people anywhere may have reason to see as valuable’ (Amartya Sen).

Other commentators, Richard Rorty among them, are more cynical – more sensitive to the ethical and political problem of why democracy should be



considered desirable. Rorty minces no words. He admits that modern democracy is a ‘peculiarity’ of ‘North Atlantic culture’. But he is sure that democracy is ‘morally superior’ because it is an ingredient of ‘a culture of hope – hope of a better world as attainable here below by social effort – as opposed to the cultures of resignation

characteristic of the East’. So even though democracy is only one norm among others it is self-evidently superior in practice. ‘There is much still to be achieved’, Rorty has said, ‘but basically the West is on the right path. I don’t believe it has much to learn from other cultures. We should aim to expand, to westernise the planet.’

Such pragmatic reasoning easily gets mixed up in violent power games. It is bound to give democracy a bad name, as is indeed happening today throughout the Middle East. When pressed further to explain why the Western ‘experiment’ with democracy is desirable, Rorty replies that all forms of universal reasoning should be abandoned because democracy needs no philosophical justification at all. In normative terms, democracy should travel light: rejecting mumbo jumbo, it should whistle its way through the world with an air of ‘philosophical superficiality and light-mindedness’.

The trouble with this conclusion –

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that democracy has absolute priority over philosophical norms – is that it ignores just how much philosophy as we know it has been changed by the democratic experience; and, conversely, just how much democracy as we experience it continues to be shaped by philosophy itself. Whether we recognise it or not, our thinking about democracy is still fed by the wellsprings of early modern normative justifications of democracy. The view that democracy is based on ‘the principles of eternal justice, the unchanging law of God’ (the words of the American anti-slavery campaigner, Theodore Parker) crops up in every other speech of President George W. Bush. Other examples of this grip of the philosophical past on the present include the definition of democracy as a universal human right; the Utilitarian claim that democracy maximizes the happiness of the governed by providing them with the means of sacking those governors who make them miserable; and the conviction (expressed by Giuseppe Mazzini and others) that every nation is entitled to govern itself democratically.

When the language of democracy began to travel across seas and continents during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, brand new justifications of its superiority as an ethical ideal appeared. One of their long-lasting effects was to widen the philosophical case for democracy by adding to its existing menu of justifications. Karl Popper’s knowledge-based theory of democracy, developed in New Zealand during the



of the kind currently championed in Iran by Ayatollah Mohsen Kadivar. ‘From the point of view of Islam’, says Kadivar, ‘human beings are endowed with magnanimity [*Keramat*]. They are the carriers of the spirit of God . . . and are therefore entitled to act as God’s viceroy or Caliph on earth.’

These sorts of claims undoubtedly leaven the philosophical case for democracy – but at the cost of incoherence. Can an ideal backed up by little platoons of clashing metaphors and colliding justifications be anything other than ‘essentially contested’ – even downright incoherent? Surely it is no longer possible to believe naïvely that democracy has a special philosophical status, that it is based on an incontrovertible First Principle? In an age that offers technical expertise, spin, blind deference and brute power as alternative ways of governing, isn’t democracy to be seen as just one – dispensable – norm among many others?

Tough questions of this kind make us realize that the age of innocent belief in democracy is over. Rorty’s cynicism is symptomatic of this deflowering of democracy. So too is the virtual disappearance of normative discussions about democracy – or their replacement by various types of

consequentialism. Consequentialists praise democracy for stimulating economic growth, taming the beast of war, or for fostering ‘human development more fully than any feasible alternative’ (Robert Dahl). Their claims are highly doubtful (they beg tricky questions about the nature of

‘human development’ or the desirability of ‘economic growth’, for instance) – so doubtful, in fact, that potentially they do more harm than good for democracy, considered as a theoretical norm.

Something more radical is required. The democratic imagination now needs to venture into new territory, for instance by ‘burrowing’ underneath all previous efforts to ground democracy in arrogant talk of first principles. Here is one possible alternative: a theory of humble democracy. This approach understands democracy as a desirable norm whose ‘universality’ – its applicability across borders and in different contexts – stems from its ‘pluriversality’, its militant striving to protect people and their biosphere everywhere and always against bogus first principles and arrogant grand ideologies. Humble democracy knows that in practice such universals – dogmatic belief in the Nation, the Party, Men, the Market or the State, for instance – have a bad track record because they nurture and camouflage monopolies of power in the fields of both government and civil society. Humble democracy therefore favours the invention and preservation of institutions and ways of life that stand guard against universals. It champions key virtues like humility, respect for legality and non-violence; and it favours institutional pluralism, complex equality and mechanisms of public accountability that ensure that wrong-headed decisions can be prevented, or undone.

Humble democracy humbles. It stands opposed to manipulation, bossing and violent rule. It knows that struggles against monopolies of power must never be abandoned, even though they are often in vain. Humble democracy dislikes hubris. This is not because it thinks of democracy as True and Right. It is rather because humble democracy sees democracy as the best political weapon so far invented for publicly humbling armies, governments, parties, corporations and other NGOs, especially when their lust for power is aroused by their conviction that true and right are on their side.

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‘The democratic imagination needs to “burrow” underneath previous efforts to ground democracy in arrogant talk of first principles’

Second World War, is a case in point: a democracy is a unique type of polity that contributes to evolutionary learning by enabling the public refutation of nonsense through public conjectures linked to truth claims. Then – a more recent example – there are Islamic justifications of democracy,

Congratulations!

I congratulate the Centre for the Study of Democracy on its fifteenth anniversary. The concept of the Centre was developed by Professor John Keane and a small number of colleagues who saw that bringing together their individual interests could lead to the creation of a major research centre.



At the time, new democracies were emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies in Central-Eastern Europe, and globalisation was beginning to challenge the

nation state. These forces have indeed proved to be potent. The events in September 2001 marked another major shift in global politics. This rapidly changing background has

proved to be a rich source of serious research and debate. The Centre, which has attracted leading academic faculty and hosted distinguished visitors, is an entirely fitting environment for the serious study of democracy. The University of Westminster is proud to be the home of the Centre, which is a key part of our international portfolio. I

wish CSD every success in the future.

Dr Geoffrey Copland
Vice-Chancellor & Rector

The School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Languages is proud to be the home of the Centre for the Study of Democracy. The School places great value on the development of its research strengths and their centrality to the relationships between learning and teaching, knowledge transfer and dissemination, and engagement with the local, national and international communities to which we belong. CSD's research is recognised nationally and internationally for its high quality and originality, contributing as it does to the development of knowledge and understanding in politics, international relations, Asian studies, science and technology public policy, environmental politics and cultural studies. This work nourishes the learning experiences of students studying

on CSD's growing postgraduate courses, and nurtures emerging and developing work, both within and between the disciplines it embraces.

CSD's standing in the wider academic community is reflected in its highly successful record of securing external research grants and contracts from both national and international bodies such as the Economic Social and Research Council, the Arts and Humanities Research Board, the Leverhulme Trust, the European Commission, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and a range of other public and private organisations. The Centre's public profile is increased by the lectures and conferences it organises, such as the recent conference on Muslims in Britain and the new annual C R Parekh



lecture on democracy generously sponsored by the Nirman Foundation. CSD's international activity also includes collaborative projects and events such as the International Summer School on Democracy with the University of Belgrade,

and joint projects with Johns Hopkins University and the Smithsonian Institution – including, in June 2004, a conference on urban sustainability.

Now in its fifteenth year, CSD is a thriving and well-established part of the university. The School proudly looks forward to its continuing growth and success.

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Liberalism by Default?

Abdelwahab El-Affendi on *Islamist advocates of democracy*



Following his release from prison in 2003, the prominent Sudanese Islamist and former Speaker of Parliament Hassan Turabi was busy preaching democracy as the best possible system for Muslim countries. Many might consider ardent espousal of democracy by Turabi (who has since been sent back to jail again by the military regime he helped install in power) highly suspect, given his repressive record during the decade

when he was Sudan's de facto ruler (1989–1999).

But Turabi is hardly the only Islamist now advocating democracy out of disillusionment with recent experiences with Islamisation. Across the Muslim world, there is a veritable stampede of Islamists away from hard-line positions. For many Islamists, the enemy is no longer the 'renegade' secularists or the 'scheming' West, but alleged extremists and their narrow-minded interpretations of Islam that advocate violence and assert that Islam is incompatible with democracy. Moderate Islamists are today at the forefront of a number of democratising experiments in the Muslim world.

The most important experiments are unfolding in Turkey and Iran. The two neighbouring rivals mirror each other in that in both the struggle is to liberalise and rationalise a militantly ideological state (the ultra-secularised republic in Turkey's case, and the militant Islamic republic in Iran's). In each country, the system revolves around a 'sacred' ideology, a charismatic founder who is revered as an object of devotion, and an institutional core – comprised of an

army, legal-political establishment and security apparatus – that acts as the guardian of officially sanctioned values. The ruling elite relies on quasi-authoritarian measures to maintain control, such as enforcing dress codes for women and vetting political actors to ascertain their faithfulness to the state ideology.

In both countries, moderate Islamists are at the forefront of the struggle to democratise, and thus rescue, the republic. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and the broad coalition of reformists around President Muhammad Khatami in Iran – in which moderate Islamists play a key role – pay lip service to the ruling ideology, but their central objective is to reform this ideology and make it more compatible with democracy. In Turkey, the reformists seek to limit the army's influence in politics and to stop the state from dictating the private conduct of individuals. In Iran, the reformists are struggling to limit the role of the entrenched conservative religious establishment and to extend freedom of expression and association.

The prominent role being played by moderate Islamists in Turkey and Iran suggests that movements based on some form of Islamic legitimacy may be vital to effect a transition to stable and consensual governance in Muslim countries. These democratizing experiments have huge implications for the Arab world, where internal models for such a transition are so far lacking. In Sudan, Islamists have a monopoly on power, but they have failed to play a moderating role (perhaps because of their monopoly). Elsewhere in the Arab world, political space for Islamists (and all other groups) is severely restricted, hindering their ability to press for reform.

The Turkish and Iranian experiences are promising, but they are also precarious. The Turkish establishment remains extremely wary of the AKP, and the judiciary and the army are poised to thwart the new

government. Setbacks have come, ironically, from Europe. The Islamists have based their reform programme on the contention that bringing Turkish democracy in line with European standards would remove undue limitations on political freedoms (such as restrictions on religiously-oriented parties) and personal freedoms (such as restrictions on Islamic dress). Yet the European Court of Human Rights's 2002 decision upholding Turkey's 1998 ban on the Islamist Refah party (a precursor to the AKP) and the French parliament's vote on 11 February 2004 to ban Muslim headscarves in schools are undermining moderate Islamists' arguments about the compatibility of Islam and secular liberal democracy. As it happens, Europe, or at least France, now is moving towards the Turkish model, not the reverse.

The situation is even more serious in Iran, where the diverse coalition of moderate Islamists and outright secularists is far from united over its long-term goals. Most secularists want radically to overhaul the system, while most Islamists seek to reform it. The conservatives have gone on the offensive, resorting to crude tactics to derail the reformist project, including the imprisonment (or assassination) of leading reformists, the closure of reformist publications, and the disqualification of thousands of reformist candidates for parliament.

Unless the entrenched establishment in both countries decides that its time is up and voluntarily relinquishes its monopoly on power, the forces of change are less likely to be moderate reformists than radical revolutionaries. The collapse of the Iranian and Turkish reform projects would be disastrous for those countries, and offer nothing but bleak lessons for Arab politics.

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Critical and Rational

Ali Paya considers the views of Abdulkarim Soroush, an Iranian Shi'ite scholar who represents a new wave of religious thought in Iran

Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran of 1978–9, the religious beliefs of Iranian Shi'ite scholars, as well as their understanding of the main tenets of Shi'i Islam, have undergone radical change. This phenomenon has far-reaching consequences for the future of the Islamic state in Iran and for Muslim communities around the globe.

One such scholar, Abdulkarim Soroush, is a prominent figure in this new wave of religious thought. Before discussing his work, a brief consideration of the religious and intellectual tradition – Shi'ism – of which he is a part is necessary.

SHI'ISM: A BRIEF HISTORY

The Shi'ites, or Shi'ats (from the Arabic *Shi'at Ali*, 'the party of Ali'), constitute one of the two major branches of Islam – the other, larger, branch being that of the Sunnites or Sunnis (the followers of *Sunnah* or 'tradition').

From early in the history of Islam Sunni Muslims used various juristic notions to conduct the affairs of the state in the absence of the Prophet or his righteous successors. These ideas, which include *maslaha*, the public interest, and *siyasa*, public policy, were necessary for the governance of complex and sophisticated societies in cases where

Shari'a (religious) law would offer no guidance, or where political necessity required the ruler to act on his discretion outside the bounds of *Shari'a* law. Sunni Muslims developed a pragmatic political system whose key political concepts – for example, *ijma'* (the consensus of the elite), *Khilafah* (the caliph), and *bay'ah* (electors swearing an oath of allegiance to the caliph) – and the manner in which they were implemented guaranteed that the personality of the ruler would not unduly affect the difficult task of leading the community.

By contrast, Shi'ites, who formed a minority and were not responsible for the affairs of state, from an early stage pursued not a pragmatic but a rationalist and elitist approach.

The intellectual output of Shi'i thinkers – in fields such as *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), *kalam*

'Shi'ites have had a predilection for abstract reasoning, metaphysical thinking and philosophical system building'

(theology), *falsafeh* (philosophy), *'irfan* (mysticism), *akhlaq* (ethics), *tafsir* (interpretation of the Quran) – reveals some of the distinguishing features of Shi'ism. Shi'ites, by and large, have had a predilection for abstract

reasoning, metaphysical thinking and philosophical system building; for esotericism; for aloofness from politics and opposition to worldly power; for idealism and utopianism; for emotionalism; and for particularism and elitism. A sense of purpose and global mission is also characteristic of Shi'ite thought. Thus it was a Shi'ite clergyman, the Iranian Seyyed Jamal al-Din Asad Abadi, who, in the nineteenth century, was the first religious reformer to launch a programme of revitalising Islamic thought by introducing the notion of 'going back to the sources', promoting radical reforms – modelled on Luther's Protestantism – in the practices of the clergymen, and by advocating the idea of pan-Islamism.

In its long history distinct trends have emerged within Shi'ism, of which the following are the most prominent. *Orthodoxy* – the belief system of average clergymen and of the bulk of the population – requires that a good Muslim should follow the instructions of his/her chosen *Mujtahid* (a qualified jurist who issues religious edicts and is an object of emulation for his followers) as they appear in his/her *resalah* (the book which contains the *Mujtahid's* religious edicts or *fatwas*). Orthodox Shi'ites, for the most part, are apolitical and subscribe to the view 'live and let live'. They observe a commonsense code of moral conduct and consider *Mafatih al-Jinan* (*The Keys to the Heavens*: a collection of Shi'ite prayers) their most important daily guide.

Traditionalism, by contrast, is a more elitist trend. For traditionalists it is not reason – the intellect – but the faculty of intuition (in the classic meaning of the term) that provides the believer with a way of extracting the truth of the Book and the Tradition. The main objective of religion is to care for the spiritual needs of the faithful and not to create a heaven on earth. Traditionalists welcome religious and political pluralism and maintain that personal salvation can be achieved even for those Shi'ites who live in non-religious societies or under secular regimes. Traditionalists are

critical of many aspects of modern, secular civilisation, which they view as a misguided adventure by modern man who has neglected and suppressed his divine nature.

While *fundamentalists* also reject the authority of reason in revealing the truth of the Book and the Tradition, they adhere strictly to a literal reading of these sources. The aim of religion, they maintain, is to take care of all aspects of the lives of the believers in this world and the next: this means,

'For *critical rationalists* the Book and the Tradition can only be understood through continuing processes of interpretation carried out by an autonomous reason'

inter alia, that it is necessary to establish a religious state. Fundamentalists oppose religious and political pluralism and believe that, at any given time, there can be only one official reading of the tenets of the religion, which all believers should follow. Fundamentalists are also critical of modern Western civilisation: they regard it as not only corrupt and decadent but as deeply hostile to Islam.

Modernists do emphasise the role of reason in understanding – through a careful study of the Book and the Tradition – the mind of God. They believe in the compatibility of religious doctrines and the achievements of modern reason, and try to provide rational interpretations



of religious tenets and doctrines. While they are interested in the establishment of an Islamic state with a liberal, not a fundamentalist, outlook, they do not pursue such a goal zealously; like traditionalists, they maintain that personal salvation is possible under the rule of secular regimes. They set great store by the personal moral conduct of believers and are at ease with religious and political pluralism.

Whereas modernists believe that reason must ultimately be subservient to the 'revealed message', for *critical rationalists* reason is autonomous in its deliberations and does not recognize any higher authority. The Book and the Tradition can only be understood through

continuing processes of interpretation carried out by an autonomous reason. For critical rationalists faith is a personal matter: the faithful, by exercising the power of their intellect (reason) and combining it with their spiritual experiences, enhance their understanding of the realm of the sacred. Critical rationalists support pluralism and oppose ideological states. Unlike fundamentalists and some modernists, they have almost no interest in ideas such as pan-Islamism; they are more concerned with those local and global issues that pertain to the national interest. Like traditionalists they maintain that religion deals with the spiritual needs of the individual. With regard to the affairs of state and society, they believe that the main problem – contrary to orthodox and fundamentalist views – is not appointing the most pious individuals as leaders, but putting in place rational and reliable systems and institutions which would help create a fair and just society. One of the leading representatives of this trend is Abdulkarim Soroush.

ABDULKARIM SOROUSH

The Iranian public first became aware of Soroush – by training a pharmacologist, then a philosopher of science – in the last few months of the Shah's regime and in the immediate aftermath of the revolution of 1978-9.

In a series of books Soroush, drawing on the arguments of Karl Popper, dealt a devastating blow to the Marxist dogma then prevalent amongst leftist groups in Iran. In the late 1980s Soroush turned his attention to the philosophy of religion. Since then, in talks, papers and books, Soroush has challenged the better known trends of Shi'ite thought. His prime targets have been the orthodox and fundamentalist accounts advocated by the (ultra) conservative clergy and its hard-line followers. Soroush's main theses can be summarised as a set of distinctions.

1) A distinction must be made between a religion *per se* and our *understanding* of that religion. The former is a set of sacred and unchanging truths. The latter is an ever-changing set of personal experiences and publicly accessible ideas and theories: these reflect the state of our knowledge of the tenets of that religion. Thus for example, in the case of a revealed religion such as Islam, only the (un-interpreted content of) the *Quran* and the Tradition of the Prophet (and, in the case of Shi'i Islam, the Shi'ite Imams) should be regarded as 'Islam', the religion. Our *understanding* of Islam is, by definition, something human and this-worldly; as such, it is influenced by, among other things, our background knowledge, our place in history, our geographical location, and our social, cultural and political environment.

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Changes in these and other external factors, which together shape our particular 'life-world', alter our understanding of Islam. The more familiar a believer is with other fields of knowledge, and the richer his/her life-world, the more enhanced his/her understanding of the tenets of the religion will be.

2) There are 'essential' and 'accidental' aspects of Islam. The essence of Islam – and of any other

divine religion – is only to remind believers that they are not God: that the whole realm of being, including human societies, is God's creation, and each human being, as God's viceroy on earth, should bear in mind that his duty is to live in a way which best prepares him for the next world. Everything else consists of temporal, historical, and context-dependent facts or norms which constitute not Islam but the body of (interpreted) Islamic doctrines. Thus, for example, the Prophet could have been Chinese and lived in the fourth century (CE); the

Quran could have had more (or fewer) chapters and verses; the Tradition could have been different; there could have been no rift between Shi'ism and Sunnism; and this or that religious ritual could have had a different form.

3) There are minimal and maximal interpretations of Islam. Maximalists maintain that Islam not only takes care of believers' lives in the next world, but also provides comprehensive guidelines for how individuals and societies should conduct their affairs in this world.

Minimalists deny this. In their view the management of worldly affairs is the task of the 'collective intellect'. By exercising the power of their intellect, and through processes of trial and error, people devise more effective ways of managing their lives. Islam does not aim to teach believers what sort of political, social, and economic systems to adopt, or how to go about making scientific discoveries and technological innovations. Islam has provided the faithful only with the bare minimum of guidance for managing mundane affairs.

4) Value systems can be internal to and external to religion. Soroush argues that values such as freedom, justice, rights, truthfulness, and respect for the others, do not emerge



from within religions but are part of systems external to the main core of religious doctrines. These values – or to be more precise, the interpretations given to them – are the products of collective reason. Religions usually endorse these values and incorporate them into their belief-systems.

5) One can distinguish between religious faith and religious belief. The former is arrived at via existential experience. It can vary in intensity and belongs to what Popper called 'world-two': the subjective realm of human inner experience. Religious beliefs, on the other hand, are states of mind which can be expressed in terms of sets of statements and assertions which form our understanding of, say, Islam. They belong to Popper's 'world-three': the objective realm of human intellectual constructs. As such, they can be publicly and critically assessed. The Prophet's existential experiences have had a pivotal role in shaping and forming Islam. The personal experience of the faithful who follow in the footsteps of the Prophet, when translated into written texts or oral narrations, enriches the realm of religious beliefs and adds to the corpus of Islamic (interpreted) doctrines.

6) A sixth distinction focuses on differences between types of religion: on the one hand, a combination of religious faith and religious belief; on



the other, religion as an ideology. As ideology, religious doctrines are instruments for changing the world. They provide the believers with easily comprehensible and rather simplistic views of the world. Ideologised religious doctrines – presented to believers as official interpretations – are typically devoid of ambiguity. Faith and belief, by contrast, are the outcomes of continuous spiritual quests by the faithful for meaning and for answers to ‘ultimate’ questions such as: who am I? where am I from? is there life after death?

Using these distinctions, Soroush’s model for understanding religion in general, and Islam in particular, emphasises the role of religion as a spiritual quest rather than a social and political ideology. In Soroush’s view, Islam was established through the personal experience of the Prophet. Throughout history the faithful have used the Prophet as their role model and try to follow in his footsteps. This pursuit results in the accumulation and expansion of a growing body of religious doctrine (religious beliefs), accompanied and complemented by religious rituals and activities.

The body of beliefs and doctrines

which gradually takes shape around the core known as Islam is of necessity categorised under various rubrics and headings. These categories form what is known as Islamic sciences (*ma’aref-e Islami*). Among the various branches of the Islamic sciences two subjects – Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and Islamic ethics (*akhlagh-e Islami*) – are of practical (and not just theoretical) importance, as they manage the public and private affairs of the faithful in accordance with Islamic norms.

Taking a minimalist approach towards religion, Soroush maintains that *fiqh* has somewhat undeservedly taken centre-stage and passed itself off as *the* temporal manifestation of Islam. In reality, however, *fiqh* in its present form can only offer limited legal guidance on a range of issues. According to Soroush, *fiqh*, as practised in Islamic countries, is duty-oriented in its outlook: it deals mainly with the duties

and obligations of the faithful towards God. Soroush – evidently influenced by liberal thinkers such as John Rawls – argues that such an orientation makes traditional *fiqh* unable to deal with the complex, rights-based, problems of the modern world; that is, with human beings *qua* human beings who have certain fundamental rights, and not as believers or Muslims. If Muslim jurists are to contribute significantly to the life of modern Muslim societies, they must undergo a conceptual paradigm-shift which would transfer them, figuratively speaking, from the middle ages to the present.

Soroush’s view is that the adoption of this new paradigm, among other things, would amount to recognising that Islam does not endorse any particular form of government. Any kind of political system could be imposed on a religious society. His own preference, however, is for a religious (Islamic) democracy. An Islamic democracy could be established in a society the majority of whose citizens are Muslim who support democracy. He also emphasises the value of freedom as a

necessary measure for helping the faithful to realize their potential and to enrich their religious experience. He believes that certain interpretations of liberalism and a religious way of life are quite compatible. However, he holds that of all values equity reigns supreme: without it a proper religious community cannot flourish. Following philosophers like Ronald Dworkin, Soroush believes that equity not only informs other values but also prepares the ground for creating more humane legal systems and fairer societies.

NEW DISCOURSE

Critical rationalism, of which Soroush is an important exponent, is an elitist trend. As such it reflects a classic feature of Shi’ism. However – significantly – it appeals not just to the educated middle class, but also to the younger members of more traditional social strata such as the *bazaris* (traditional entrepreneurs), the clergy, and the working class. The new

‘Soroush holds that of all values equity reigns supreme: without it a proper religious community cannot flourish’

discourse gradually gaining prominence in Iran under the influence of critical rationalism seems, further, to be preparing the ground for a fundamental paradigm shift in Shi’ite approaches both to Islam and modern life. For example, the recognition that pragmatism is unavoidable in the affairs of the state should help Shi’ites to appreciate the predicaments of the Sunni *moftis* in the past. At the same time, the prominent role Shi’ite critical rationalists give to reason when dealing with doctrinal matters is bound to appeal to Sunnis, who – at least in the shape of the *mu’tazelite* – have favoured this approach from the early days of Islam. The result could be better mutual understanding and closer cooperation between the two main branches of Islam – which should prove to be beneficial to humanity as a whole

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The emergence of transnational systems of political and economic governance – the European Union, the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations, among others – has created a dilemma, according to Robert Dahl (*Political Science Quarterly* 109, 1994): while they offer opportunities for effective, large-scale, decision-making, they do so at the cost of reducing citizens' ability to influence this decision-making directly.

Yet large-scale systems of governance that transcend the control of the nation state and its citizens are, arguably, only one aspect of this transformation in democracy and its accompanying 'democratic deficit'. Another aspect is that governance processes (involving a multitude of policy-makers, experts and stakeholders) have to deal with increasingly complex issues – and in a context of cognitive, normative and practical uncertainty. Recent examples of such issues include global climate change and technological innovations in agriculture, such as genetically modified (GM) foods. Decision-making is thus remote not only in terms of the *spatial* distance between citizens and the political institutions representing them, but also of the *communicative* distance between the expert discourses that dominate technocratic policy- and decision-making and 'lay' discourses in the wider public sphere.

A growing body of scholarly literature is considering how contemporary public policy- and decision-making can, through 'participatory governance', be reconnected with citizens and the wider public. Dahl proposes the strengthening of democratic institutions and practices at national and subnational levels in order to improve the democratic control over, and the delegation to institutions of, transnational decision-making. Others call for the direct and regular involvement of social actors who represent both different types of expertise and special interests, and the general

The Paradox of Participatory Governance

Simon Joss analyses the recent UK GM Nation? initiative


public interest; this would increase the mutual accommodation of interests and generate trust and accountability among participants. Such 'heterarchical' networking among state and non-state actors, it is proposed, could help decision-makers come to grips with the complexity, diversity and dynamics of recent socio-technological developments and related structural changes.

This debate has been matched by policy-makers' commitments to

increase accountability and public involvement, as illustrated by the European Commission's 2001 White Paper, *European Governance*.

There has been considerable experimentation for some time with forms of public and stakeholder participation in science and technology policy-making. New methods of 'participatory' and 'interactive' technology assessment and 'public engagement' – including 'scenario workshops', 'consensus conferences' and 'citizens panels' – have been implemented in various institutional and national settings, with the aim of rendering policy procedures socially more robust and politically more legitimate.

However, the value of these procedures as tools for policy analysis and decision-making has often been questioned. For some they are ambiguous, as the procedures are both assessment tools – a quasi 'extended expert peer review' process – and public policy-making fora: a kind of 'court of public opinion' within institutional



'In the public events the emphasis was not just on policy, but also on the wider politics of GM technology and the government's stance on GM crops'

settings. Criticisms have also been levelled on empirical-analytical grounds – with regard, for example, to the representativeness of participants, the framing of issues and the validity of outcomes; and on normative-conceptual grounds – with regard, *inter alia*, to underlying political aims and strategies as well as democratic rationale.

A practical example of 'participatory governance' as a response to the perceived 'democratic dilemma' was the *GM Nation!* initiative that took place in Britain in summer 2003. This initiative was a product of the 'great GM debate' that swept across Britain in the late 1990s. In summer 1999 the government set up two non-statutory commissions to advise on policy alongside the new, statutory, independent Food Standards Agency (FSA): the Human Genetics Commission (HGC) and the Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC). In February 2000 – in response to, among other things, widespread public debate about and media coverage of the possible dangers of

GM foods – the prime minister conceded that there was 'cause for legitimate public concern' and that 'consumers and environmental groups [had] an important role to play' in finding answers to the questions raised about GMOs (genetically modified organisms).

In its 2001 report *Crops on Trial*, the AEBC (membership of which was open to GM-critical civil society

'It should not surprise if the majority of participants were people who wished to engage with the issue of GM crop commercialisation – farmers, scientists, environmentalists, consumers'

actors and experts) recommended public involvement in the decision-making process on the commercialisation of GM crops. The government asked the AEBC to elaborate a concrete proposal; in April 2002, the AEBC submitted one; and, in summer 2002, the government gave the go-ahead for the *GM Nation!* initiative – under a Steering Board chaired by Professor Malcolm Grant, chairperson of the AEBC – for which the Prime Minister approved a budget of £500,000.

GM NATION


The *GM Nation!* initiative comprised six, linked, methodological elements. First, in autumn 2002, nine 'foundation discussion workshops' made up of 20 people each took place across the UK. In eight, members of the public – chosen from a random sample, representing different

groups, and with no vested interest in GM crop technology – framed the issues for subsequent public debate. They identified six broad issues: food, choice, (lack of) information, (lack of) trust, regulation and commercialisation of GM crops, and the ethics of genetic modification. The ninth workshop consisted of pro- and anti-GM campaigners. Together, the workshops formulated 13 questions which formed the basis of the standard questionnaire later used for participant feedback.

Secondly, a 'tool kit', based on the workshop findings, that outlined the issues at stake. This comprised a 40-page booklet (20,000 copies) to be used in the public deliberation; a CD-Rom (6,000); a film

(1,100) distributed on video to broadcasters and shown in the public debate; and the *GM Nation!* website (<http://gmnation.org.uk>).

Thirdly – the main focus of the initiative – the *public deliberation events*, in three 'tiers', that took place in a six-week period in June and July 2003. Tier 1 consisted of six, three-hour, pre-structured, facilitated regional meetings (in Birmingham, Taunton, Harrogate, Belfast, Glasgow and Swansea). The altogether 1,000 participants watched the film (see above); discussed, in small-group sessions, the issues and questions raised in the toolkit booklet (ditto); and then reported their views and conclusions back to the plenum for further discussion. Tier 2 consisted of an estimated 40 debates hosted by county councils in collaboration with the *GM Nation!* Steering Board. The largest number of events – some 630 – took place on Tier 3: local, 'bottom-up', meetings, hosted by local councils, research organisations, churches, environmental groups, galleries, villagers, and many *ad hoc* groups. Estimates of participant numbers on all 'tiers' range from 20,000 to 35,000.



Participants in the events returned – the fourth methodological element – over 8,300 official feedback questionnaires. Analysed by the Central Office for Information, the questionnaires showed that only two percent of respondents found GM crops acceptable under any circumstances. The vast majority cautioned against the hasty commercialisation of GM crops before sufficient risk and ethical analysis had been carried out, and demanded proper safeguards.

To verify further the results of the public debates the Steering Board commissioned a parallel ‘narrow-but-deep’ consultation – the fifth element – in the form of *deliberative focus groups*; these involved 77 members of the public. At an initial meeting, the issues were introduced and the toolkit booklet discussed; at the second – two weeks later – participants’ views and concerns were debated. Participants completed the feedback questionnaires twice – before and after the process; the results showed that, as they acquired more information, participants became more sceptical about GMOs, expressed greater concern about the various risks they might pose, and shifted towards a more cautious, anti-GM view position. Overall, however, their opposition to GM crops was less pronounced than that of the participants in the public debates; and they saw some benefits in GM crops (cheaper food, medical benefits, advantage for developing countries).

The sixth methodological element was the Steering Board’s *detailed final report*, published in autumn 2003 and submitted to the government; among other things, this contained an analysis of the questionnaire and focus group findings. In its written response of March 2004, the government indicated that, as part of its strategy for recommending the commercialisation of GM crops on a regulated, case-by-case basis, it would push for proper labelling of GM products, introduce measures to prevent cross-contamination of non-GM crops (‘coexistence’), consider



setting up GM-free agricultural zones, and provide information openly and transparently.

WEAKNESSES

While the *GM Nation!* initiative was, arguably, a ground-breaking innovation in GM policy-making in Britain, it had several weaknesses. These included the *time available* for, and the *organisation and funding* of the initiative. Why, for example, had so little time been allocated – six weeks – for the public debate, several participants asked. It was difficult for members of the public and interest groups to organise local events in time, especially as the toolkit materials only became available to the public shortly before, or during, the public deliberation phase; and getting through to the Central Office for Information often proved difficult in the absence of comprehensive and timely information on the dedicated website. As a consequence, the media became the main disseminator of information. Nor was financial support available, even for basic expenses such as the travel costs of

invited expert speakers. It was thus often practically difficult for people to get involved, either as participants or organisers. That a large number of Tier 3 events were organised can therefore be seen as an indication of the high level of interest in GM crops among significant sections of the British public.

There was also criticism of the *framing* of the Tier 1 and 2 events, which was based on the video, worksheets summarising possible risks and benefits of GM crops, and the toolkit booklet. Participants criticised the latter for simplifying arguments and for not attributing sources (it was insufficiently clear that the booklet was based on the foundation discussion workshops involving members of the public).

Participants also wanted to discuss not just specific policy issues (such as risk assessment, regulation, and labelling), but the wider politics of GM crops: why, for example, was there such a rush to proceed with the commercialisation of GM crops, given the many uncertainties involved, a participant at a Tier 3 event in Forest Row, East Sussex, asked. Others wondered what was driving the political process behind GM technology. Was the USA pushing the UK government into promoting GM technology? Did the overmighty, unaccountable World Trade Organisation, as well as multinational companies, threaten Europe’s precautionary approach with its *de facto* moratorium on commercialisation?

‘Participants were also concerned about how the government provided and used information.’

Participants were also concerned about how the government *provided* and *used information*. At the Forest Row meeting participants complained that, as with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in relation to Iraq – a highly sensitive issue at the time – it was difficult to know whether the

government had made available all the relevant information, and whether scientific information had been manipulated to suit political decisions. They also wondered aloud whether government was paying proper attention to public opinion. One farmer said, to loud applause:

My main concern tonight is that . . . whatever we are discussing, it's going to be of no consequence as far as the decision that's going to be made about growing GM crops [is concerned]. And that to me creates great anger, just like it did over Iraq, that the population can have one view and regardless of that the government goes ahead and does something else. And I see this as exactly the same as GM as well.

Many participants' and commentators' suspicions of and reservations about the role and significance of the *GM Nation!* initiative were confirmed when, as indicated above, in early 2004 the government gave the go-ahead for the commercialisation of GM crops. GM critics argued that the government had ignored the findings of its own initiative as well as wider public opinion. The government's case was not helped when internal government documents (leaked to the *Guardian* in early 2004) showed the Secretary of State and her officials at DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) discussing how to 'wear public opposition down' by 'solid, authoritative scientific argument'.

A PARADOXICAL INITIATIVE

The *GM Nation!* initiative was paradoxical: on the one hand, it was embedded in, and controlled by, formal policy-making. Important features – such as the *time available* for it, its *funding* and how it was *framed* – were set and controlled by government and the Steering Board. One source close to the organisers complained that DEFRA tried to exert control over the organisation of the initiative, requesting almost weekly meetings between DEFRA and members of the (supposedly



independent) Steering Board. On the other hand, the government's commitment to the initiative, and the initiative's relation to the policy-making process, were unclear.

Another difficulty facing the initiative was that of its public representativeness. Some media commentators criticised the public

'Participants wanted to be not just providers of "public opinion", but politically and socially engaged actors who could influence the politics of GM crops'

debates for being dominated by people who had already made up their mind – mostly GM-opponents, but also some pro-GM scientists – and thus not representing public opinion. One *Financial Times* journalist asked: 'why on earth did the government not commission a large-scale opinion survey instead?' This misses the point, as the aim of the initiative was to assess public perceptions of GM crops on the basis of in-depth deliberation, and to consult members of the public pro-actively and openly, rather than carrying out a closed, anonymous opinion survey with a statistically representative sample of average (and by – questionable – implication, relatively uninformed) members of the public. It should not surprise if the majority of participants were people who wished to engage with the issue of GM crop commercialisation – farmers, scientists, environmentalists, consumers, and so on.

Different parties – the government, participants, the media – had different stakes in the initiative and the contested issue of GM crops, and thus brought their particular interest to bear on the initiative in their role as organisers, participants or commentators. The initiative was instrumentalised and politicised in different ways and for various purposes. This led, in turn, to discussions, during the deliberations, of the value of the initiative.

There was thus a certain disjuncture between policy and politics. As an initiative instigated from within the regulatory system, the official emphasis was largely on policy, with the participatory process aimed at informing policy-makers about public perceptions of and opinions about the commercialisation of GM crops. However, as the political tone of the discussions indicated, in the public events themselves the emphasis was not just on policy, but also on the wider politics of GM technology and the government's stance on GM crops. Participants did not just want to be providers of 'public opinion', but politically and socially engaged actors who could influence and co-determine the politics of GM crops.

This has more general implications for the conceptualisation and analysis of participatory governance. First, one needs to pay close attention to the particular circumstances that give rise to participatory governance initiatives. Secondly, one needs to consider how various actors relate to, and interact with, such processes. Finally, and importantly, one needs to be aware of the politics of participatory governance. This will help one understand and consider its actual – and not just its normative – potential and limits as a dynamic and diverse socio-political process for addressing the 'democratic deficit' of multi-level governance.

Simon Joss is the director of CSD. This is an edited extract from an article in The 2003 Yearbook of Sociology of Science (Kluwer Academic Publisher).

Cinema and National Memory

Taiwanese director Hou Hsiao-hsien's City of Sadness is a powerful example of national cinema, argues Mark Harrison

Like many cinema traditions outside Hollywood and Europe, Taiwan has produced films with a self-conscious project to articulate and create a national experience. Hou Hsiao-hsien's *City of Sadness* is one of the most remarkable such films, for its artistry, its subject matter, and the period in modern Taiwanese history in which it was made.

The film deals with the event which has defined the development of Taiwan's social and political life to the present: the 2-28 Incident, the failed uprising against the Chinese Nationalists which began on February 28 1947 and in which twenty thousand Taiwanese civilians were killed during its brutal suppression. The film traces the life of an extended family from Retrocession in 1945, when Taiwan was returned to mainland Chinese rule under the Nationalists after fifty years as a Japanese colony, and shows the descent into corruption, violence and economic collapse which led to the uprising and its aftermath.



The film was released in 1989, only two years after the lifting of the state of martial law which had been in place since the 2-28

Incident. Over that forty year period, Retrocession had been celebrated by Taiwan's authoritarian government, while 2-28 had been erased from Taiwan's official history. In this context *City of Sadness* was a part of a national catharsis in which the bitterness of past events was being slowly and painfully expunged by the political processes of democratisation.

The director, Hou Hsiao-hsien, already a well-known figure in the Taiwanese film industry, has recognized his artistic project as being the self-conscious practice of discovery, recovery, and remembrance. In an interview in 1995, he said:

I have lived in Taiwan for over forty years but it was only when I made *A City of Sadness* that I began to learn about Taiwan's history. In preparation for the film, I read a lot of books on Taiwan's

history. It was only then that I consciously wanted to delve further into this area. Making a movie is a process of learning about history, people and life itself.

June Yip has read *City of Sadness* as a moment of the recovery of social memory (*Transnational Chinese Cinemas*, ed. Sheldon Hsiao-ping Lu, 1997). She notes the film's contribution to the 'reclamation of a Taiwanese position as subject – rather than mere object – of history'; Hou's comments indicate that the film was intentionally so. She also describes the film as a "history from below", deliberately rejecting the vantage point of the rulers in favour of the perspective of the common people', an observation which locates *City of Sadness* in the nativist cultural movement which flourished in the 1970s.

For Yip, *City of Sadness* presents an open-ended and pluralistic interpretation of Taiwanese history. The nature of the film, with its narrative conventions, stylistic devices and emotiveness, makes for a 'text' which allows for a presentation of historical events that emphasises the personal and dramatic, contrasting with the conventions of historical scholarship and journalism, which achieve legitimacy through a claim on

'City of Sadness was a part of a national catharsis in which the bitterness of past events was being slowly and painfully expunged by the political processes of democratisation'

objective truth and generalizations. Indeed, one of the features of *City of Sadness* is its deliberately oblique evocation of the actual events of the 2-28

Incident. Rather than anything as direct as a recreation of the violence of uprising, the event is evoked by a static scene of chaos in a hospital dealing with the injured.

As a cultural representation of the remembrance of a silenced history, *City of Sadness* expresses the equivocal and contested process of history writing which took place during the enormous political changes occurring in Taiwan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A received reading of the 2-28 Incident had not been securely established at that time and *City of Sadness* suits this moment, when the possibility of an authoritative reading of 2-28 remained difficult because of the uncertainty of Taiwan's political future.

The central character in *City of Sadness*, played by Hong Kong actor Tony Leung, is a deaf-mute, and his inability to speak symbolises the Taiwanese as silenced by their oppression. Critical of the film, Ping-hui Liao reads the mute central character as expressing Hou Hsiao-hsien's ambivalence towards his own history (*Public Culture* 5, 1993). For Liao, Hou is unwilling to fully embrace a specifically Taiwanese history, with the necessary claims on authenticity and authority over it, but rather uses a silenced subject to convey a distanced perspective:

by using a deaf and mute character, the filmmaker can maintain an ambivalence that allows him to at once say nothing or anything about the character (and the Incident) who can neither hear nor speak



for himself. Instead of facing human violence and cruelty, Hou consistently – and redundantly – turns his gaze away and focuses on the landscape that, in its permanent silence, seems to witness the loss of human lives and nevertheless survives.

However, Liao's strongly political interpretation of the film plays down the moral dimension of that landscape. Rather than simply looking away, the film evokes a

'The film evokes an aesthetic of Taiwanese life as a lived experience with a particular detail and attentiveness'

sense of place, and it is this sense which functions as a witness to violence and suffering. In a sense of place is the remembrance of history, and with it the capacity to judge and forgive.

The film evokes an aesthetic of Taiwanese life as a lived experience with a particular detail and attentiveness. Hou Hsiao-hsien's exteriors are the mountains north of Taipei, covered in bamboo and grasses and misty with Taiwan's subtropical humidity. His interiors are cluttered and claustrophobic, small rooms with

noisy wooden floors, dim lighting and filled with furniture. Outside are cool and humid greens with the sounds of insects, and inside are rich reds and blacks, and the sounds of children, cooking and the Taiwanese dialect. Rapidly disappearing under the pressures of modern industrial development, the mountains and old houses become idealized sensory impressions of Taiwan. Hou's cinematic technique eschews the use

of close-ups, and he frames his interiors with doorways and windows and shoots exteriors from high angles.

In this way, the film invokes place as a witness to history, and this gives the film a moral strength. The film appeals to the Taiwanese audience to recognize themselves in their own memories, and to act as witnesses to their own history. As a result, despite its tragic subject, *City of Sadness* contains an optimism. By placing the bitter events away from the viewer, the film is able to acknowledge them without being consumed by them. *City of Sadness* evokes a Taiwanese experience, but is not

trapped by it. It says that the past is real and cannot be undone, but it is nonetheless the past. The film marks social memory but also the acceptance of the past injustice which is necessary to create an effective democracy and civil society. The film's conjunction between artistic expression and national sentiment makes *City of Sadness* one of the great examples of a national cinema.

Mark Harrison is research fellow in Chinese Studies at CSD.



CSD: past, present, future

Simon Joss, director of CSD, reflects on CSD's achievements, its current work, and its future tasks

In 1989 a group of scholars led by Professor John Keane founded the Centre for the Study of Democracy with the mission to cultivate an innovative research programme in politics and international relations. They wanted to create an institutional forum in which a vibrant research culture could develop; in this forum scholars and students from various disciplinary backgrounds would address, in intellectually challenging ways, salient issues of democracy, politics and society in national and international contexts. Important historic events – above all the end of the Cold War – helped draw interest to the Centre's research and public events.

Since those early days, CSD has built up an increasingly varied research profile. This has been made possible by generous organisational and financial support from the University of Westminster, the strong directorship of John Keane (1989–2000) and Richard Whitman (2000–03), and the commitment and energy of all CSD staff (see pages 16–18). In 1998 CSD relocated to its current base at 100 Park Village East. Here CSD formed links with the prestigious Policy Studies Institute (at the same address) and could now offer improved research facilities, including new PhD desks, a spacious library, office space for visiting research fellows, and an in-house conference centre. The addition, in the same year, of the Asian Studies Research Group further raised the Centre's research profile.

The Centre has become widely known for its successful Masters

programme, which attracts highly motivated and skilled students from a broad range of national and cultural backgrounds (see page 20). Its PhD programme brings together talented students from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds; they carry out research into politics, societies, cultures and the many ways in which they are interdependent (see page 19). Together, CSD's over 70 postgraduate students are an essential part of its life.

The Centre's public events programme (see pages 21–22) includes the regular CSD Seminar, *ad hoc* workshops, international conferences, public lectures, and the annual CSD Encounter. These provide important fora for open-minded and intellectually stimulating scholarly discussions and topical public debates. Recent noteworthy CSD events include the 2003 CSD Encounter with Bruno Latour; the international conference in June 2004, *The Future of the European Polity*, the autumn 2004 workshop, *Time, Space and Violence*; and November 2004 conference, *Muslims in Britain: the making of a new underclass?*

CSD publicises much of its work through this Bulletin, on its website (www.wmin.ac.uk/csd), in its working papers series (*CSD Perspectives*), and in occasional books (see page 23).

If the past 15 years have seen the establishment of CSD as a leading research and teaching centre in Britain and abroad, the future holds out the prospect of growth and expansion. A host of developments – from the 'war on terror', the emergence of new democracies, and economic and

political globalisation, to multilevel governance and emerging transnational civil society movements and public spheres – are set to stimulate interest in the study of, and innovative research into, politics, international relations and societies. The recognition of the crucial link between research and teaching in higher education in general, and the importance attached to research at the University of Westminster in particular, means that the Centre can play a major role in providing research and teaching excellence. CSD is also well placed to contribute substantially to 'knowledge transfer' between academia and business, policy-makers and civil society organisations.

CSD will seize these opportunities by consolidating its excellent international academic links; building on successfully established research and teaching activities; securing additional funding; making a valuable contribution to the intellectual life of the University of Westminster; and by engaging in political and public debate in London, Britain and the wider world.

At a time of growing demands for quality assurance and accountability in the university sector, which put extra pressure on the workload of academics, CSD will continue to develop new visions and programmes for innovative research, teaching and public engagement. The spirit of creative, original thinking and academic work that has served CSD so well in the last 15 years will guide the Centre's activities in the years to come.

Research at CSD

Current CSD research projects and collaborations (for more information visit www.wmin.ac.uk/csd or contact the staff members directly).

POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

European Civil Society

The emergence, dynamics and perspectives of a European-wide civil society. European Commission (EC)-funded research network (CiSoNet) coordinated by Berlin Science Centre WZB.

Professor John Keane

History of Democracy

Study co-funded by the Ford Foundation of the history of democratic ideas and institutions.

Professor John Keane

Civil Society, Conflict and the History and Future of Democracy

Collaborative project with Berlin Science Centre WZB.

Professor John Keane

Style and Context: Contemporary Party Leadership in the US House of Representatives

A British Academy-funded analysis of the interaction of leaders' personal characteristics, leadership styles, and context on legislative success.

Professor John Owens

The Impact of 9/11 on America's Separated System

An examination of patterns of congressional-presidential and judicial-presidential relations in response to 9/11.

Professor John Owens

Agonistic Democracy

The elaboration of an agonistic model of democracy. This aims to grasp the central role played by passions in the formation of collective forms of identifications and to acknowledge the political in its antagonistic dimension.

Professor Chantal Mouffe

The State-Building Paradox

An analysis of the problems and contradictions of external attempts to address state failure.

Dr David Chandler

Protecting the Bosnian Peace

An assessment, 10 years after the Dayton Agreement, of progress in building sustainable peace. In collaboration with University of Oxford, Nottingham University, University of Plymouth, London School of

Economics; Virginia Tech; Queens University, Belfast; University of Wales.

Dr David Chandler

Joint Projects with South-East Europe (Bosnia)

British Academy-funded project on the political, economic and social transition of Bosnia; in collaboration with academics from Sarajevo University, University of Bergen, Nottingham University and University of Plymouth.

Dr David Chandler

Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: Pitfalls, Possibilities and Paradoxes

A project on ethical foreign policy with Frankfurt University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, London School of Economics and Nottingham University. Co-funded by the British Academy.

Dr David Chandler

American Power and the Middle East

Collaborative project with David Held and others (see *American Power in the 21st Century*; Polity Press: 2004).

Dr Abdelwahab El-Affendi

Terrorism, Democracy and the War of Ideas

An examination of political violence in the Middle East, state instability, and external interventions.

In collaboration with the Brookings Institution, Washington DC.

Dr Abdelwahab El-Affendi

Islamic Liberalism: An Empirical Investigation

A cross-country study of the concept of 'Islamic Liberalism'.

Dr Abdelwahab El-Affendi

The Limits of Modern Islamic Reformism

Project on Sudanese Islamist thinker Hassan Turabi, in collaboration with Dr Ibrahim Abu Rabia of Hertford Seminary and others.

Dr Abdelwahab El-Affendi

The Role of Islam in Political Reform and Democratisation

Project on current Islamic thought in the Middle East, Europe and South East Asia, in collaboration with the Centre for Political Research & Studies, University of Cairo.

Dr Maria Holt

Le Bottin des Lumières

Collaborative project marking the 250th anniversary of the Stanislas enlightenment period. Funded by Ville de Nancy and the French Ministry of Culture.

Dr Simon Joss

European Discourse on Brain Science

Multinational project on European research policy on brain sciences, with funding from the King Baudouin Foundation and the European Commission.

Dr Simon Joss & Dr Alison Mohr

Citizen Participation in Science and Technology

A multinational EC-funded network on citizen participation in the European Research Area, coordinated by Cité de la Science (Paris).

Dr Simon Joss & Dr Alison Mohr

Nanotechnology in European Society

A multinational study of nanotechnology and its socio-political repercussions, coordinated by Città della Scienza (Naples) with EC funding.

Dr Simon Joss & Dr Alison Mohr

Public Accountability in European Contexts

A multinational EC-funded cross-national comparison of public accountability institutions and processes.

Dr Simon Joss & Dr Alison Mohr

Dynamics and Obstacles of Multilevel Governance

EC-funded research training network including University of Maastricht, Charles University Prague, University of Mannheim, University of Munich and University of Odense.

Dr Svetlozar Andreev, Dr Simon Joss

Regions and Regionalisation through Business Clusters – the Role of Territory and Networks in Economic Policy-making: Insights from Europe and North America

ESRC-funded collaborative project with University of Sheffield and the Open University.

Dr Tassilo Herrschel, Dr Peter Newman

Asymmetric Devolution and European Policy in the UK

ESRC-funded project on the impact of devolution on the handling of EU policy; with University of Manchester and University of Edinburgh

Dr Patricia Hogwood

Argentina in the 1990s

A case study of the success and failures of a neo-liberal experiment.

Dr Celia Szusterman

Transformation of Internal Processes

A DTI-funded knowledge transfer project, in collaboration with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, on the

transformation of internal processes of information research through communication technologies.

Foad Zaman, Dr David Chandler

ASIAN STUDIES

Mothers, Daughters and Gendered Subjectivities in Urban China

Project on changing gendered identifications, with Tsinghua University (Beijing), financially supported by the Universities' China Committee (London).

Professor Harriet Evans

Power and Masculinity in Contemporary Art from the People's Republic of China

Dr Katie Hill

The Political Body: Posters from the People's Republic of China in the 1960s and 1970s

AHRB-funded exhibitions of the University of Westminster Chinese Poster Collection: Brunei Gallery, London, Durham Oriental Museum, and Bath Museum of East Asian Art.

Dr Katie Hill

Taiwanese National Identity: Epistemology, Legitimacy and Crisis

A critique of Taiwanese national identity using Derrida, Bhabha and Bourdieu.

Mark Harrison

Visions of the Future in the Chinese-speaking World: Science Fiction, Space and Shopping Malls

A study of the cultural production of the future in contemporary China; with the Centre for Arts Research and Education (CARTE), University of Westminster

Mark Harrison

CSD Staff



Dr Simon Joss, Director of CSD

Science and Technology



Mark Harrison

Chinese Studies



Professor Lord Bhikhu Parekh

Political Theory



Suzy Robson

CSD Administrator




Dr Katie Hill

Modern Chinese Visual Culture



Dr Ali Paya

Islam and Democracy



Dr Svetlozar Andreev

EU Governance



Dr Maria Holt

Islam and Democracy



Dr Jon Pugh

Environmental Planning/
Political Geography



Dr Patrick Burke

Publications Officer/Webmaster



Professor John Keane

Political Theory



Professor Richard Whitman
(on secondment to the Royal Institute of International Affairs)



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EU Policy/
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Dr Peter Newman

Urban and Regional Governance



Professor Harriet Evans

Chinese Cultural Studies



Professor John Owens

US Government and Politics



Dr Celia Szusterman

Latin American Politics/Political Economy

CSD's PhD Programme

CSD has a highly-regarded MPhil/PhD programme with over 25 research students enrolled. These high quality students are attracted to the work of the Centre's internationally renowned staff. Their research covers various geographical regions and a broad spectrum of interests in political theory, international relations, cultural studies and media and civil society, among others. Several of our students have received scholarships from both British and international funding bodies. Below Giovanni Navarra, one of CSD's PhD students, describes recent developments in the students' life.

The 4th floor at 100 Park Village East is the heart and soul of the PhD students' life. Here, on the couches in the lunch area, or in front of one of the PhD offices, most of our meetings and discussions take place. These informal chats, which cover a wide variety of topics, are slowly but steadily changing the PhD experience at CSD.

In the last year, partly because these meetings and discussion have increased in frequency, partly because of the moral and practical support provided by CSD staff members (Simon Joss, David Chandler, John Keane, Patrick Burke and Suzy Robson, among others), and partly because of the work and enthusiasm of several PhD Students (especially Dan Greenwood, Derek Hird, and Tara McCormack), interaction between PhD students and staff members at CSD has gradually improved.

Methodology Workshops

The PhD group now organises workshops with CSD academic staff. These are informal, relaxed events, in which staff members share their research experiences with us. We hope these meetings will become an essential part of the PhD experience at CSD and will help build stronger ties between students and academic staff.

In July 2004 Mark Harrison led the inaugural workshop, on the topic of *Epistemological Issues in Taiwanese Identity*. Drawing on his own PhD, Mr Harrison took us through the difficult



and confusing area of epistemology with insight and clarity.

In October David Chandler, speaking on *Methodology and the Research Process*, gave a thought provoking assessment of the role of methodology and theoretical frameworks in academic research. He discussed Hedley Bull, Karl Marx and Michel Foucault as examples of theorists whose engagement with the most challenging questions helped shape their methodological approach. We also discussed the distinction between the process of research and the 'writing up' stage.

PhD Students' Webpages

The PhD students' own section of the CSD website, 'PhD Students' News and Resources' (linked to the PhD Programme pages), is a forum for news about, events organised by and of interest to, and for publicising resources relevant to PhD students. The page currently has three sub-sections (Methodologies workshop reports; PhD students' conference funding; PhD links). Other sections will be added, including a page for each student. PhD students and staff are always invited to contribute material and ideas to help us

improve these pages. Send these to Dan Greenwood (danielmgreenwood@yahoo.co.uk) and Giovanni Navarra (giovanni_navarra@yahoo.it).

Webpage address:

<http://imm-ive.wmin.ac.uk/ssh/page-120-smhp=1>

News about PhD Students

We welcome new PhD students at CSD: Amanda Machin, recipient of the first Margaret Blunden Scholarship and working on the topic of nationalism and identity with Chantal Mouffe; Danila Genovese (anti-terrorism legislation and the future of dissent in the Muslim community; Abdelwabad El-Affendi, Simon Joss, John Keane); James Heartfield (EU integration and subjectivity; David Chandler); Julia Svetlichnaja (how art can influence democracy and the formation of an active public sphere; Chantal Mouffe, Harriet Evans); and Sabri Carmikli (the construction of the discourse of secularisation in the Turkish Republic, 1924-45; Chantal Mouffe, Abdelwahab El-Affendi).

Congratulations to Patrick Burke, who successfully defended his thesis in October.

Magdalena Larsen and Tara McCormack have each received £600 from the CSD PhD Conference Fund Award towards the costs of attending the International Studies Association annual convention in Hawaii in March 2005. The papers they will present to this, the largest and most prestigious annual international studies conference, will be posted on the CSD website. *Next deadline for the Conference fund: 18 February 2005*: see the PhD students' webpage for more details.

Derek Hird, currently doing ethnographic work in Beijing for his research on 'Men and masculine behaviour in China', gave a paper in September 2004 on 'Representations of masculinity in contemporary China' to the Joint East Asian Studies Conference at the University of Leeds.

Giovanni Navarra will present a paper to the CSD Seminar on 3 May 2005 (see page 21).

Finally, Javier Gomez-Arribas has successfully transferred from MPhil to PhD.

CSD's Masters Courses

MA INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Core modules:

International Relations 1: Theoretical Perspectives; International Relations 2: Beyond International Relations?; The Human Sciences – Perspectives and Methods; Dissertation.

Elective modules (3 from the list below)

MA INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY

Core modules:

International Relations 1: Theoretical Perspectives; The Human Sciences – Perspectives and Methods; The State, Politics and Violence; Dissertation.

Elective modules (3 from the list below)

Elective modules

Introduction to Contemporary Chinese Societies and Cultures; Contemporary Democratic Theory; Controversies in United States Foreign Policies and Processes; Democracy and Islam; Democratic Politics and the Dynamics of Passions; The Governance and Policies of the European Union: Theories and Perspectives; International Humanitarian Law; International Relations I & II; International Security; Latin America and Globalization; The Politics of Science, Technology and the Environment; Politics, Public Life and the Media; Problems and Perspectives in Cultural Studies; Processes and Issues in European Union Foreign and Security Policy; The State, Politics and Violence. (*Not all elective modules are available on each Masters course.*)

Students may only begin the Masters in International Relations in September but all other courses in September or February

For specific enquiries contact:
Professor John E Owens, CSD,
University of Westminster,
100 Park Village East, London NW1
3SR, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)20 7911 5138
Fax: +44 (0)20 7911 5164
Email: csd@wmin.ac.uk

CSD's Masters programmes (one year full-time, two years part-time) offer innovative and intellectually challenging theoretical and empirical frameworks for postgraduate study in International Relations, Politics, Political Theory, Asian Studies and International Studies.

The courses relate the study of national politics and cultures, international relations and normative political theory to the analysis of social processes and the dynamics of international politics. Our courses build on undergraduate knowledge, but allow for concentration in particular fields.

CSD's Masters courses should appeal to those who seek stimulating and demanding courses of study and wish to acquire advanced knowledge in Politics, International Relations and Asian Studies. Some students will want this knowledge and skill to progress to a doctoral degree; others will want a higher degree with a different career in mind. Recent Masters students are now employed in corporate and public international organisations – including the United Nations and NGOs – media outlets, think tanks and other consultancy organisations, as well as foreign ministries in different countries. Others are studying for PhDs at CSD or at other universities.

Teaching in the Centre has been rated 'excellent' by the United Kingdom Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA).

MA INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

(East Asia/European Union/
Islamic World)

This MA programme in International Studies offers students an integrated programme of regional specialisms with political and cultural studies.

Students may focus on East Asia, Europe or the Islamic World, drawing on the research expertise of CSD staff in political science, cultural studies and international relations.

The *East Asia* strand gives students a critical introduction to the political, economic, social and cultural aspects of contemporary China (including Hong Kong), Taiwan, Japan, and Korea, such as Chinese cultural politics, media across Greater China, and Japanese politics, as well as the inter-relationships between these states and regions.

The *European Union* strand emphasises the study of contemporary Europe and its political institutions and policy-making processes. Contemporary political developments in Europe are located in a wider international context so that the international significance of European integration can be better appreciated.

The new strand, *Islamic World*, includes modules on democracy and Islam, modern Islamic thought and new developments in democracy.

For specific enquiries contact:
Professor Harriet Evans
CSD, 100 Park Village East,
London NW1 3SR, UK
Tel: +44 020 7468 2254/7911 5138;
Fax: 7911 5164;
Email: evansh@westminster.ac.uk

FURTHER INFORMATION/APPLICATION FORMS

For detailed information about our Masters programmes go to <http://www.wmin.ac.uk/csd> (see 'Masters Courses'; for on-line applications see 'How to Apply').

Or write to:

Admissions & Marketing Office, University of Westminster,
16 Riding House Street, London W1W 7UW.
Tel: +44 020 7911 5088; Fax: +44 020 7911 5175; Email:
regent@westminster.ac.uk

Seminars, Lectures, Clubs

CSD SEMINAR PROGRAMME Spring—Summer 2005

15 February

JEAN HILLIER

*Sweeping the Dust of Fixities:
Reconceptualising Time and
Space in Planning*

1 March

YANNIS STAVRAKAKIS

*The Politics of Affect: Discourse
and Jouissance*

15 March

PROFESSOR JOHN KEANE,
CSD

*Why Democracy? On The Need
For Fresh Thinking About An
Old Ideal*

19 April

DR HELGE TORGERSEN
AND DR WALTER PEISSL,

Institute of Technology, Vienna
*Public Debate In The Age Of
Post-Genomics/Technology And
The Private Sphere*

3 May

GIOVANNI NAVARRIA, CSD

*Reinventing Democracy in the
Age of the Internet*

17 May

HUGO DE BURGH,
University Of Westminster
China And The Media

*For more details, go to
[www:wmin.ac.uk/csd](http://www.wmin.ac.uk/csd)*

THE DEMOCRACY CLUB

Not another venue for gentlemen, nor a Jacobin cell for the pursuit of democracy by terror: the proposed Democracy Club is a twenty-first century initiative that aims to promote high-quality research and discussion about the past, present and future of democracy. Based at CSD, the Club will be a loose local grouping of staff and students - and friends and associates from other institutions - mainly drawn from London, who have an interest in the subject of democracy and meet regularly, at least once a month, to share and compare views. The Democracy Club will normally meet in the evenings, with tea, coffee and soft drinks provided. It will have various overlapping aims: to encourage participation among CSD staff and students and visiting researchers in discussions about democracy, considered as a language, a way of life and a set of institutions; to provide intellectual, moral and strategic support for the second phase of the Islam and Democracy research programme; to invite distinguished outside speakers, from home and abroad, to share their views with the Club's participants; to explore contacts

with policy-makers and practitioners of democratic politics and to encourage awareness of the strategic difficulties of building and preserving democratic institutions; to strengthen CSD's ties with other research and policy-making bodies elsewhere in Europe and the wider world; to focus attention at CSD on the need to seek new sources of research funding in this area; and to provide support for the annual Democracy Lecture to be hosted at CSD from the spring of 2005. The Club will be informal and self-organising and, aside from a convenor and rotating chairs of meetings, it will not have a permanent organizational structure. It will strive to be an open space for differently-minded people - a non-partisan association of scholars and others who do not make presumptions about what democracy is or can be, but instead are bound together by a strong sense that democracy matters, that it is a fragile and precious way of life, and that its fate is now, for the first time in its history, surrounded by uncertainty on a global level.

John Keane, CSD, December 2004

THE ANNUAL C R PAREKH LECTURE ON DEMOCRACY

With the help of a generous donation from the Nirman Foundation (Alexandria, USA), CSD is launching a new annual event, the C R Parekh Lecture. This will explore relevant issues of democracy, such as the cultural precondition of democracy, whether or not democracy can be exported, different forms and models of democracy, and the crisis of western democracy.

Benjamin Barber of the University of Maryland will give the inaugural lecture, in spring 2005. Professor Barber is the author of *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics For A New Age* (University of California Press: 1984); *The Truth of Power: Intellectual Affairs In The Clinton White House* (W W Norton: 2001); and *Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism and Democracy In An Age Of Interdependence* (W W Norton: 2003)

The date and venue of Benjamin Barber's lecture will be announced on our website: www.wmin.ac.uk/csd

Democracy & Islam Programme

The relationship between Islam and democracy lies at the heart of contemporary intellectual debates on the nature of democracy and its cultural and socio-economic preconditions.

In October 2004 CSD launched the second phase of its pioneering research programme on Democracy and Islam – with increased funding, more staff and an expanded mandate. The programme – which also has a postgraduate teaching component – will develop CSD's innovative research on democratic processes (or lack of them) in Muslim states. It will also focus on the sometimes difficult but increasingly fruitful relationship between the Muslim world and the west and, in particular, on the challenges facing Muslims in Europe, especially Britain.

RESEARCH

The research programme's projects for the coming year include:

- The state, Islam and political violence in the Middle East
- Islamic liberalism and the question of democratization in the Muslim world
- The new media and political change in the Arab world
- British Muslim women and the democratic process
- The image of Muslims in the British media

RESEARCH SEMINARS

Our programme of research seminars, workshops and conferences begins in Spring–Summer 2005 with the following seminars (all of which take place at CSD):

Democracy by Occupation: Iraq, Afghanistan and their aftermath
Tuesday 22 February 2005:
18.30–20.00



Iran's Stalled Reform Process: what will happen after the Khatami era?
Tuesday 26 April 2005:
18.30–20.00

The Broader Middle East Initiative: one year on
Tuesday 24 May 2005:
18.30–20.00

For more information about these events – including about participation – see our website: www.wmin.ac.uk/csd ('Events')

PHD PROGRAMME

Currently PhD students in the programme are conducting research on:

- Islamic reformism in Iran (Tawfiq Al Saif)
- Religions and national identity in Saudi Arabia (Hamzah Al Hassan)
- Anti-terrorism legislation and the future of dissent in Muslim

communities (Danila Genovese)

- The media and the second Gulf war (Nasir Akram)
- The Chambers of Commerce and civil society in Saudi Arabia (Abdullah al Hudaithi)

PUBLIC EVENTS

These public events bring together leading Muslim and non-Muslim academics, journalists, policy-makers, representatives of NGOs and community groups, and other concerned individuals.

Muslims and the Democratic Process in Britain

Wednesday 16 February 2005:
16.00–17.30, House of Lords

Muslim Women in Britain: beyond stereotypes

Wednesday 16 March 2005:
18.00–19.30, The Board Room, University of Westminster

The Rise of Islamophobia: the role of the media

Thursday 14 April 2005:
10.30–12.00, The Board Room, University of Westminster

Being a 'Good' Citizen: debates on identity and participation within the Muslim community

Thursday 12 May 2005 :
16.30–18.00, CSD

In future we will hold public seminars on 'Islam and Europe', and 'Democracy in the Muslim World'.

PERSONNEL

Dr Abdelwahab El-Affendi
Dr Maria Holt
Dr Ali Paya
Dr Simon Joss
Professor John Keane
Professor Lord Bhikhu Parekh

Publications

CSD Publications Online

We are gradually making back issues of the *CSD Bulletin* and past titles in the *CSD Perspectives* series available on our website (wwmin.ac.uk/csd).

CSD PERSPECTIVES

A series of monographs published by the University of Westminster

The titles marked with an asterisk* are now out of print and only available online. The remaining titles are available online and between covers. The titles in printed form cost £3.00 each and are available from CSD, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR, United Kingdom. Make cheques payable to 'University of Westminster'.

**The Betrayal of Bosnia*
Lee Bryant (1993).

**Nations, Nationalism, and the European Citizen*, John Keane (1993).

**Universal Human Rights? The Rhetoric of International Law*
Jeremy Colwill (1994).


**Islam and the Creation of European Identity*, Tomaz Mastnak (1994).

**Uncertainty and Identity: the Enlightenment and its Shadows*
Chris Sparks (1994).

The Making of a Weak State: The Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1906 Mehdi Moslem (1995).

The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: Perspectives on European Integration Richard Whitman (1995).

Renewing Local Representative Democracy, Keith Taylor (1996).



European Democracy at the Russian Crossroads, Irene Brennan (1996).

**The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Obstacles and Prospects*, Richard Whitman (1996).

Managing Variety: Issues in the Integration and Disintegration of States
Margaret Blunden (1997).


Between the Living and the Dead: the Politics of Irish History
Bernard Rorke (1999).

On Refugees and the New Violence
Pierre Hassner and Bridget Cotter (1999).

**On Communicative Abundance*
John Keane (1999).

For a State of Peace: Conflict and the Future of Democracy in Sudan, Abdelwahab El-Affendi (2002).

Politics and Passions: the Stakes of Democracy, Chantal Mouffe (2002).



Participatory Technology Assessment: European Perspectives

Edited by Simon Joss and Sergio Bellucci
(CSD, 2002. £15.00)

Since the early 1990s, an increasing number of citizens, stakeholders and user groups have become involved in assessing new scientific and technological developments. This involvement has taken various forms, including citizens' panels, scenario workshops, round tables and consensus conferences. The aim of such 'participatory technology assessment' is to provide advice to policy-makers and to encourage wider public debate about socio-technological developments.

This volume gives a comprehensive overview of recent developments in participatory technology assessment in a variety of European national and institutional contexts. It includes a research framework that provides a basis for both theoretical and practical analysis; contains studies of 16 participatory initiatives in Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom; and offers in-depth, cross-country comparisons focusing on important issues such as the methodological design, political role and impact of participatory technology assessment.

To order this book, email CSD:
csd@wmin.ac.uk

Summer School for Democracy

Every year since 1998, CSD and the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Belgrade have organised an international summer school. Below Margaret Blunden, and overleaf Vukasin Pavlovic, two of the main movers behind this project, reflect on its achievements so far.

I first went to Montenegro in 1997 when the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade and CSD held a joint one week seminar in Budva on the spectacular Adriatic coast. The topic was the University and Democracy, a theoretical issue of pressing practical concern to academics in a country where the government was already exerting considerable pressure on the intelligentsia. Our Serbian partners proved adept at combining business and pleasure. We spent the afternoons travelling all over the mountainous terrain of this fascinating country by minibus.

The idea of the summer schools was to provide concentrated studies on democratic theory and international relations, in a region where these subjects were not widely available, to young academics and professionals starved of access to books, periodicals and the lifeblood of international debate. The focus on the Balkans region as a whole was



most important: we were trying to put back together the intellectual dialogue among young people that had been tragically shattered by the civil wars of the early 1990s. We took postgraduate students from CSD to the first school; it was important that it attracted Albanians, who got across the border with some difficulty, and both ethnic Serbs and Albanians from Kosovo. The bonds formed during this summer school were, we learnt later, useful in making possible mutual protection among our Kosovan alumni when the war came.

The organization of the summer school in 1998 was complicated by the introduction of Milosevic's new Law of the

Universities, which brought academic activity under tighter political control and made life particularly difficult for Professor Pavlovic, who, as Dean of Political Science at the University of Belgrade, held one of the highest profile academic posts in the country. Since European universities had agreed to impose a boycott on collaboration with Serbian universities, our partnership was only able to continue with the help of an umbrella organisation, the Anglo-Serbian Society, which became the official host body for the school in the region.

The running of the second summer school in the summer of 1999 was scheduled to take place in Perast, a breathtakingly beautiful village on the Bay of Kotor, home for some centuries of the tall sailing ships of the region. Unfortunately, it was threatened by the NATO bombing of Belgrade, Novi Sad and other surrounding targets. The British Council – along with the Open Society Institute, one of the stalwart sponsors of the

early years – advised British people not to attend the school, in accordance with Foreign Office warnings against travel to the region. But within five weeks of the end of bombing we were back in business again, with a memorable school in which, as before, it proved possible to air the most painful issues and passionately held political views with admirable self-restraint and serious effort at academic objectivity. I have happy memories of sitting under the huge grape vine which covered the entire courtyard of the Villa

Perast, overlooking the bay which is one of the most beautiful places in the world.

One year a Macedonian student would produce a musical pipe in the evenings and our students from all over the region – Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro – sang their shared traditional songs, as though nothing had ever happened to separate them. It was with great pleasure, after the fall of Milosevic, that the University of Westminster was able formally to renew its partnership with the University of Belgrade, with a new Memorandum of Collaboration signed by Professor Maria Bogdanovich, the new Rector and the first woman to hold the post in the University's long and distinguished history.



The summer school has now produced some 200 alumni, junior academics and rising young professionals in NGOs and the civil service. The summer schools have provided them with a rare experience to apply the theoretical

insights of politics and international relations to the challenging contemporary problems of the region. The numbers applying to the school, and the range of countries from which they are drawn, continues to increase. The international dimension has been enhanced by academic contributors from the United States (Professor Joseph Julian from Syracuse University has attended every year), Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and Greece among others, and by a student body drawn from Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey as well as more immediate neighbours.

Every year Professor Pavlovic somehow manages to secure the funding – from an ever widening set of sponsors from across Europe and North America – which enables this school to operate without cost to its students.

Having now proved its value across the Balkans, the hope is that the school will steadily expand its scope, drawing in more students from Western Europe and North America, to share in the rich intellectual tradition of this troubled but always resilient part of Europe.

Professor Margaret Blunden was Provost of the Regent Campus of the University of Westminster and a member of CSD until summer 2004.

INTERNATIONAL SUMMER SCHOOLS SINCE 1998

1998: Democracy and Social Change

1999: Modernity and the State – East and West

2000: the Democratic Reconstruction of
South-Eastern Europe

2001: Good Governance: Globalisation and Localisation

2002: the Consolidation of New Democracies

2003: Democracy, Globalisation and Security

2004: Globalisation, the European Union, and the
Western Balkans

Summer School

Academic co-operation between political scientists from Belgrade and the Centre for the Study of Democracy began in the mid-1990s with a British Council-funded joint research project entitled *Suppressed Civil Society in Serbia*. By participating in this project, the founder and first director of CSD, John Keane, demonstrated his support for a group of professors in the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Belgrade who opposed the militarist policies of the Milosevic regime, supported democracy, and advocated the development of a civil society in Serbia.

The idea of organizing a summer school for democracy emerged in 1997 during a joint conference, 'The University and Democracy', held after the completion of the research project. Professor Margaret Blunden, then Provost of the University of Westminster, was instrumental in creating a solid foundation for the school.

In the 1990s the opportunities for Serbians to travel abroad were limited. The International Summer School for Democracy thus allowed lecturers and young scholars from Serbia and Montenegro – indeed from throughout South-Eastern Europe – to meet British colleagues and to attend lectures by them on important topics such as the problems of globalisation; democratic changes in post-communist societies; the rule of law; the democratisation of a polity; the establishment of civil society; and the role of media in democracy.

Every year the school's participants come from the countries that emerged from Yugoslavia. This has helped improve not just mutual relations amongst young academic elites but, in a region with such a tragic and painful experience of multi-ethnic

conflicts, has also provided a good foundation for bilateral and multilateral co-operation between nations and states. It has been particularly important that participants from Albania have regularly attended the school; this – despite the conflicts provoked by the crisis in Kosovo – has created new opportunities for co-operation and friendships to develop.

The International Summer School has shown that international academic co-operation may be preserved and developed even under very difficult circumstances. Thankfully, since the democratic changes in Serbia in October 2000, many obstacles have been removed that once made this co-operation difficult. Serbia today, with

its visa-free regime for visitors, is one of the most open countries in the world.

While most teaching staff come from the University of Westminster and the Faculty of

Political Science at the University of Belgrade, the roster of lecturers includes professors from the USA, Canada, and elsewhere in Western Europe and the Balkans. Both amongst young academics in South-Eastern Europe and their colleagues in Western Europe interest in participating in the Summer School for Democracy has grown. In recent years applications have increased; the academic credentials of participants and the quality of teaching has also improved.

The International Summer School for Democracy tries to advance the quality of university education in the political and social sciences; and it promulgates the spirit of multiculturalism and tolerance, democracy and civil political culture.

Dr Vukasin Pavlovic is Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Belgrade

CSD TRUST FUND

In support of its long-term development plans, the Centre for the Study of Democracy has established an interest-earning fund, the CSD Trust Fund.

The Fund aims, broadly, to supplement CSD's current revenue base (drawn from taught Masters' courses, research student fees, government research grants, and individual research contract sources) and so to provide for the things that we urgently want to do. CSD needs additional funds to encourage staff development and to support our publications, seminars, and conferences; and to enable us to appoint additional teaching, research, administrative and library staff. Support is also needed to create an enlarged community of resident scholars and postgraduate students; and to publicise better the work and good reputation of CSD on a European and global basis.

The establishment of the CSD Trust Fund, and the launching of an appeal to raise an endowment to support these various appointments and activities, was initially supported by a modest grant from the University. The CSD Trust Fund operates strictly under the auspices of the University of Westminster Prizes and Scholarships Fund, to whose Trustees it is directly accountable. Decisions about fund-raising and disbursements are initially formulated by a CSD Trust Fund Working Group, which includes several CSD staff, senior University representatives, well-placed patrons of the appeal, and a representative of the CSD Council of Advisers. In principle, the functions and activities of the CSD Trust Fund are kept quite separate from the governing institutions of the Centre, including its commitments to the wider University structures.

Requests for further details and offers of financial support should be directed to:

Dr Simon Joss, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR.

FUTURE SUMMER SCHOOLS

2005: the Environment and Democracy

2006: Democracy and Islam

Strong Democracy

Dan Plesch

We need a renaissance in democratic politics in order to defend the achievements of the Enlightenment against religious extremism – Christian or Islamic – and the emergence of corporate totalitarianism. Three interconnected approaches could provide the basis of such a renaissance: applying the principle of equality before the law to company law; making Britain and other countries constituencies in an international system of representative democracy; and developing our democratic heritage.

A key principle of a free society is that all are equal before the law. However, a central feature of company law – the legal device of limited liability – places the owners of companies, the shareholders, above the law. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this feature of company law – though unremarked today – was highly controversial in both politics and scholarly debate. Adam Smith, for example, declared that limited liability ‘would not be reasonable’ for normal business activities.

Limited liability – the most socially damaging special interest protection created by legislation – contradicts both the principles of the US constitution as well as those of fundamental documents on human rights adopted by nation states, the United Nations and the European Union. Owners may benefit without limit from the activities of a company in which they invest, however damaging the actions of the company. Limited liability has many features often condemned by free-marketeers, as well as by those in the United States who seek to repeal much government social and environmental legislation on the basis of a minimalist interpretation of the constitution.

The application of universal standards of human and political rights to corporate behaviour can strengthen

democratic constraints on corporate intervention across many sectors – be they labour rights, environmental protection or social ownership. Efforts to make corporations behave responsibly will be far more effective when underpinned by the demand that owners should not be above the law. The demand for this reform can progressively redress the economic and social inequality that all too often makes democracy a political façade for a deeply undemocratic economic structure.

A second weakness of modern democracies – the disconnection



between, on the one hand, representative democracy in both parliamentary and presidential systems of government and, on the other, international and supranational bodies – has concerned policy makers, protestors and scholars. It has become a cliché to observe that political power and decision-making has moved to a regional or global level but that the system of state-based representative democracy has not evolved. Indeed, one may argue that representative democracy has regressed, since, in the age before the telegraph, politically empowered representatives – ministers plenipotentiary – represented the state abroad.

Incremental, evolutionary change to this system could take the form of

developing the representation of the nation state at the level of the regional or global institution. Governments could post ministers of state to join diplomatic representatives at bodies such as the EU Council of Ministers, the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. In this way these bodies might become increasingly political rather than bureaucratic bodies. In parallel, political parties could nominate shadow ministers for these overseas postings; as a result a closer relationship would develop between the national electorate and the relevant international or supranational body. In national electoral systems with a party-list system this relationship could be made even stronger by identifying candidates on the list with particular offices in international or supranational bodies. And, in the most developed form of this upgraded representative democracy, voters at general elections would elect to the cabinet such overseas representatives of the state.

These economic and political economic reforms would be strengthened if the culture as a whole became more democratic. In Britain, popular history – from the National Trust to television history programmes – lacks a strong democratic element. For example, the sign on Putney Church which explains that this – the site of the Leveller debates with the Army Council in the 1640s – is where English democracy was founded, is a battered, A3 laminate. An event of such historic importance warrants a more prominent place in our national life. Similarly, close to Heathrow airport we find the mansion where Sir Edward Coke, the architect of the parliamentary revival in the early 1600s, once lived. Yet, unremarked, it has been lost to history.

Taken together, these three mutually reinforcing elements of a democratic revival can create a more robust and democratic culture in Britain.

Dan Plesch, who spoke at CSD in March 2004 on ‘The United Nations: Challenges and Prospects’, is a visiting fellow at Birkbeck College, London, and Keele University, and author of The Beauty Queen’s Guide to World Peace (Politico’s; 8.99). (www.danplesch.net)

Big Boss Man

John E. Owens details how the US president and the executive have aggressively extended their powers since 11 September 2001

Analyses of post-Vietnam patterns of lawmaking in the US present an essentially Madisonian interpretation of congressional–presidential relations and presidential power. The president has the ‘power to persuade’, insists Richard Neustadt. America has a ‘government of separated institutions sharing powers’ (*Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*, 1990). ‘The Constitution, in effect, put two combatants into the ring and sounded the bell that sent them into endless battle’, observes James Sundquist (*The Decline and Resurgence of Congress*, 1981). It is now commonly accepted that seesawing or fluctuations in the preponderance and power of co-equal institutions occurs: in certain periods the president has been preponderant; in others, Congress; and, in still others, there has been a balance of power.

An analysis of patterns of congressional–presidential interaction and policymaking on all major legislation considered since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrates clearly that the healthy inter-branch and inter-cameral rivalry and competition that the Constitution’s framers intended has continued. Yet the Madisonian interpretation of presidential power and congressional–presidential relations captures much less than it

once did the dynamics and power of the ‘unilateral presidency’; this is especially so in times of national crisis and war when there are strong incentives for presidents to use the brute powers of the institutional presidency to make public policy unilaterally.

UNILATERAL PRESIDENCY

Neustadt insists that presidents cannot usually achieve their objectives by executive fiat or ‘command’; this is ‘a painful last resort’, he argues, ‘suggestive less of

‘The Madisonian interpretation of presidential power and congressional–presidential relations captures much less than it once did the dynamics and power of the “unilateral presidency”’

mastery than of failure – the failure of attempts to gain an end by softer means’. Contrary interpretations emphasise the effectiveness of the president’s command or his unilateral actions, above all in times of crisis, and especially after the Great Depression.

Congress has given all American presidents the statutory authority to issue rules and regulations with which to implement policies explicit or implicit in congressional statutes.

Executive orders (EOs) have the force of law. During World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt issued dozens of executive orders that nationalised aviation, shipbuilding, and coal plants; in 1965 President Johnson issued EO 11246 instituting the first affirmative action programme; more recently, Bill Clinton issued executive orders to make 1.7 million acres of land threatened by industrial development into a national monument (1996).

GEORGE W. BUSH

George W. Bush and his administration have aggressively asserted the powers and authority of the presidency as a deliberate political strategy. White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card (*National Journal*, 17 April 2004):

There was a recognition . . . that the previous administration allowed for the erosion of some executive power. [President Bush] knows how important it is that the president . . . is in a position where he can have unfettered, candid, counsel that will allow him . . . to be able to make the most important decisions on behalf of the country, and to be able to keep the oath that is also written in Article II [of the Constitution] . . . He wanted to restore the executive authority the president had traditionally been able to exercise.

In the absence of systematic data or analyses, and because it is difficult to compare contextual factors, one cannot say whether or not


George W. Bush has resorted to unilateral action more, or has used unilateral powers more successfully, than earlier presidents. Many scholars argue that the sea change occurred under the wartime presidency of Franklin Roosevelt; others that it occurred during the Reagan presidency. Recent work shows that, regardless of their personality qualities and inclinations, newly elected presidents of the opposite party to their predecessor have a

greater incentive to exercise unilateral powers than do second-term presidents and new presidents of the same party as their predecessor.

Before 11 September, Bush used these powers to institute a wide range of policies consistent with his conservative sympathies. Bush's unilateral presidency became much more distinctive, however, after the terrorist attacks on 11 September.

Following the president's declaration of a state of emergency pursuant to the National Emergencies Act, Bush demanded from the Congress *new executive powers*: to enhance intelligence-gathering, law enforcement and asset seizure capacity; to strengthen the powers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and to redefine comprehensively the Justice Department's primary mission to protect the country against terrorism. He won approval from the Congress, on 14 September 2001, for a wide-ranging joint resolution authorising the president to use 'all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons *he determines* [emphasis added] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001'.

At a joint session of the Congress on 20 September, the president went further: he declared a 'war' on terrorism. By interpreting the 11 September attacks as acts of 'war' by foreign aggressors, rather than as criminal acts that would require redress by the US justice system, he sought to stretch the traditional definition of war in international law ('military conflict among states') to include hostile actions by non-state foreign individuals and groups, and thereby to legitimate America's unilateral right to respond forcefully to attacks in self defence. The president's declaration of a 'war' on terrorism evoked not only an image of a wartime president but suggested that the president could – without further congressional consideration or authorization or judicial review – claim wartime powers inherent in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution and in the authority derived from the Congress' joint resolution – and, thereby, had the legal authority to define how and where



the US should respond. When coupled with statements that the new 'war' on terrorism would be of indefinite duration and unrestricted by geography, the president's claims to exercise new powers unilaterally were breathtaking.

The president issued a small avalanche of *presidential directives*: these ordered the armed forces' Ready Reserve to active duty and delegated new powers to the secretaries of Defense and Transportation (EO 13223); froze property and prohibited transactions 'with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism' (EO 13224); and established an Office of Homeland Security and a Homeland Security Council in the White House (EO 13228). As permitted under the Constitution, congressional approval was neither sought nor given for these (uncontroversial) actions. More controversially, the president issued an order authorising the use of lethal force in self-defence against individuals now classed as enemies of the United States; signed an intelligence 'finding' instructing the CIA to engage in 'lethal covert operations'; rescinded a ban on political assassinations instituted by President Ford in 1976 (EO 11905); and, in early 2002, issued an intelligence finding and order directing the CIA to topple Saddam Hussein – this included using lethal force to capture the Iraqi president or kill him if acting in self-defence. On the basis of other

presidential orders, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also 'authorized the establishment of a highly secret [Department of Defense] program that was given blanket advance approval to kill or capture and, if possible, interrogate, "high value" targets [in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere]'. This led to the abuse of prisoners in US custody in contravention of the 1948 Geneva Conventions (Seymour Hersh, *The New Yorker*, 24 May 2004.)

The administration similarly evaded international humanitarian law and the Third Geneva Convention, as well as US domestic law, by unilaterally deeming non-citizens engaged in armed conflict against the United States – including members of al Qaeda or the Taliban – as 'unlawful' or 'enemy combatants' rather than prisoners of war. This policy change sanctioned interrogation techniques and treatment of prisoners prohibited under the Geneva Conventions.

The administration has also *detained or deported immigrants, 'enemy aliens' or other individuals* suspected of terrorist activities. Relying on previous court rulings – upholding the federal government's

'When coupled with statements that the new "war" on terrorism would be of indefinite duration, the president's claims to exercise new powers unilaterally were breathtaking'

plenary power to determine who can enter and stay in the United States – the administration contended that a) the US courts are not 'well positioned' to decide questions of immigration and naturalization where, according to the administration, cases relate to terrorism: such cases are inextricably intertwined with foreign affairs and other matters that are best left to the president; b) that where national security is invoked (by the administration) judicial review should be precluded; and c) that as commander-in-chief the president is in possession of greater expertise than the courts and must be allowed therefore to

decide unilaterally. As a consequence, after 11 September 2001, 5,000 non-citizens were detained for significant periods – often on the basis of religion and ethnicity – and sometimes subject to physical and other abuse (including 1,200 people who had overstayed their US immigration visas).

Executive agencies also extensively manipulated arrest, detention, and removal practices relating to aliens; stretched detention statutes (such as the 1984 material witness statute) to detain for prolonged periods other individuals whose testimony the administration has claimed is ‘material’ to a criminal proceeding and who, it is claimed, are likely to flee; and directed cases to particular courts known to be deferential to the executive.

Bush’s unilateral presidency has also been marked by his administration’s almost unerring *penchant for secrecy*. This is most evident in cases allegedly related to terrorism, but in other areas as well: for example, with regard to the real costs of a new Medicare prescription drug programme; the Vice President’s energy task force and his communication with Enron during the period when he was formulating the president’s energy policy; and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s review of accounting practices in certain companies. In the first two years of the first Bush administration, executive records were classified some 44.5 million times – the same total as in the entire second Clinton administration. Bush even went so far – under EO 13292 issued in March 2003 – to make the task of reclassifying previously declassified



documents easier. Although the president has the right to defend his executive prerogatives and executive privilege as an important legal principle, refusal to disclose information is a form of unilateral power that constrains accountability to the public and the Congress.

ACQUIESCENT CONGRESS

Following Madison’s dictum, the framers of the Constitution anticipated that the governing institutions would compete with one another for

‘Congress has bowed to administration pressures for new anti-terrorist powers’

influence and jealously guard their constitutional roles and prerogatives. As the previous discussion has shown, the Congress and the president have shared in the process of making major laws since 11 September – notably, for example, the Congress forced the White House to abandon its idea of a Homeland Security Council for an Office of Homeland Security accountable to the Congress. However, the Congress has generally been unwilling or unable to challenge the administration’s aggressive assertion of unilateral powers and insist on its prerogatives, especially in respect of anti-terrorism and national security policy. Instead, as the following examples indicate, congressional leaders have eschewed the highly conflictual pattern of oversight during the Clinton presidency and reverted almost to a pre-New Deal passive model of congressional oversight that assumes that the separation of powers should be interpreted to mean that the executive alone should execute, manage and administer policy, while Congress’s role should be confined to monitoring and supervising executive action after the fact.

When, after 11 September, President Bush insisted that he could go to war without congressional approval, the legislature waived its constitutional prerogative to declare

war and deferred to the president’s request for a broad, loosely worded, congressional resolution under the War Powers Act. This allowed him to define unilaterally the future contours of national security and antiterrorism policy and to take military action against any targets involved in the 11 September attacks. The Congress similarly deferred to the president during the build up to the war in Iraq.

The Congress has been no more insistent on overseeing and scrutinising the administration of anti-terrorist legislation, where the executive’s claims to unilateral authority are much more dubious. The lengthy, complex, and highly controversial USA PATRIOT Act was rushed through the House and Senate in just five weeks. Certainly, a few attempts by the Congress to restrict the scope of the PATRIOT Act and other anti-terrorism measures have been successful: in 2002, for example, a bipartisan coalition in the House killed provisions in the Homeland Security Department legislation authorizing Operation TIPS (the Terrorism Information and Prevention System, a programme to organise a volunteer army of lookouts to report ‘suspicious’ activities to the federal government) and a national ID card. Yet the Congress has also bowed to administration pressures for new anti-terrorist powers. In early 2003, after the Justice Department was forced by an untimely leak to abandon a proposed PATRIOT II bill and then threatened to introduce legislation to make the original act permanent, congressional leaders agreed to break the PATRIOT II package into several bills; in mid-2003 won House and Senate approval for a significant expansion of the act in the 2004 Intelligence Authorization bill. This legislation was not approved in the 108th Congress (2003–04) but congressional leaders have vowed to place it on the congressional agenda in early 2005.

EXPLAINING CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCENCE

The most obvious factor limiting congressional willingness and capacity to challenge the president’s use of unilateral power is that most members – as well as much of the American

public – agree with most of President Bush’s actions. Not only has there been almost unanimous public and congressional support for military intervention against terrorist training camps and other facilities, but public attitudes to the administration’s detention and other antiterrorist policies have provided the Congress with few incentives to assert their prerogatives – successive opinion polls have shown that most Americans think that the administration has struck an appropriate balance between ensuring security and preserving civil liberties. In addition, a majority of the public has been untroubled by the administration’s aggressive actions against certain immigrants, its use of military



tribunals for non-citizens accused of terrorism (with the possibility of death penalties and the denial of rights of appeal), wiretapping of telephones, interception of internet activity, tracking credit card purchases, examining tax records, and so forth.

A second important reason is that under the Constitution the Congress is not supposed to run foreign and national security policy. Nor do members have the motivation (given the limited electoral rewards for doing so, especially in wartime) or the capacity (given the limitations on their resources) to do so.

A third factor is the impact of the return of single party government in 2001 and again in 2003. Majority Republican congressional leaders and rank and file members made the calculation that their electoral prospects were tied to George W. Bush; any predisposition to oppose aspects of his policies on Afghanistan, Iraq, and the ‘war’ on terrorism were thus suppressed by the shared aim of winning re-election for the party in 2004. Given the 2004 election results, this was clearly an accurate calculation. (Having said this, Senate Democrats – who formed the majority between June 2001 and January 2003 – can hardly be absolved of any responsibility.)

Republican majority leaders have

also used their agenda-setting powers to keep certain proposals opposed by the administration off the congressional agenda – for example, the treatment of the Guantánamo detainees – and neither the Republican rank and file nor the Democratic minority have seriously challenged these decisions.

Finally, Congress is not only relatively unwilling to challenge the president’s unilateral actions; it has a limited capacity to do so. As a collective and fragmented institution, Congress finds it difficult to coordinate and formulate a timely and coherent

‘Congress’s acquiescence represents a permanent shift in power within the constitutional system’

response to the president, especially when the concern is foreign and national security policy.

POWER SHIFT

The American Constitution and the separated system that it sanctioned are predicated on institutional competition among the different

branches of government. In the wake of September 11, institutional power has clearly shifted to the president and the executive. Although the Congress shared in law-making after the terrorist attacks, it willingly ceded power to the president in the vital areas of war making and national and domestic security. For its part, the president and the executive have aggressively asserted and extended their unilateral or plenary powers, especially in the areas of national and domestic security; and the Congress has generally been unwilling or unable to insist on its prerogatives. As such, the Congress’s acquiescence not only represents a significant change from the highly conflictual pattern of


congressional oversight during the Vietnam era and most recently during the Clinton presidency but, more significantly, a permanent shift in power within the constitutional system that is legitimated by the president’s ‘war’ on terrorism metaphor.

As such, these developments clearly carry important implications for the Constitution’s intended balance of power. While the Congress has largely acquiesced to the post-11 September growth in executive power, in certain significant cases the Supreme Court – perhaps surprisingly – has moved to check it, most notably in declaring unconstitutional the legal no man’s land for ‘unlawful combatants’ created by the Pentagon at Guantánamo Bay. The Court has also ruled that the administration must charge two US citizens incarcerated as alleged terrorists for indefinite periods in military camps in the US, and denied access to their families and defence lawyers, or release them.

John E. Owens is professor of US government and politics at CSD. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Conference of the European Association for American Studies on America, Charles University, Prague, in April 2004.

CSD Interview

Jim Skea, recently appointed research director at the UK Energy Research Centre, talks to Simon Joss about developments in environmental research and energy policy



Mark Harrison

How did you become interested in environmental research and policy?

My first degree, at the University of Edinburgh, was in physics. When I graduated – a couple of years after the energy crisis – energy was fashionable. I joined a new, interdisciplinary, energy research group in the Cavendish labs at Cambridge. Though this was in the physics department lots of economists and other people were in the group, too. My PhD focused on reducing industrial energy use; this

involved going to factories and seeing what people did; it had economic aspects as well – as well as engineering and physics. I spent six years with the Cambridge Energy Research Group.

I got into the environmental area when, subsequently, I joined a group looking at energy and environmental interactions in the department of engineering and public policy at Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh; here I worked on contracts for the Environmental Protection Agency

related to designing emissions trading schemes – about 20 years before they actually came into effect. However, this was during the Reagan administration so there was little enthusiasm for implementing these kinds of environmental measures.

In the mid-1980s – back in Britain – I became involved with energy again. (Amongst other things, I built part of the Department of Trade and Industry's energy model.) I joined the energy group at the Science Policy Research Unit [SPRU] at Sussex University.

Environmental issues were coming up the agenda in the late 1980s in the UK – initially driven by the European Union's increasing involvement in environmental policy. In about 1990 I established an environment group at SPRU; this looked at a wide range of issues and picked up on work I'd been doing in the US.

In my last four years at SPRU I was semi-detached because I was director of the the ESRC [Economic and Social Research Council]'s global environmental change programme. This was a fairly large investment – reputed to be about £20 million over ten years – and covered a vast range of projects and disciplines. The intention was to engage a wider cross-section of people from the social sciences in environmental issues.

Was it a success?

It's difficult to evaluate a ten-year programme. The ESRC's objectives changed – as did those of research policy in Britain – during the course of the programme. When it kicked off in 1991 under the directorship of Michael Redclift it had an academic, social science character. But the 1993 Science and Technology White Paper, *Realising our Potential*, emphasised the applicability of knowledge being generated by research. The programme was expected to change direction. At that point I became director.

Was there much interaction between

the research councils at that point?

Around 1990 research councils competed much more with each other over funding. The Natural Environment Research Council might have considered global environmental change to be its area. But there has been pressure on the research councils through the 1990s to develop interdisciplinary approaches. In the global environmental change programme we organised quite a few 'cross-council' workshops which were intended to encourage environmental scientists, on the one hand, and social scientists, on the other, to engage with each other.

You became director of the Policy Studies Institute in 1998. How did you create an environment group?

The global environmental change programme was a vast, amorphous network. PSI was an interesting challenge: it was an organisation, and one which had had some difficulties; a hands-on, directorial, approach was needed. When I arrived there were essentially two functioning groups: social policy and employment. It was strongly felt that PSI had to have a wider range of activities if it was to restore its reputation. With my background in the environmental field, but with a social science perspective, my aim was to build up that area.

For 2–3 years the environment group at PSI was me. It was quite a struggle to maintain my capital in the environmental field while trying to run PSI. The key point was attracting Paul Ekins to take on the leadership of the group. He's been enormously energetic: we've now got 8 or 9 researchers that make up what is recognised as one of the top environmental social science groups in the UK.

You've just started as research director of the UK Energy Research Centre, a national research programme launched in 2004 by the

UK government. What are the programme's aims and research priorities?

The centre is part of a larger programme called 'Toward a Sustainable Energy Economy', which is worth about £28 million. There's a further £25 million going into the Supergen programme, which is essentially about energy supply and power. Altogether that's about £13 million a year of new money going into energy research. The energy centre is part of that overall effort.

In the 1990s, there were two priorities for energy policy: climate change, and the liberalisation of energy markets. The latter resulted in a dramatic decline in energy research funding in the UK. Research became more fragmented: the tide went out and left a few disconnected pools. Now it's recognised that there are strategic energy imperatives that include security of supply as well as the environment; and funding is going up. Though the centre has a modest research programme, its headline objective is to coordinate that wider programme of activity and to make sure that it's coherent.

How will it do this?

People don't know what research is being conducted. There might be a

'In the 1990s, there were two priorities for energy policy: climate change, and the liberalisation of energy markets'

department, say at Sheffield University, doing energy research that nobody's heard about. The centre's website will include the definitive map of energy research in the UK. We'll also be operating a thematically organised national energy research network: co-directors responsible for energy demand, renewable sources of



energy, and so on, will organise events to draw together the research community in the UK.

Have the centre's aims been defined from the 'bottom up', after listening, say, to energy researchers in universities and institutes; or 'top-down', for example by government?

The starting point was Sir David King, the Chief Scientific Advisor's, 2002 energy research review group, which fed into the PIU [Performance and Innovation Unit]'s report on energy strategy for the UK. The review group diagnosed a decline in research funding and a fragmentation in research, and recommended the establishment of a centre that would network and coordinate, and have a research programme. It also identified areas in which to invest more money. The Supergen initiative and the 'Towards a Sustainable Energy Economy' programme picked up on these recommendations with things like biomass, the hydrogen economy, carbon capture and storage, and energy efficiency.

Is basic research needed at this stage; or should we be putting in place policies that achieve sustainable energy consumption and delivery?

Both. Last year's Energy White Paper set a long-term goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 60 per cent by 2050. To achieve such an ambitious reduction you need substantive technological change,



which does require a lot of underpinning basic science for example, in the area of developing new materials. On the other hand, you don't get to 2050 all at once. There are intermediate targets: 2010, 2020. Here the challenge is to develop policies with which to deploy existing technologies, or to get technologies that are close to the market over the hurdle. The centre covers both these objectives.

How will the research centre contribute to the important debate on the future of energy production, and particularly the choice between different energy sources – coal, gas, nuclear, and renewable?

I want the centre to emphasise evidence-based policy. It will not be our aim to say, for example, we must – or must not – 'go nuclear'. We will evaluate options and present costs and benefits. Given the ambitious objectives of UK energy policy we can't start throwing away options. One of our functions will be to conduct technology and policy assessment. This entails sifting through and synthesising existing research to establish what evidence it provides for policy-makers to make choices.

Energy production and delivery are not just issues for scientists, engineers and technocrats; they also have important political and social dimensions. How are you going to address these in your research?

Fifty years ago energy policy was very technocratic: scientists started at the top, and there was almost a central planning system that determined energy policy. The big change has been the marketisation of the energy field: companies now

'The PSI now has 8 or 9 researchers that make up what is recognised as one of the top environmental social science groups in the UK'

make choices based on prices and market conditions, while government can frame that market with regulations, taxes, and other incentives. So economists, and perhaps political scientists too, need to understand better how markets and technological choices operate. For example, one of the centre's 'themes' is 'infrastructure and

supply'. To get more renewable energy into Britain the electricity network needs to be changed, especially if you've got smaller, more distributed sources. We're trying to do this through the market; so it's essential that you get engineers, economists and political scientists working together to understand not only the technology but how you incentivise it: how you reward the people who make the investments, and so on.

There is also the issue of the social and political acceptability of technologies – not just, say, of nuclear power, but also of wind power. The centre will help, for example, engineers and social scientists to work together to look at these acceptability issues.

Will you also address the wider public?

Yes. The communications strategy for the centre will be conscious of the different audiences we need to reach: elite audiences and specialists – policy-makers in government and elsewhere, for example – but also the broader public.

There is considerable controversy, even among experts, about the link between man-made greenhouse gases – particularly carbon emissions – and global climate change. What is this controversy about?

There is much less controversy than your question suggests. Ninety to 95 per cent of the scientific community are convinced that climate change is real. The other 5 or 10 percent are, however, of considerable interest to the media – who want to construct a debate around the issue – and to the

economic interests that might be affected by measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. I've been asked to chair debates between climate scientists and climate sceptics and I've found that, with a little digging, one can establish that they agree on about 90–95 per cent of the science. What they're debating are the nuances. There is also a controversy about the cost of actually implementing measures. Different tribes of economists come up with different answers depending on the analytical framework they use.

But governments still have different policies in this area, with regard, among other things, to international treaties and cooperation. The US government has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, for example. Do you think this is a problem?

I don't think the US can ratify the Kyoto Protocol. It's simply too late now, because the compliance date is 2012; emissions have risen too much. No US President or the Senate will ratify the Kyoto Protocol as it stands. The more interesting issue is, what kinds of policies will be put in place after Kyoto? Although the US downplays climate change, an awful lot is happening at lower levels in the administration, and in individual US states. Some states, for example – and some Canadian provinces – are interested in joining the EU emissions trading scheme – even though the US at the federal level is not.

Do we need new national and international political institutions and mechanisms to tackle the complex policy area of the future of energy production and delivery?

It's fashionable to say that we need new tools and organisations. The PIU's energy review proposed a government department with responsibility for energy, environment, and transport. I don't share this view. I came into the

energy field in the 1970s when there was a central planning flavour to the energy system; large, homogeneous bodies ripe for political capture by various energy interests. I prefer a system in which a looser network of organisations looks after the energy area.

What are the future themes and challenges for environmental research?

I think the big challenge for the future is interdisciplinarity: how are we to marshal different academic disciplines and communities to work together to pursue common agendas? Some questions cannot be answered unless you draw on the skills of multiple disciplines.

'Although the US downplays climate change, an awful lot is happening at lower levels in the administration, and in individual US states'

Can UK universities and other institutions already do this at undergraduate and postgraduate levels? Or do we need to create new degrees or diplomas? Should we be educating young academics to become multi-tasking experts, or putting together teams consisting of people from different disciplines?

You don't want too much interdisciplinarity at the undergraduate level. A thorough grounding in basic disciplines is the starting point. Otherwise interdisciplinarity all too often turns into non-disciplinarity – people without deep enough roots in one discipline. At the postgraduate level one can help individuals to think in more than one discipline. It's not that difficult for people with natural science background to turn themselves into certain kinds of

economists. I have seen other successful conversions.

Will you foster this approach in the energy research centre?

We have a programme of interdisciplinary energy research studentships; one of its requirements is that the student conducts a project that pulls together different perspectives. But the project must be hosted by an institution that can provide the right kind of supervisory support.

The perception that funding opportunities are increasing is encouraging some larger universities to bring together energy research activities. Cambridge and Oxford have so far *not* been good about doing this – though some people there may disagree with me. However, they and other institutions, for example Imperial College and Birmingham, are now starting to put together cross-interdisciplinary initiatives.

Finally, what would you like to focus on in your research in the next 10–20 years?

I don't think I've got 20 years left! And I'm not sure how much time I'll have to do research. The energy area is terribly tribal: people have absolute belief in the technologies they're working on. This is an area where what passes for scientific judgement is often the judgement of people who happen to be scientists; they act as very sophisticated advocates for particular technologies. But evidence-based policy has almost passed this field by. So my big theme is to promote an evidence-based approach to energy policy.

Professor Jim Skea, OBE, was director of the Policy Studies Institute until September 2004. He is now research director at the UK Energy Research Centre. He was interviewed by Simon Joss in November 2004.

International Therapeutic Governance

Increasingly, Anglo-American emotional norms are being projected onto international issues, argues Vanessa Pupavac

Western societies today conceptualise issues above all in psychological terms. Public institutions today find a new source of legitimacy in appeals to the emotive self. Equally, emotional well-being is regarded as underpinning responsible citizenship. Hence emotions are no longer simply a personal matter but are associated with good governance – and are therefore of official concern. Now, Anglo-American societal emotional norms – *emotionology* – are being projected onto international issues, including security strategies.

War trauma became a hot topic in international policy-making in the 1990s. Trauma has displaced hunger as the main problem which international humanitarian responses are meant to solve. Indeed, international aid increasingly resembles forms of therapeutic intervention. This is evident not only in the proliferation of trauma counselling and other psychosocial programmes, now a standard component of international aid work. It is visible also in the World Bank's embrace of the therapeutic concept 'well-being' as the goal of

development, and in the promotion of war crimes tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions in terms of collective therapy. International agencies essentially understand social problems in terms of cycles of psychosocial dysfunctionality and promote emotional management strategies to deal with these problems.

The rise of therapeutic

'International agencies essentially understand social problems in terms of cycles of psychosocial dysfunctionality'

governance in international policy-making is bound up with Western insecurities and political disorientation after the end of the Cold War: the end of Cold War rivalry meant that wars could no longer be rationalised in an ideological framework. The 'new' wars of the 1990s became characterised as irrational conflicts whose source could be traced to how individuals functioned psychologically and

socially. The security paradigm of a primarily *state*-based system of international security has been replaced by one that encompasses *human* security. This human security involves therapeutic regimes maintained by informal NGO networks which modulate not only the behaviour and beliefs of populations but also their emotions. This new therapeutic security paradigm effectively seeks to create new subjectivities able to negotiate risk and uncertainty and manage anger. As such this paradigm may be said to represent a shift from ideology to emotionology.

The ideas that underpin these programmes originate in Anglo-American social psychology of the interwar period. The influence of this psychology is clearly evident in UNESCO, whose constitution states, 'Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.' Social psychology's understanding of war and social conflict as arising from particular mental states or cultural norms became marginalised in UN institutions during the Cold War. Instead, economic development strategies were emphasized in the context of an East-West rivalry for influence in the non-aligned world. Yet Western policy-makers continued to be preoccupied by the mental fitness of non-Western societies internationally (and of the masses domestically). Western officials and academics debated whether economic modernization was possible without a prior modernisation of the non-Western personality. Notably, the culture and personality school of anthropologists associated with Columbia University researched the 'Third World mind'.

Although the Cold War climate was not receptive to psychosocial programmes, a shift towards therapeutic approaches took place from the end of the 1960s. First, the international modernization paradigm was gradually displaced by a psychosocial or 'people-centred' paradigm, which emphasised the importance of psychosocial

conditioning as a cause of conflict and poverty. Influential international policy-makers such as E. Schumacher called for the moderation, rather than the perpetual raising, of material expectations, and for the fulfilment of basic needs to ward off potential frustration and aggression. A key theme of contemporary emotionology is the promotion of self-esteem to counter feelings of alienation, demoralization or the disruptive emotion of anger: the aim is to restrain the emotions – to temper frustration – not fire ambition. Policy-makers want to moderate aspirations and thereby discourage grievances from germinating.

The disciplining aspects of the international war trauma model are evident in its association of untreated trauma with dysfunctionality. International conflict management has a tendency to treat war as the continuation of psychology, as opposed to a Clausewitzian model of war as the continuation of politics. In essence, the international trauma model treats trauma as a *cause* of future wars. Distressing experiences are regarded as triggering traumatic symptoms; these cause dysfunctionality, which leads to new trauma and violence. War trauma is regarded as significant because it impairs not only the development and mental wellbeing of the individual, but also the future development and wellbeing of the society as a whole. Thus individual emotions have become a legitimate target of external intervention.

The therapeutic model is giving health professionals greater standing to comment on international security matters. The American Psychological Association, notably, is gearing itself up for greater involvement in world affairs. Crucially, politicians, diplomats and other international agenda setters have been ready to adopt a therapeutic model with which to understand, and articulate responses to, conflict and other global problems. The World Bank and the British Department of International Development have become interested in the link



between mental health and poverty. Media coverage of recent conflicts, too, is framed in therapeutic terms. Report after report on war-affected societies refers to 'traumatized nations' or 'traumatized societies'. Foreign correspondents often speak in the language of therapy: of cycles of trauma and violence, of states 'in denial', of victims attempting 'to come to terms with their traumatic

'The World Bank and the Department of International Development have become interested in the link between mental health and poverty'

experiences', and of 'the need for closure'. Jerrold Post, a psychologist who has worked as a researcher for the CIA, was prominent in the media with his attribution of Saddam Hussein's politics to the former Iraqi leader's low self-esteem.

The US social psychologist Kenneth Keniston's 1968 satirical article, 'How Community Mental Health Stamped Out the Riots', is prophetic in its anticipation of the ascendance of a therapeutic security paradigm. In this dystopian vision,

the Department of Defence has re-designated itself the Department of International Mental Health and wages wars in the name of global mental health. Here the insistence on guaranteed mental health 'from the womb to the grave' carries totalitarian overtones. His short satire is prescient in warning of the potential dangers for political rights and freedoms that therapeutic governance could pose. The contention over international therapeutic governance is thus not merely about the efficacy of outside interventions and their dismissal of a population's own coping strategies; it is also concerned with how the therapeutic security model pathologises the recipient population by locating the source of conflict in the personality of the population – thereby questioning the population's capacity for self-government.

The emotionology of the international therapeutic security paradigm requires further examination if its implications in relation to the unresolved conflicts of the 1990s and the new security dilemmas are to be grasped. International officials were caught unawares by the violent hostility which greeted them in Iraq – perhaps because they were cushioned by their cathartic experience of administering to the Balkans in the 1990s. The fraught security situation in Iraq has put on hold many international psychosocial programmes. Nevertheless, Western therapeutic precepts continue to inform international policy-making and Western thinking remains reluctant to concede that its emotionology might not be up to the task of addressing the human security needs and aspirations of populations globally.

Vanessa Pupavac is a lecturer in the School of Politics, Nottingham. This is an edited extract from a lecture given at CSD. For a longer article on these themes see 'War on the Couch: The Emotionology of the New Security Paradigm', European Journal of Social Theory 7(2), 2004, 149-170.

Messianic Multitudes

Chantal Mouffe takes issue with the anti-political character of Michael Hardt and Toni Negri's *Empire*

Empire (Harvard University Press, 2000) has been hailed as a *Communist Manifesto* for the twenty-first century. As various critiques have argued, however, the book's basic theses are deeply flawed. Indeed, the authors' central tenet – that imperialism is at an end and a new form of sovereignty without a centre has emerged – has been shattered by



the recent policies of the United States. Could Hardt and Negri still maintain, as they reasserted in 2001, that 'there is no centre of imperial power'?

Refuting the claims of the book should not, however, stop one acknowledging its impact. We live in a period in which it is thought there is no alternative to neo-liberal globalisation. It is not surprising, therefore, that the messianic rhetoric of *Empire* should have fired the imagination of those many people eager to find a new revolutionary subject in the 'multitude'. Its visionary character has offered hope at a time when capitalism's victory seems so complete that no alternative to it can be envisaged. The problem, however, is that, instead of helping to create an alternative to neo-liberal hegemony, *Empire* is likely to produce the opposite effect. What is needed today is an adequate understanding of the nature of the political; this is precisely what is missing from *Empire*.

Empire expresses a post-political vision that does not allow us to grasp the challenges facing contemporary democratic politics. It presents a radical version of the post-political perspective that constitutes the

common sense of our post-democracies. Indeed, despite their Deleuzian terminology and revolutionary rhetoric, Hardt and Negri's views are in many ways similar to those of the Third Way theorists and cosmopolitan liberals who assert the need to 'rethink politics'. For example, Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Daniele Archibugi, and David Held see globalization as a progressive phenomenon, the homogenizing consequences of which are creating the conditions for a more democratic world. They perceive the demise of nation-state sovereignty as a new stage in the process of emancipation from the state: a global polity is being established which will allow for a new form of global governance. Leaving aside the vacuous rhetoric of 'the multitude', one can see *Empire* as a radical version of the liberal cosmopolitan view. Hardt and Negri's insistence on the 'smooth' character of empire and the creation by global capital of a unified world without any

'The Third Way theorists and the authors of *Empire* also converge in their attitude towards sovereignty'

'outside' fits remarkably well with the cosmopolitan vision. Similarly, their underestimation of the crucial role of the United States in the imposition of a neo-liberal model of globalization chimes with the optimistic view held by the advocates of global civil society.

The Third Way theorists and the authors of *Empire* also converge in their attitude towards sovereignty: there is not much difference between those who celebrate the notion of a universal order organized around a 'cosmopolitan sovereignty', or which is 'beyond sovereignty', and Hardt and Negri's radical antisovereignty. In both cases there is a clear desire to do away with the modern concept of sovereignty in the name of a supposedly more democratic form of governance.

Beck and Giddens, on the one hand, and Hardt and Negri, on the

other, also envisage the diverse forms of social-democratic politics in strikingly similar ways. As Michel Rustin has observed (*Debating Empire*, 2004):

[Hardt and Negri] share with the post-socialists of the 'Third Way' the view that we now have to accept a new individualized, globalized, networked society as the only possible basis for future action, though the action they envisage is apocalyptic where the reformist post-socialists seek only to mitigate and regulate somewhat the turbulence of global capitalism, to which they envisage no conceivable alternative.

Hence Hardt and Negri's negative attitude towards struggles to defend national welfare states, and their dismissal of the importance of the European Union.

ANTI-POLITICAL

But the anti-political character of the book comes most clearly to the fore, and its influence can be most damaging, in the way it envisages an alternative to empire being brought about. For a book which presents itself as offering a new vision of radical politics, *Empire* is seriously lacking in a proper understanding of the political.

What form will the multitude's political challenge to empire take? The multitude, Hardt and Negri say, is a logical hypothesis which proceeds from their analysis of the economic, political and cultural structures of Empire. It is a counter-Empire contained within Empire; it will inevitably break the constraints the latter imposes in order to impede the seizure of sovereignty by the constituent power of the multitude. This break will be an act of radical discontinuity; an ontological metamorphosis that opens historicity anew: with it an absolute democracy of the multitude will come into being.

All Hardt and Negri can do is assert the messianic desire of the multitude. They avoid all the crucial questions for political analysis. How,

for example, will the multitude become a revolutionary subject? We are told that this depends on the multitude facing empire politically; but this is precisely the question that, given their theoretical framework, Hardt and Negri are unable to address. Their claim that the desire of the multitude is bound to bring about the end of empire evokes the determinism of the Second International with its prediction that the economic contradictions of capitalism were bound to lead to its collapse. Of course, in Hardt and Negri's case, the 'multitude', not the proletariat, is the revolutionary subject. But, despite the new vocabulary, this is the same deterministic approach that leaves no space for effective political intervention.

This approach forecloses a fundamental political issue: what relationship to each other should contemporary radical struggles have? They make up a heterogeneous movement; and, while diversity can doubtless be a source of strength, it can also pose serious problems. Hardt and Negri take it for granted that the immanent powers of the multitude will defeat the constituted power of empire. They never pose the question of how different struggles can be politically articulated – because, in their view, the fact that all those struggles do not communicate is not a problem but a virtue: 'precisely because all these struggles are incommunicable and thus blocked from traveling horizontally in the form of a cycle, they are forced instead to leap vertically and touch immediately on the global level' (p. 55). As a consequence, each struggle – despite its local origin – directly attacks the virtual centre of empire. That is why Hardt and Negri exhort us to relinquish the model of horizontally



articulated struggles: it is no longer adequate, they argue, and blinds us to the new radical potential. There is no need to worry any more about how to articulate a diversity of struggles with different interests and possibly conflicting demands. With this they simply brush aside the central question for radical democratic politics: how to organize across differences in order to create a 'chain of equivalence' among democratic struggles.

'Hardt and Negri's claim that the desire of the multitude is bound to bring about the end of empire evokes the determinism of the Second International'

Another serious problem with *Empire* is the negative way in which the book perceives local, national and regional struggles. This chimes with its vilification of sovereignty and its celebration of globalization as creating a 'smooth' space in which national sovereignties and obstacles to the multitude's free movement are swept away. Hardt and Negri reject any form



of national or regional politics: the process of 'deterritorialization' and the concomitant weakening of nation-states characteristic of empire, they argue, are a step forward in the liberation of the multitude. Any valorisation of the local is regressive and fascistic; the 'multitude's resistance to bondage - the struggles against the slavery of belonging to a nation, an identity, and a people - and thus the desertion from sovereignty and the limits it places on subjectivity is entirely positive.' (p. 361).

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PLURIVERSE

However, despite *Empire's* claims, nation-states are still important players. And even if it is true that multinational companies operate for the most part independently of states, they cannot dispense with those states' power. Globalized space is not 'smooth' but 'striated'; and it contains a diversity of sites where relations of power are articulated in specific local, regional and national configurations. This multiplicity of nodal points calls for a variety of strategies; struggle cannot simply be envisaged as taking place at the global level. Resistance takes place in many spaces; it is important to establish connections amongst spaces. It is also necessary to acknowledge that local and national allegiances can provide important sites of resistance; dismissing these allegiances as reactionary, and refusing to mobilize their affective dimension towards democratic objectives, means that they might be exploited by right-wing populist movements. Contrary to the fallacious picture of a global multitude facing a unified empire – a confrontation which will inevitably result in the victory of the multitude – the question of the political form organised resistance should take needs to be addressed; this requires acknowledging that divisions exist on both sides.

Like the liberal cosmopolitan viewpoint, Hardt and Negri's vision of a 'smooth', globalised space fails to appreciate the pluralistic nature of the world: that the world is not a 'universe' but a 'pluriverse'. Their idea of an 'absolute democracy', a state of radical immanence beyond sovereignty, where a new form of self-organization – the multitude – would replace a power-structured order is the postmodern form of longing for a reconciled world; I have criticised this approach, as expressed by liberal theorists like Jürgen Habermas, in my earlier work. This longing – whether liberal or ultraleft – prevents us from grasping the real challenge facing democratic politics at the domestic and the international level: how to establish a truly pluralistic democratic order.

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